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This study is an attempt to elucidate on the complex 
phenomenon of intervention in two African countries, i.e., 
Republic of Zaire and the People's Republic of Angola. Any 
study that examines the interventionist thrust of one polity 
on another, (if it lays claim to an exhaustive treatment of 
the subject matter) must recognize the multi-layered facets 
of intervention, for example, from politics, social institu-
tions, religion to culture. Mindful of the variegated nature 
of this phenomenon, this study has only focused on politico-
military intervention. 
An attempt is made to provide the historical back-
ground of Western assault on Africa generally before shifting 
our emphasis on Angola and Zaire. Zaire and Angola, in our 
view, are only case studies of what is a continent-wide pheno-
menon. 
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The study looks at the role and place of Africa in 
the world as the continent emerged into a mere juridical 
independence during the cold war that replaced the devasta-
tion of the second intra-European War of 1939-45. It suggests 
that with the institutionalized constraints occasioned by 
this juridical independence armed intervention remains the 
most potent force used to consign Africa to subordinate status 
in the world system. 
After examining the phenomenon of politico-military 
intervention in Zaire and Angola, the dissertation examines 
what we see as a record of bankrupt political leadership 
offered by the African political class, existing as it does 
as local managers of the neo-colonial State, and therefore 
part of the infrastructure of external intervention in Africa. 
The study suggests that only a democratic, continen-
tal socio-economic and political reality which will put an 
end to the African fragmented polities and thus end its 
structural weakness can effectively resist the interventionist 
propensity of extra-African powers. 
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Statement of the Problem 
The nature of Africa's interaction with the world 
system is conflict prone. That is, Africa articulates with 
the world system within a set of interlocking but conf1ictua1 
interactions which give rise to systemic schisms and 
crises. However, there is a historical basis for the 
schism; the unequal nature of this interaction, beginning 
from its very inception in mid-fifteenth century, has 
determined the contemporary continuum. In the contemoorary 
epoch, with the demise of classic colonial occupation, 
interventionism has been the principal instrument of 
systemic regulation and maintenance. From the enslavement 
of her people to provide free labor for Euro-American 
capital accumulation, during the era of primitive accumu1a-
tion,l to the forcible incorporation of the whole continent 
into Euro-American mercantilist empire,2 European influence 
has been, indeed since mid-1400s and proqressing therefrom, 
pervasive and decis~ve on the African continent. 
1Eric Williams, Capitalism and Slavery (New York: 
Putnam, 1980). 
2wa1ter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa 




There are, in fact, those like Leopold Sedar Senghor 
of Senegal who subscribe to the concept of Eurafrica. 
Eurafrica as a concept posits a mutuality and convergence 
of interests between Europe and Africa and thus a natural 
link at the political, economic, and socio-cultural levels. 
Western Europe needs Africanraw materials and strategic 
minerals for its continued economic growth and development. 3 
Thus, the notion of Eurafrica represents a sophisticated 
rationalization of Europe's political domination and 
economic exploitation of Africa. Senegal represents one of 
the more acute cases of settler intervention and domination; 
after twenty-three years of juridical independence, French 
influence permeates virtually all aspects of life in Senegal, 
from the hotel owner to extensive military presence. 
The phenomenon of interventionism has been a recurrent 
feature of the contemporary neo-colonial epoch of the 
African articulation with the world system. This era is 
characterized by indirect economic and political domination 
of Africa through a series of neo-colonial contractual and 
institutionalized multi-lateral arrangements, namely -
Yaounde I(1964-1969) , Yaounde II (1969-1975), Lome I 
(1975-1980), Lome II (1980-1985), and a plethora of milito-
strategic, defense, cultural, and educational agreements. 
301asupo Adedokun, "Franco-African Relations and the 
Use of Intervention as an Instrument of Foreign Policy 
Objectives: A Critical Study of Victims of French Foreign 
Policy Objectives" (Ph.D. dissertation, Atlanta University, 
1982) • 
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Many African countries achieved juridical independence 
between 1960-64, but the economic levers of the continent 
remained and still are wi.th Euro-American economic and 
financial institutions. The various contractual institu-
tionalized arrangements referred to earlier only help to 
deepen the unequal division of labor where Africa remains 
the suoplierof commodities and strategic minerals for 
continued Euro-American industrial development. The most 
widely advertised aspect of Lome I convention for example -
STABEX, (commodity price stabilization scheme) only served 
to ensure the stabilization of the price of African commodi-
ties for European industries. Yet, the West African 
regional group - ECOWAS is trying to develop means of 
industrializing the sUb-region using the same commodities 
now directed to 'the ~uropean economy.4 
The subject of our study comes under the general rubric 
of interventionism and counterrevolution in Africa. Specifi-
cally, we seek to examine critically, and analyze politico-
military intervention by extra-African powers to determine 
the outcome of internal conflict in Angola and Zai:re. 
The Congo (Zaire) crisis of the 1960s effectively 
brought cold war politics to Africa and exposed the inade-
quacy of the juridical independence many African countries 
4Ademola Adebo, "The Political Economy of the Lome 
Convention' and the Relations Between European Economic 
Community, Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific States: 
A Study in the Political Economy of North-South Relations" 
(Ph.D dissertation, Atlanta University, 1982). 
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so loudly proclaimed at the time. In both Zaire and Angola, 
extra-African powers were to play a decisive po1itico-
military role and exert strategic influence in the outcome 
of their struggle for independence. 
In spite of the fact that the crisis of interventionism 
by extra-African powers presents an ever present danger in 
contemporary Africa, much of the published literature has 
dealt with the phenomenon in a fragmented fashion. There 
have been very few systematic studies on the subject. The 
published literature on Zaire has been more varied and can 
be classified into three: the polemical, the sophisticated 
apologies for western intervention, and lately, the critica1/ 
analytical. The works 5 of Gran, Weissman, Jackson, Ca11aghy, 
and Young and Turner can be regarded as serious and worthy 
improvements on some earlier works. 
Works on Angola have been fewer, but this paucity has 
been somewhat compensated by a certain rigor of analysis. 
The works 6 of Marcum, Bender, and Nzongo1a fall into this 
category. 
5Guy Gran, (ed) , Zaire: The Political Economy of 
Underdevelopment (New York: Praeger, 1979); Stephen Weissman, 
American Foreign Policy in the Congo, 1960-64 (Ithaca, 
New York: Cornell University Press, 1974); Henry Jackson, 
From the Congo to Soweto: U.S. Foreign Po1ic Toward Africa 
S~nce 60 (New York: W~ll~am Morrow, 1982); Thomas Ca11aghy, 
The State-Society Struggle: Zaire in Comparative Politics 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1984); Crawford Young 
and T. Turner, The Rise and Decline of the Zairois State 
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985). 
6John Marcum, The Angolan Revolution, Volume I: The 
Anatomy of an Explosion (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1969); 
John Mar.cum, The Angolan Revolution, Volume II: 1962-76 
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The proposed study, therefore, fits into ongoing 
research concerning interventionism in Africa. Our choice 
of Angola and Zaire is neither haphazard nor arbitrary. The 
crisis of intervention in both countries occurred at 
different periods in contemporary African political history. 
More importantly, the interventions marked historic water-
sheds in ongoing African struggle against external domina-
tion in contemporary times. Zaire with its abundance of 
critical mineral resources, strategic geopolitical location 
in the heart of Africa and sharing borders with no less than 
nine African states, has attracted the interests of extra-
African powers since its independence in 1960. Interven-
tionism can be rationalized on economic, political, 
strategic, and ideological grounds. If we analyze the 
economic factor for interventionism in Zaire, we can hardly 
be guilty of narrow reductionism or a one-factor analysis of 
the complex nature or imperatives of interventionism as a 
foreign policy tool. In the case of Zaire, the economic 
imperative does provide unassailable evidence of the 
propensity for intervention by extra-African powers. Zaire 
is one of those countries in Africa that possess many of 
the strategic minerals Western countries can only obtain in 
some selected countries. Zaire today produces 60 percent 
••• (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1978); Gerald Bender, 
Angola Under the Portuguese: The Myth and the Reality 
(Berkeley, California: university of California Press, 
1978); Nzongola Ntalaja, Class Struggle and National 





of the cobalt needs of the Western industrial economies and 
39 percent of its industrial diamonds. Zaire is the world's 
leading producer of cobalt. Thus, protracted interventionism 
in Zaire is a function of Euro-Arnerican attempts to maintain 
an ideological, strategic, political, and economic strangle-
hold on Zaire in order to facilitate unimpeded access to 
Zaire's formidable mineral resources. In contemporary times, 
Euro-American intervention has been through proxies, via 
such client states as Morocco, Egypt, Sudan, and Senegal as 
manifested by the use of these countries' troops to prop up 
the regime of Mobutu in the Shaba I and II episodes of 1977 
and 1978. 
Zaire's crisis of 1960-64, occurred in a background of 
heightened cold war tension between the major powers. The 
reality of strategic superiority vis-a-vis their ideological 
adversary, combined with the hegemonic leverage of colonial-
ism which was a reality in the subregion contributed in no 
small way in determining a favorable outcome for Western 
intervention in Zaire in this period. The critical point 
of convergence though, is that the outcome of intervention 
in both countries revealed the scope and nature of the 
structural and strategic weakness of Africa in combating 
overt military intervention by extra-African powers. 
Angola is bo~nded in the North by Zaire and this 
geographical contiguity of territory was a strategic factor 
in interventionism in Angola. More importantly, Angola's 
case offers three interlocking theses: (1) the Angolan war 
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brought to a head the crisis of radical/nationalism counter-
posed to neo-colonialism in the Organization of African 
Unity~ (2) it marked a critical watershed in African 
perceptions or misperceptions regarding Western interest in 
Africa~ and (3) in the final analysis, the outcome of 
interventionism in Angola contrasts sharply with and is in 
contradistinction to same in Zaire. In this case, Western 
powers were effectively denied the benefit of a supplicant 
neo-colonial regime, and thus Angola opened up the real 
possibility of sustained struggle in Namibia from a 
liberated zone - Angola. 
The fifteen year period that separates the two case 
studies allows us to study over time what factors facilitate 
a different outcome in Angola - changing political and 
strategic conditions, especially with reference to the 
international system at large. Objectively, therefore, 
Angola and Zaire provide us with adequate data for a 
thorough analysis of extra-African intervention. 
Method of Research 
The dominant paradigm in comparative politics, the 
subfield in which African studies is located in the 
Euro-American world, is the positivist school. Its mode 
of research and inquiry is the quantitative method. Its 
claim to respectable methodology is limited to its pre-
occupation with order, system maintenance and adaptability, 
plus an unconcealed fetishism for empiricism. Its 
-8-
pragmatism conceals an ideological conservatism in that it 
fails to raise fundamental questions about the nature of 
the socio-economic reality and proceeds on the basis of what 
is empirically quantifiable. Its central concern is "with 
the day-to-day affairs of particular and diverse fractional 
interests and the empirical--focused on the visible, 
computational variables.,,7 Besides, this method of research 
conceptualizes the social phenomenon-(- a. dynamic social 
realit¥) in terms of "things," rather than "processes" and 
the social forces that impel and propel these processes. 
Itt tries to sum up everything in a formula, which says that 
the whole world, or any part of the world which is under 
consideration, consists of just such and such things with 
such and such properties. 1I8 As a consequence, empiricism 
and functionalism are epistemological obstacles to knowledge 
because they embrace a metaphysical way of thinking by 
seeking to comprehend and grasp the dynamics of social 
reality, apart and removed from their conditions of 
existence--in abstraction, separate from one another, ignor-
ing their interconnections, and conceiving of them as "fixed 
and frozen.,,9 The metaphysical abstraction inherent in 
7J.M. Barbalet, "Political Science, the State and Marx," 
quoted in Nzongola Ntalaja, Class Struggle and National 
Liberation in Africa (Roxbury: Omenana, 1982), p. 15. 
8Maurice Cornforth, Materialism and the Dialectical 
Method (New York: International Publishers, 1978), p. 59. 
9Ibid ., p. 58. 
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structural-functionalism is not without a raison d'etrei it 
"is related to the ideological commitment of Western social 
science to the justification and preservation of the exist-
ing social order'~ 1 0 Thus, for example, seeking to measure 
the "degree" of dependency in the political-economic frame-
work in Africa, McGowan and Smith11 examined health, 
education, and social amenities provisions. By beginning 
with this specific factor analysis (which is a function of 
their methodology), they thought they could measure the 
reason for backwardness. Economic growth is thus confused 
with economic development, reduced to a technical matter, 
because development is conceived as an economic phenomenon, 
removed from its politics. 12 It is for these severe 1imita-
tions adumbrated here, that we reject the methodology of 
structural-functionalism for this study. In summation, 
this methodology is inadequate for the study of crisis, 
conflict and radical change, because its basic concern is 
stability. It constitutes an impediment to knowledge of 
the real as a synthesis of multiple determinations, 
propagates mystification and metaphysical mode of thinking 
10Claude Ake, A Political Economy of Africa (Essex: 
Longman, 1981), p. 3. 
11patrick J. McGowan and Dale L. Smith, "Economic 
Dependency in Black Africa: An Analysis of Competing 
Theories," International Organization 32 (Winter 1978). 
12Basi1 Davidson, Can Africa Survive?: Arguments 
Against Growth Without Development (Boston: Atlantic 
Monthly Press, 1974). 
- -_._----------------------------------, 
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which for our purpose in the study will only inhibit us in 
finding out and arialyzing the phenomenon of intervention. 
The method of research in this study is historical 
materialism, that is the investigation will be based on 
interpretation of historical data. Therefore, one makes 
no a priori judgement, but looks at social reality abstractly 
and heuristically. This method frees the researcher from 
the metaphysical outlook of structural-functionalism, 
because it encourages the perception of social phenomena 
as elements of a continuum. That is, things do not just 
happen to be there, "fully formed and with set characteris-
tics--as something with a natural history.,,13 
Historical materialism encourages dialectical thinking 
and it is about the systematic and heuristic interpretation 
of history in the study of social reality. It encourages 
the understanding of the social phenomenon in its concrete form 
rather than its abstract form. It conceives of phenomena 
not in terms of "things" but "processes" not fragmented, 
autonomous, and unrelated, but coherent, cumulative, and 
comprehensive. It rightly gives recognition and premium to 
material conditions because by "creating and recreating his 
economic and other material conditions, man also creates his 
culture, history, and civilization.,,14 The method of 
l3Ake , A Political Economy of Africa, p. 6. 
l4 Ibid ., p. 9; see also Martin Carnopy, Education as 
Cultural Imperialism (New York: David McKay Company, 1974), 
chapters I and IIi Maurice Cornforth, Materialism and the 
Dialectic Method, p. 4. 
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historical materialism insists especially that we consider 
a phenomenon, not each by itself but always in terms of 
interconnections with other things, in their development 
and change, in their continuum but also dialectically in 
their reversal. The usefulness of this method for this 
study then can be summarized as follows: 
1. It allows us to grasp the fact that the 
phenomenon of intervention has a historical 
basis in the predatory hegemony of first 
Western-controlled slave trade, and 
secondly, colonialism. In other words, even 
though our study is located in the contempo-
rary epoch, it has to be properly studied in 
the background of history. 
2. We can better study in history, the dialectical 
relationship of African underdevelopment and 
European development and the role that inter-
vention,as a foreign policy, plays in this 
continuum. That is to say intervention does 
not just happen, it can be more meaningfully 
understood in the relational asymmetry that has 
,informed Euro-African encounter from its incep-
tion. Intervention thus can be appreciated as 
but a tool in the hands of those that profit 
from this unequal relationship to keep those 
subordinated to it in check, within the socio-
economic and political formation that has 
sustained it over time. 
3. Intervention is a multi-faceted phenomenon. 
It cannot be reduced to quantifiable inter-
pretation without doing serious damage to its 
multiple determination and motivation. Let us 
say we sum up the number of times France, for 
example, has committed or threatened to commit 
its armed forces for the defense of the regime 
of a junior ally in Africa; we might then say 
that since there has been no overt military 
intervention since 1983, French intervention 
(military) appears to have stabilized or even 
decreased. But quantifying them does not tell 
us what motivates or invites intervention, 
what particular class formation exists, and in 
whose hands the state apparatus is geared 
towards interventionism. We also fail to 
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analyze the objective relationship between the 
intervenor nation and the target nation. Thus 
by studying the phenomenon apart and removed 
fro~ its contextual, situational, and historical 
. wdlieu, we fail to place and understand it in 
its socio-economic context, and end up studying 
it only as an abstract phenomenon as opposed 
to the concrete. The study then becomes simply 
an attempt to celebrate the empirical method 
because this specific factor analysis which 
flows from the method only promotes mystifica-
tion as opposed to enlightenment. 
The Application of the Method 
in the Study 
What are the objective interests of the intervenors 
in Angola and Zaire? How and why do these interests conflict 
with objective African interests? Our method of analysis 
is to examine and bring into relief the contradiction 
between the objective interests of the intervenor and the 
target country, i.e. the dialectical process of the consoli-
dation of these interests by those who gain from them and 
the repulsion of their intervention by its victims. Our 
focus will be in the following specific areas. For Zaire, 
we will examine: 
1. The contradiction of Belgian colonialism and 
Zaire resistance. 
2. The post-colonial phase, the contradiction 
of sovereign independence and neo-colonialism, 
i.e. the specific ideological, economic 
and strategic interest of the West in a 
supposedly sovereign African state. 
3. The Zaire political class and the contra-
diction of their existence and collusion 
with neo-colonial interests. 
4. How the Zaire political class resolves this 
contradiction in favor of the intervenor. 
-13-
For Angola, we examine: 
1. The contradiction of stability in an African 
chiefdom and the Portuguese export of Angolans 
as human merchandise to provide free labor 
in Portuguese South American colonies during 
the era of primitive accumulation. 
2. The contradiction of African nationalist 
aspiration and Portuguese colonial expansion-
ism. 
3. In the post-colonial phase, we analyze, 
a. The strategic and political condition 
that facilitateda different outcome 
in the crisis of extra-African inter-
ventions in Angola. 
b. The contradiction of the strategic and 
ideological interest of the West and 
the establishment of a nascent non-
capitalist order in Angola. 
Theoretical Framework 
The philosophical imprimatur of modernization theory, 
i.e., the dominant theoretical analytic paradigm in which 
African studies is taught in Western social science, is 
rooted in empiricism. As a theory of social change, 
modernization theory has come under scathing and severe 
criticism for its static conception of society and its 
linear view of the history of human existence. Confronted 
with the rising waves of nationalist struggle against 
Western imperialism, after the war of ~939-45, Western 
social scientists came to the aid of their nations, in an 
attempt to deal theoretically with this phenomenon, by 
"stringing together a series of categories called stages of 
development and stating what form of social engineering 
-14-
"lS might be needed to realize a particular stage. Moderniza-
tion theory conceives of human history as developing in a 
linear progression, from an original stage of underdevelop-
ment to the epoch of mass consumption, abundance and 
prosperity. It arrives at this conclusion by examining the 
history of the United States of America, Britain, and some 
references to Japan and India. 16 The critique of moderniza-
tion theory can be divided into two: the general and the 
specific. 
Generally, the assumptions implicit in the theory have 
been assailed by many authors,17 on the ground that it is 
ethnocentric, astructural, and ahistorical. Modernization 
theory posits in a static sense, the existence of an 
original state of underdevelopme~t, which.will ceteris 
paribus lead to development; it rejects the historical 
process of the subjugation of the productive forces of the 
colonized world to the needs of the imperialist Western 
nations. 
15Claude Ake, Social Science as Imperialism (Ibadan: 
Ibadan University Press, 1979), p. 4. 
16This is amply demonstrated by W.W. Rostow, in 
Stages of Economic Growth (Cambridge: University Press, 
1960) • 
17Aidan Foster-Carter, "From Rostow to Gunder Frank: 
Conflicting Paradigms in the Analysis of Underdevelopment," 
World Development 3 (1976): 167-180; Paul Baran, The Politi-
cal Economy of Growth (New York: Monthly Review, 1977); 
Samir Amin, Imperialism and Unequal Development (New York: 
Monthly Review, 1977); James D. Cockroft, Dependence and 
Underdevelopment (New York: Doubleday, 1972). 
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Having committed this ahistorical error, it fails to 
see that underdevelopment of one, rather than being an 
original stage, is actually dialectically linked to the 
development of the other. 
Secondly, it reduces development to simply the absence 
of technical skills. The "greatest need" of the developing 
nations is for "private investment to aid the free sectors 
of their economies."18 It attributes the cause for under-
development to the absence of "appropriate" values and 
argues that the imbibing of these values would produce 
development. It isolates fragmented parts of the world with-
out examining the entire structure of the capitalist system 
or its role in creating, facilitating and perpetuating 
underdevelopment. 
Specifically, Ake has characterized modernization 
theory as a form of imperialism,19 disguised as scientific 
theory. He argues that the theoretical framework has as its 
. central concern "how to make the developing countries more 
like the West." It 'attempts to foist on developing 
countries capitalist values, capitalist institutions, and 
propagates mystification and modes of thought and action 
which serve the interests of capitalism and imperialism.,,20 
18Chester Bowles, "The Developing Nations' Greatest 
Need," quoted in Richard Barnet, Intervention and Revolution 
(New York: The World Publishing Company, 1968), p. 35. 
19Ake , Social Science as Imperialism, p. 4. 
20Ibid ., p. 13. 
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It employs analytic themes and categories such as nation-
building, national integration, stability and authority to 
define the reality of Third World nations. By so doing, 
it pays no attention to class analysis, thus masking class 
domination because its interest is really in maintaining 
the status quo. 
Counterposed to the theory of modernization is the 
dependencia theory as exemplified by the works of Frank, 
Dos Santos, and Amin: there have been debates among these 
authors2l regarding what particular area within the broad· 
theoretical field should command emphasis and the need to 
transcend the broad analytic categories. For example, while 
some works have concentrated on the old colonial dependency, 
based on trade export and characterized by the domination 
of big capital in the hegemonic centers at the end of the 
nineteenth century, emphasis has also been placed on 
dependency based on multinational corporations, the class 
forces and alignments in the periphery.22 The dependency 
theory suggests that underdevelopment of the Third World 
21And~e G~nder Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment 
in Latin America: A HistorICal Study of Chile and Brazil 
(New York: Monthly Review Press, 1967): Dos Santos, "The 
Structure of Dependency," American Economic Review LX (May 
1970): Andre Gunder Frank, Latin American: Underdevelopment 
or Revolution (New York: Monthly Review, 1967): Samir Amin, 
Unequal Development (New York: Monthly Review, 1976). 
22For representatives of these differing emphases, see 
"Dependency Theory: A Reassessment," Latin Amer~can 
Perspectives 1 (Spring 1974). 
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far from being an original state is a result of the histor-
ical subjugation of these countries by the capitalist states. 
We postulate that development and underdevelopment 
are the two faces of the same universal process 
••• , and that its geographic expression is trans-
lated into two great polarizations; on the one 
hand, the polarization of the world between 
industrial, advanced developed metropolitan 
countries and underdeveloped, backward, poor, peri-
pheral and dependent countries ••• 23 
The dependency school argues that the process that has 
on one hand, led to the structure of dependency in the 
underdeveloped countries has also brought about the cooption 
of the ruling class of the dependent world as junior allies 
of the dominant class of the metropoles. They further argue 
this class alliance has facilitated the distorted and 
disarticulated economies of the Third World. 
The problem that faces a researcher then, is, which of 
these two contending theoretical schools will be useful in 
elucidating the reality of ihe African polity craracterized by 
crisis, change and conflict? Proceeding with our method of 
analysis, historical materialism, a method based on the 
interpretation of historical data, the dependency theory 
will provide us with a more exhaustive framework to study 
radical change and crisis. The dependency theory allows us 
23 p •N• Ndue, attributes this quota to Osvaldo Sunkel, 
"The Underdevelopment of Cameroon: A Study in the Political 
Economy of Neo-Colonialism," (Ph.d dissertation, Atlanta 
University, 1983), p. 7. 
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to more meaningfully fathom and reveal the forces at work 
in the polity. Intervention as a foreign policy tool is not 
a phenomenon that just happens, it must be studied in its 
proper historical context. Colonial intervention in African 
polity cannot be divorced from the political-economy of the 
neo-colonial epoch. For example, if modernization theory 
is preoccupied with stability and continuity, dependency 
theory helps us to clarify the nature of this stability and 
for whose benefit continuity is to be maintained. It raises 
the question, stability for what and for whom? It is the 
specific factor tendency of the modernization school which 
isolates parts of a whole without looking at the entire 
world system and the class hierarchy that sustains it, that 
suggests to us that it is an inadequate theoretical framework 
for this study. As a theoretical school developed to explain 
the change and continuity of classical colonialism to 
constitutional independence within an unaltered socio-
economic formation, it has little analytic and explanatory 
merit to elucidate the reality of radical change and con-
flict which is our concern in this study. In African 
studies, the works of Rodney, Magubane, and Ake 24 have been 
based within the theoretical framework of historical 
materialism and dependency school. They have in the main 
24Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa; 
Makhosetzwe Magubane, The political Economy of Race and 
Class in South Africa (New York: Monthly Revies, 1979); 
Ake, A political Economy of Africa. 
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delineated the historical process that has brought about 
underdevelopment and the forces at work in the contemporary 
era, both to perpetuate it and dialectically to reverse 
't 25 1 • 
Hypothesis 
Our premise for this study is, that mutually 
irreconcilable interests and antagonistic contradictions 
informed the encounter between Europe and Africa from its 
very inception. European colonial expansionism rationalized 
this encounter on the ground that it was fiduciary, an argu-
ment that was later supplemented by crude chauvinism. 
According to Frederick Lugard: 
As European imperialism laid the foundation of 
modern civilization, and led the wild barbarians 
of these islands (Britain) along the path of 
progress, so in Africa today, we are repaying the 
debt and bringing to the dark places of the earth, 
the abode of barbarism and cruelty, the torch 
of culture and progress, while ministerinq to the 
material needs of our civilization . . . We 
hold these because it is the genius of our race 
to colonize to trade, and to govern.26 
What is the socio-economic consequence for the victims 
of this false humanitarianism? Classical economic theory 
suggests, land, labor, and capital as factors of production. 
In ministering to the material needs of their own 
25Claude Ake, Revolutionary Pressure in Africa 
(London: Zeb Press, 1978). 
26Frederick Lugard, quoted in Martin Carnoy, Education 
as Cultural Imperialism (New York: David McKay, 1968), 
p. 7. 
-20-
civilization, the harbingers of the torch of culture and 
progress recognized the futility of land andcapital with 
no labor. 
As land and capital were both useless unless 
labour could be commanded • • • and with limited 
population of Europe in the sixteenth century, 
the free labourers necessary to cultivate the 
staple crops of sugar, tobacco and cotton in the 
new world, could not have been supplied in 
quantities adequate to permit large scale pro-
duction. Slavery was necessary for this and • 
the Europeans turned first to the aborigines and 
then later to Africa. 27 
Nor is the slave a wage earner, who has sold his labor 
to the owners of the means of production, since this is 
the era of primitive accumulation - prewage labor. This 
means that the African provides his labor, free, cheap, 
and bounteous for life without the benefit of wage recom-
pense. The encounter, thus, then was a relation of 
antagonist contradiction -- the African wants his labor to 
be used by him in his community to tame nature for produc-
tion, consumption, and saving. The European wanted the 
African labor under compulsion, and coercion, to be 
provided free, without recompense and for life •. It is, 
thus, a relation of antagonistic contradiction and of 
domination and subordination. 
In concrete terms, what did this mean to Africa? It 
meant that, '1abour was drawn off from agriculture and 
conditions became unsettled. Dahomey, which in the six-
teenth century was known for exporting food to parts of 
27williams, Capitalism and Slavery, pp. 4-6. 
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what is now known as Togo, was suffering from famine in the 
nineteenth century. ,,28 This massive loss of African labor 
force of the most productive categories of its population, 
i.e. young men and women occurred mostly in the "zones 
most notorious for human export (namely), West Africa from 
Senegal to Angola along a belt extending about 200 miles 
inland, and secondly, that part of East Central Africa which 
tqday covers Tanzania, Mozambique, Malawi, Northern Zambia 
and Eastern congo."~ For Angola and Zaire, this meant 
stagnation and even regression of socio-economic and 
productive life. In Zaire, as we shall see later, an 
estimated fifteen million Africans were sold out during the 
period of slave trade, while another eight million died 
during the period of forced labour on the Belgian planta-
tion economy. Along with this stupendous misery and stag-
nation of economic life in Zaire, Belgian colonial 
adventure (through Belgian companies where Africans provided 
forced labour) was reaping enormous profits such that, "betweer:. 
1893 and 1900, the revenue rose rapidly from 5,500,000 francs 
to 26,000,000 francs; by 1901, it had become 31,000,000 
francs. ,,30 
28Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, p. 108. 
29Ibid ., p. 109. 
30 . 
Maur1ce Hennessy, The Congo (New York: Praeger, 
1961), p. 27. 
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This understanding allows us to postulate the follow-
ing hypothetical propositions for this study. Our charge is 
to evaluate them in the light of historical interpretation 
of what actors say motivate them on one hand, and what 
obtains in practice. 
1. It is the realist conception of interest and 
consequently of power in pursuit of that 
interest that impels transnational action 
in the international system, i.e., contrary 
to the idealist conception of history which 
posits that it is the pursuit of peace and 
order in the abstract, that undergirds 
transnational action and interaction, we 
suggest that the pursuit of peace and 
order is not value-free, it is based on 
preference and is interest~laden. 
2. Protracted intervention in Africa is a 
function of the need by the West to maintain 
the decisive influence it had exercised 
on the African polity since the European 
Berlin Conference of 1884-1885, when Africa 
was partitioned among the European powers. 
In the present epoch, this historical 
subjugation had crystallized in the con-
version of Africa as markets for Western 
goods and sources of supply for critical 
industrial metals. 
3. Zaire,in 1960, was the acid test of Western 
determination to maintain this strategic 
hegemony through the conversion of the United 
Nations operations (1960-1964), as an agency 
through which the forces of African radical 
nationalism were contained and neutralized. 
4. Angola represented the example of 1970s; and 
even though the form and nature of interven-
tion there were different, the goal was the 
same as in Zaire, except while Angola, if 
requced to specific reductionist analysis 
may not necessarily be a source of critical 
metals (though Angola has oil and diamonds 
which are exported mainly to the West), the 
objective of strategic hegemony posits the 
'loss' of one territory might have a domino 
effect on the subregion. We argue that 
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protracted Western assistance to Portugal to 
combat the forces of African nationalism and 
the attempt to subvert the sovereignty of 
the Peoples Republic of Angola were based 
on'this premise. 
CHAPTER II 
INTERVENTION AS NATIONAL INTEREST: THE PURSUIT 
OF FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVE 
What constitutes an interventionist act in transnational 
action and interaction? What is intervention in foreign 
policy and international politics generally? Intervention 
is a polychromatic reality and feature of international 
politics. According to Richard Falk,l the phenomenon of 
intervention is used to characterize 'conduct with an external 
animus that credibly intends to achieve a fundamental altera-
tion of the state of affairs in the target." Lamenting the 
monochromatic, catch-all nature of the term which is really 
trying to describe a polychromatic2 reality, Falk cautioned 
that the term 'is not very adequate as a comprehensive 
definition for it ignores the modern techniques ranging 
from subversion to hostile propaganda that are used to 
undermine the internal autonomy of another state ••• ,,3 
lRichard A. Falk, Legal Order in a Violent World 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), p. 343. 
2The term, 'monochromatic' to define the catch all 
nature of the term intervention while noting its poly-
chromatic features was used by John Norton Moore, "The 
Control of Intervention in Internal Conflict," The Virginia 
Journal of International Law 2 (May 1969). 
3Falk , Legal Order in a Violent World, p. 160. 
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While agreeing with the polychromatic features of 
intervention, Rosenau cautions us to pay attention to a 
definition that is both exhaustive and discriminating 
enough. Thus, he suggests that the definition ought to 
'be broad enough to identify those phenomena that are 
generally associated with the term and yet not so bread 
that it fails to discriminate them from other aspects of 
international politics."4 
Glahn bemoans what he sees as a 'general lack of 
agreement"5 among scholars as to what in international law 
constitutes intervention, but some authors have attempted 
to lay this seeming ambiguity to rest. Oran Young, 
characterizes intervention as ~rganized and systematic 
activities across recognized boundaries aimed at affecting 
the political authority structures of the target.~ For 
Melvin Gurtov, intervention is the ~alculated and partisan 
use of national power - military, economic and political -
to influence the domestic politics of another state."7 
4James N. Rosenau, "The Concept of Intervention," 
International Affairs 2 (1968): 166. 
5Gerhard Glahn, Law Among Nations: An Introduction to 
Public International Law (London: Collier-MacMillan, 1970), 
p. 168, quoted in Nnamdi Obiaga, "The Politics of Humani-
tarian Intervention: An Analysis of the Humanitarian Organ-
izations' Roles in the Nigerian Civil War," (ph.D Disser~ 
tation, Atlanta University, 1983), p.3. 
60ran Young, "Intervention and Internati~nal System," 
Journal of International Affairs (1968): 177-178. 
7Melvin Gurtov, The United States Against the Third 
World: Anti-Nationalism and Intervention (New York: Praeger 
Publishers, 1974), p. 2. 
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William Appleman Williams characterizes intervention as 
"the knowing and willful intrusion by one nation into the 
affairs of another with the purpose of changing its policies 
and even its culture." S 
There is, thus, quite clearly a common agreement among 
these authors that intervention as a conceptual tool is a 
multi-faceted phenomenon in its exhaustive application. It 
is geared towards altering a whole range of behavior in a 
target country from a specific policy that is vexing to the 
intervenor to even culture. Intervention may be military -
overt invasion, economic-espionage, sabotage of industrial 
plants or even illicit tampering of exports to target 
country; political - overt political meddling and even 
cultural and intellectual domination. Indeed, we suggest 
that because it is largely unrecognized by the target popula-
tion, political, cultural, and intellectual intervention is 
all the more potent because its basic assumption and goal 
are largely uncomprehended by the target population. The 
planting of a 'news' or 'features' account by a well-paid, 
anonymous but strategically placed or connected correspondent, 
the secret funding of a journal of opinion or broadcast 
station are aspects of cultural and intellectual intervention 
whose impact is more potent that the forced presence of 
100,000 alien troops. Education, for example, in colonized 
SWilliam Appleman Williams, "Understanding Intervention," 
The Nation, 9 July 1979. 
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nineteenth century Africa was an arm of colonial presence, 
whose intended function "was to help Europeans transform the 
local economic and social structure in ways which strength-
ened European commercial and political control over the 
region.,,9 It is thus a form of intervention whose potency 
is concealed in its sublety. While cultural, intellectual 
intervention is, to some extent subtle, and not readily 
acknowledged in the popular consciousness, it is the blatant 
and quite overt nature of military intervention that is 
quite discernible. For example, when a non-Caucasian, 
non-Arab, or Moorish African runs a hot comb through 
her/his hair or subjects his/her hair to a hair straighten-
ing potion, one can begin to discern a psychological and 
cultural depravity or an identity problem that is rooted 
in his/her attempt to assimilate the cosmetic or beauty 
ethos of an alien culture. But this case of cultural inter-
vention or disruption is often unrecognized by the tarqeted 
population. 
Having conceded the polychromatic nature of inter-
vention, the only type of intervention that is the focus of 
this analysis is politico-military intervention -- that 
particular mode of intervention that "seeks to manipulate 
the outcome of internal conflict (insurgency, political 
crises, revolution, or civil war) or through subversion to 
9Martin Carnoy, "Education and Traditional Colonialism: 
India and West Africa," in Education as Cultural Imperialism 
(New York: David MCKay Company, 1974), p. 82. 
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precipitate such conflict."lO Military intervention is 
really a mode of intervention of a last resort, that is, 
when preference for, or compliance with an objective cannot 
be obtained by any other means. All modes of intervention 
posit a preference, but military intervention goes further 
in that it seeks compliance with or preference for its 
objectives under compulsion. "It implies a peremptory demand 
for positive conduct (which) if not complied with, 
involves a threat of recourse to compulsion ••• "11 
That is to say, that what we are seeking to analyze is the 
use of political and armed intervention to achieve a 
strategic objective, by manipulating the outcome of domestic 
conflict. Our point is that extra-African powers enter the 
terrain in order to influence or manipulate the outcome of 
the conflict in Zaire and Angola. 
The merits and demerits of the motivational factors 
for an armed interventionist policy are related issues to 
the extent that they help to elucidate the reality of an 
African polity struggling to regain its own initiative in 
world affairs and terminate all relations of domination and 
exploitation. We are making a distinctionl2 between this and 
lOGurtov, The United States Against the Third World, 
p. 2. 
IlH. Lauterpacht, International Law and Human Rights 
(New York: Prae~ers, 1950), quoted in Obi~g~, ~olitics of 
Humanitarian Interventjon,"p. 3. 
12 h d' . . b h On t e ~st~nct~ons etween t e two parameters of 
interventionist activities, see W.E. Hall, (ed), A Treatise 
on International Law (Oxford: Pearce Higgins, 1924), p. 337; 
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interventionist policy directed against an actor's foreign 
relations. That is, we seek to analyze such actions which 
seek to penetrate, influence and prejudice the outcome of 
internal conflict. 
The Purpose of Intervention 
Is intervention founded and based on interest, or some 
abstract and abstruse doctrine of balance of power? Is an 
interventionist policy a humanitarian gesture or a concealed 
vehicle for the consolidation and defense of economic 
political and strategic interests? Is intervention moti-
vated by pacific principles or guided solely and 
unambiguously by ruthless pursuit of interest? Is an inter-
ventionist policy a means to an end, an instrument for an 
objective whose unwavering purpose is the defense and 
consolidation of economic and geopolitical hegemony? Western 
social science, both its orthodox and liberal genres have 
attempted to answer this cardinal question. Slater, for 
example, wondered whether characterizing u.S. intervention 
abroad13 as "imperial," "imperialistic," or "empire-building" 
should be taken literally or metaphorically and if the 
••• T.J. Lawrence, (ed), Principles of International Law 
(London: P.H. Winfield, 1925), p. 119; Ann Van Wynen Thomas, 
and A.J. Thomas, Jr., Non-Intervention (Dallas, 1956), 
p. 71; Charles G. Fenwick, International Law (New York, 
1965), p. 288. 
13 
Jerome Slater, "Is United States Foreign policy 
Imperialist or Imperial," in At Issue: Politics in the 
World Arena, ed. Steve L. Spiegel (New' York: St. Martins 
Press, 1977), p. 3'8. 
----- - ~~~~~~----~~-~ 
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emphasis is on the metaphorical, whether this is an apt, 
accurate, insightful, enlightening or basically misleading 
characterization. 
Taking issue with that they saw as the condemnatory 
and accusatory connotation of the word "imperialistic" some 
authors have suggested that the word "imperial" is more 
illuminating in elucidating the purpose of intervention. 
They14 argue that: 
a. Imperial policies are primarily a function 
of the international rather than the domestic 
imperatives -- it was the need to maintain 
world peace and the absence of international 
institutions for the conduct and regulation 
of transnational transactions that lead to 
imperial policies. 
b. An imperial policy is not fundamentally 
economic in nature and not structurally 
rooted in any particular socio-economic 
system. The policy is just concerned with 
power for its own sake or the maintenance 
of world order. 
c. A great power (their example was the United 
States) may have an imperial role without 
having an imperial policy and interests and 
commitments of states expand (naturally and 
inevitably) as their power expands. 
d. Since imperial policies largely arose out of 
a need to regulate an "anarchic international 
system," it is the 'altruistic' philosophy 
that lies behind the policy that should be 
emphasized rather than the aberrations of 
the policy in practice. 
l4This is a summation of the central argument of these 
works, John Spanier, American Foreign Policy Since World 
War II (New York: Praeger, 1973) ~ Raymond Aaron, The 
Imperial Republic (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-
Hall, 1974): George Liska, War and Order (Baltimore: The 
John Hopkins Press, 1968); Robert W. Tucker, Nation or 
Empire (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1968). 
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e. Genuine security fears, expansionist idealism 
and ideological anticommunism and other politi-
cal, strategic or psychological factors have 
been contributory factors for an intervention-
ist imperial policy. 
With respect to the psychological factor, Slater15 failed 
to specify whether this is some kind of Western neurosis or 
some other psychotic pathological dysfunction. 
Thus, these scholars suggest, it was the "humanitarian 
and pacific tradition" to make the world safe as opposed to 
the logic of the pursuit of interest that gives birth to an 
interventionist policy. Slater, for example, appears to 
have been influenced by Herz,16 when he argues that obses-
sion with security leads inexorably to acquisition of more 
power and influence. Thus, an hegemonic pursuit is disguised 
and explained away as just a security dilemma whose safe-
guard can only be 'guaranteed' by world domination. 17 
Consequently, according to the security and world 
policemen thesis of these authors, between 1500 and 1900, 
"the guarantors of world peace and international order" 
enslaved or colonized (both in Africa) most of the world 
with the exception of China and Japan. Two traditional 
expansionist outposts characterized the four centuries. 
l5Sla ter, "Is the United States Foreign Policy 
Imperialist or Imperial," p. 25. 
l6John H. Herz, Political Realism and Political Idealism 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951). 
l7Jarnes Burnham, The Struggle for the World (New York: 
Praeger, 1947), this is the central thesis of this work. 
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In the first one, European settlers conquered the natives, 
appropriated their land and developed the country for the 
enclave European community. The natives were almost com-
pletely annihilated and exterminated and the remaining 
were confined by 'treat:ies"to reservations and "autonomous" 
enclaves. The U.S., Central, South America, Australia and 
New Zealand represent this type. The second of these 
expansionist outposts are "occupied and administered 
colonies, where a few European colonists, primarily traders 
and soldiers, controlled the colony for the home country. 
Taxes and primary goods flowed into Europe from the colonies 
under tight trade monopolies."IS Africa, and the European 
Asian colonies represent this type. Within the same period, 
the thirteen original U.S. colonies expanded into a whole 
continent, that today, the strategic geopolitical frontiers 
of the U.S. run from River Elbe to the coast line of Asia. 
All these developments occurred in the service of world 
peace and orderly regulation and in consonance with 
"humanitarian and pacific traditions.,,19 
No attempt is made in this school of thoughtto explain 
and analyze the history of the genocidal treatment meted 
out to the people domiciled in the areas in which these 
18carnoy, Education As Cultural Imperialism, p. 78. 
19 Frank Tannebaum, "The Balance of Power Versus the 
COordinate State," Political Science Quarterly 67 (June 
1952) • 
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expansionist policies were visited, their enslavement for 
free labour and bounteous harvests forcibly extracted. 
In the spirit of this pacific tradition, the British 
virtually appropriated Indian textile production, that 
between 1780 and 1850, India went from almost self-reliance 
in textile production to importer of British Lancashire 
exports; the British, having now taken control of both pro-
duction and distribution in the textile industry. According 
to Mandel, this was a result of the "fact that capitalism 
entered this country under conditions of imperialist 
domination, which transformed India from a producer of manu-
factured goods into a producer of agricultural raw mate-
rials.,,20 
In the modern era, intervention in the Third World is 
premised on a need to protect these countries from the 
untoward influence of· communism so that they can have the 
freedom to develop Western attitudes and institutions that 
will guide them to the terminal station of prosperity and 
abundance. It is for this reason that Ake 21 had character-
ized Western social science as a form of imperialism in that 
it attempts to foist capitalist values on Third World 
societies and sees their development only within the context 
20Ernest Mandel, Marxist Economic Theory (London: 
Merlin Press, 1973); Paul Baran, The political Economy of 
Growth (New York: Monthly Review, 1968), pp. 144-150; 
Ranjit Sau, Unequal Exchange, Imperialism and Underdevelop-
ment (Calcutta, 1978), pp. 38-40. 
21Ake , Social Science As Imperialism, p. 7. 
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of capitalism. Latin America, for example, has had 
constitutional independence for 150 years, and rather than 
develop, the region is reeking under massive debt burden, 
agricultural stagnation and inhuman poverty and suffering. 
Brazil, the Western economic miracle of the 70's has $99 
billion of the total $830 billion22 debt of the Third World, 
while Mexico's total debt is $96 billion. 23 Brazil's debt 
service ration in 1980 was over 60 percent and American 
banking and financial institutions are creaming off enormous 
profits from the miseries of Brazilian economy. In 1980, 
Brazil provided more than 10 percent of the earnings of 
Citibank and Chase Manhattan Bank. 24 
With specific respect to the phenomenon of intervention 
in Africa, Colin Legum25 has argued, in consonnance with this 
world order thesis, the extra-African powers in the modern 
era had committed themselves to armed intervention to 
influence the outcome of internal conflict when, (1) in-
securely based unpopular regimes trying to maintain power 
have invited them; (2) inter-African disputes spillover to 
extra-African concerns; and (3) liberation struggles seeking 
22C•A• Bogdanowicz-Bindert, "World Debt: The U.S. 
Reconsiders," Foreign Affairs (Winter 1985-86): 261. 
23New York Times, 6 October 1985; The Atlanta Constitu-
tion, 9 February 1986. 
24New York Times, 8 December 1980. 
25colin Legum, "Foreign Intervention in Africa," in 
The Yearbook of World Affairs (New York: Praegers, 1980), 
p. 80. 
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external support have appealed to extra-African sources. 
First, Colin Legum proceeds as if the political history of 
the target of intervention begins in the specific period 
his analysis covers. That is, what is the historical basis 
for the act of intervention? Legum fails to tell us what 
objective an intervenor hopes to achieve. His analysis 
ascribes the motive, mode and nature of intervention to its 
victim. By not locating his analysis in history, Legum 
renders a superficial and unenlightening analysis. Why, for 
example, will an intervenor support one disputant and not 
the other? Are the imperatives of intervention based on 
pacific and humanitarian instincts? That is, does a policy 
of intervention serve the self-interest of the intervenor? 
Legum provides no elucidation on this critical point except 
to locate all the motivating factors of intervention within 
the target area. Bon and Mingst26 went further than Legum 
in analyzing the nature and range of an activist inter-
ventionist policy by France in Africa. They characterized 
French intervention in Senegal as both "continuous and 
subtle." They faulted what they saw as the undue "optimism" 
of decolonization perspective and the "pessimism" of the 
dependency perspective, but paid insufficient attention to 
what they themselves characterized as "French motivations 
as facilitators of an interventionist policy in general.,,27 
260aniel Bon and Karen Mingst, "French Intervention in 
Africa: Dependency or Oecolonization," Africa Today 
2nd quarter (1980): 5-20. . , 
27 Ibid., p. 6. 
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Taking issue with the world order thesis of Western 
social science, the Marxist analysis suggests that inter-
vention is rooted in the rapacious character and nature of 
capitalism, its need for ever widening market area and 
commodity products, means that capitalism must "nestle 
everywhere, settle everywhere.,,28 The dependency school 
also takes the Marxist interpretation of intervention as a 
point of departure. It is necessary, however, to state tnat 
there are two variants of the dependency school. The first 
represented by Raul Prebisch and the UN Commission for 
Latin American and including the writings of Osvaldo Sunkel 
and Celso Furtado29 could be termed nationalist-capitalist. 
The other variant is represented by the writings of 
Andre Gunder Frank, Baran, Amin and wallerstein. 30 In 
African Studies, Walter Rodney, Ake and Magubane are exam-
ples of this school. 3l Hm...rever, there is some convergence 
28Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Manifesto of the 
Communist Party (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1973), 
p. 35. 
29celso Furtado, Economic Growth of Brazil: A Survey 
From Colonial to Modern Times (Berkeiey: University of 
California Press, 1963); Osvaldo Sunkel, "Big Business and 
Dependency," Foreign Affairs (April 1972). 
30Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World System 
(New York: Monthly Review, 1976); Immanuel Wallerstein, 
The Capitalist World Economy (Cambridge, 1979); Samir Amin, 
Accumul·ation On A World Scale (New York: Monthly Review, 
1974); Paul Baran, The political Economy of Growth (New York: 
Monthly Review, 1957); A.G. Frank, Latin America: Under-
development or Resolution (New York: Monthly Review, 1967). 
31 
Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa; Ake, 
A Political Economy of Africa; B. Mugubane, The Political 
Economy of Race and Class in South Africa (Boulder: Westview, 
1980). 
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of viewpoint between these two variants of the dependency 
school, because they are both; (1) nationalist and anti-
imperialist, (2) both accept externally based and directed 
capitalist domination as a historical legacy of capitalist 
intervention, (3) they both argue that the prevailing inter-
national economic system is structured to the disadvantage 
of the Third World countries whose surplus is now creamed 
off through various institutionalized mechanisms such as 
the Western dominated lending and banking institutions. 
However, for the nationalist school this perceived 
anomaly can be remedied, if this domination were removed, 
the enclaves would then embark on their own process of 
accumulation, within and maintaining a capitalist relation 
of production and distribution. For the radical variant, 
what they see as the phenomenon of economic stagnation, 
compounded by social inequity and injustice can only be 
overhauled in a thorough going socialist reconstruction. 
The radical variant went a little further in analyzing 
the social classes in neo-co1ony. We have stated earlier 
why we prefer the theoretical framework of dependency 
w~~h takes the Marxist theory of intervention as a point 
of departure. This symmetry we see between the Marxist 
theory of intervention and dependency school (the radical 
variant) rests on two main points. 
According to Marx, 
The discovery of gold and silver in America, the 
extirpation, enslavement and entombment in mines 
of the aboriginal population, the beginning of 
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the conquest and looting of the East Indies, the 
turning of Africa into a warren for the commercial 
hunting of black skins, signalled the rosy dawn 
of the era of capitalist production. These 
Idyllic preceedings are the chief momenta of 
primitive accumulation • •• The treasures cap-
tured outside Europe by undisguised looting, 
enslavement, and murder, floated back to the 
mother-country and were turned into capital • • • 
Liverpool waxed fat on the slave-trade. This was 
its method of primitive accumulation ••• 32 
Mandel has also argued that, 
• • • Indeed the unlimited industrial advance 
of the western world has been possible only at 
the expense of the so-called underdeveloped 
world, which has been doomed to stagnation and 
regression. 33 
This Marxist theory of intervention enabled the radical 
dependency school to argue that underdevelopment far from 
being the original state -- the state of nature as argued 
by the development theory is but the other side of a 
historical process. 
Economic development and underdevelopment are 
the opposite sides of the same coin. Both are 
the necessary result and contemporary manifesta-
tion of internal contradictions in the world 
capitalist system • •• One and the same histori-
cal process has simultaneously generated -- and 
continues to generate -- both economic develop-
ment (in the industrialized core states) and 
structural underdevelopment in the dependent 
peripheral states. 34 
32 1 . 1 1 1 . . 11 . . 1 . Kar Marx, Cap1ta , Vo. ; Er1c W1 1ams, Cap1ta 1sm 
and Slavery (New York: Putnam, 1944); Harry Magdoff, 
lm erialism: From Colonial Age to the Present (New York: 
Monthly Rev1ew, 1978 ; Harry Magdo , The Age of Imperialism 
(New York: Monthly Review, 1969). 
33Mandel, Marxist Economic Theory, p. 441. 
34Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin 
America, p. 9. 
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This process characterized by Frank as "the development of 
underdevelopment," in which the loss, plunder of one (the 
periphery) becomes the gain of the other (the core) enables 
us to suggest that the specific mode of intervention we 
seek to study here has an historical basis in both Angola 
and Zaire. Thus, we need to investigate whether it is 
the imperative need to maintain the unequal relations between 
an intervenor and the target that informs this particular 
type of intervention. Thus, we can find out if critical 
dependence of Western economy on vital strategic metals 
emanating from Zaire: the loss of market to the finished 
goods of intervenors is a factor and whether the domino 
effect of strategic "loss" of any territory compels an 
activist interventionist policy to forestall that eventual-
ity. For Angola, apart from the economic imperative that 
may inform an interventionist policy, the political and 
strategic calculation vis-a-vis its ideological adversary, 
the process of potential radicalization of a subregion where 
Western hegemony had been uncontested for 500 years was at 
the heart of Western policy. Henry Kissinger seems to give 
credence to this thesis, when he said that, 
Angola represents the first time since the after~ 
math of World War II that the Soviet Union has 
moved militarily at long distances to impose a 
regime of its choice. It is the first time that 
the U.S. has failed to respond to Soviet military 
moves outside their immediate orbit. 35 
35Henry Kissinger, "U.S. Involvement in Angola," 
Hearings Defore the sub-committee on Foreign Relations of 
the U.S. Senate, 94th Congress, 2nd Session, March 1976, 
p. 56. 
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What Kissinger did not tell us was whether Africa has 
historically been within the Western orbit since that 
initial epoch of plunder and enslavement referred to 
earlier. Thus, we need to uncover, proceeding with the 
method of historical materialism, based on the interpreta-
tion of historical data, whether intervention as a foreign 
policy tool of extra-African powers is a phenomenon of the 
contemporary epoch, or one that has a long history. 
An examination of the same historical data will help 
us determine the veracity or otherwise of the pacific nature 
of this encounter -- whether intervention was based on 
ruthless pursuit of self interest, that brought mass poverty, 
stagnation, humiliation and ruin to Africa politically, 
economically and even psychologically or whether it was 
truly an altruistic humanitarian venture to keep peace and 
order among warring natives. 
The second point in the symmetry we see between the 
radical variant of the dependency school and the Marxist 
theory is in regard to the assessment of the dialectical 
relationship between the ruling classes of the centre and 
the periphery of the world system. 
L ,36 , f en1n wrote about the bUY1ng 0 f of the workers by 
the ruling class in the Centres of imperialism; it was this 
theme of the cooption of the local bourgeoisie in the 
neo-colony to accept imperialist hegemony as grasped and 
36 , , l' h' h f V.I. Len1n, Imper1a 15m: T e H1g est Stage 0 
Capitalism (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1970):--
------ ---- --------------
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further analyzed by the radical dependency school that 
glaringly exposed the error of the nationalist variant. For 
the ruling elites of a neo-colony far from being the 
progressive prototype of the European middle class in the 
first three centuries of capitalism, did not save, accumu-
late or produce nor oversaw an inward, autonomous capitalist 
development. Its room for manouvre corresponds to the 
respites it is able to gain during the boom and bust cycles 
of capitalism. Dominated and manipulated by the economic 
power37 of its senior allies in the centre under whose 
broad aegis it operates, it functions in the main, as a 
conduit, to facilitate further imperialist penetration and 
domination. It operates the state apparatus, for its 
narrow class interest and in compliance with the interests 
of its senior allies. It is thus neither a proper nor a 
true bourgeoisie but a faJse one, 
Its mission has nothing to do with transforming 
the nation: it consists, prosaically, of being 
the transmission line between the nation and a 
capitalism, rampant though camouflaged, which 
today puts on the masque of neo-co1onia1ism • • • 
Because it is bereft of ideas, because it lives 
to itself and cuts itself off from the people, 
undermined by its hereditary incapacity from 
the point of view of the whole of that nation, 
the national middle class will have nothing 
better to do than to take on the role of manager 
for Western enterprise, and it will in practice 
set up its country as the brothel of Europe. 38 
37prank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin 
America, p. 65; see also, Brazil: State and Struggle 
(London: Latin America Bureau, 1982), chapters 3, 4, and 
5. 
38 Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (New York: 
Grove Press, 1963), pp. 152-154. 
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Lacking a material base, because the logic of colonial-
ism conditioned its underdevelopment, the African bourgeoisie 
easily falls prey to the machination and manipulation of the 
dominant class of the imperialist centre; the contradiction 
it sees between its own country and the centre are resolved 
in favour of the centre. This analysis enables us to 
understand aspects of the conditions that facilitate inter-
vention in a target country. With the demise of classical 
empire building and colonialism which has been replaced by 
juridical independence, the contradictions between the rul-
ing elites in a neo-colony and the mass of the people become 
further exposed. Acceding to independence within an 
unaltered socio-economic formation, places the African 
bourgeoisie between two contending forces -- that of its own 
people and that of imperialism. If. the bourgeoisie attempts 
to resolve these contradictions in favour of the people, it 
faces the implacable hostility of imperialism. If it attempts 
to resolve it in favour of imperialism, it faces the fury of 
the people. Consequently, the only way it can retain state 
power in the service of it~ class interest is to come under 
the tutelage of imperialism. The infiltration and cultiva-
tion of the ruling elites of a neo-colony by the intervenor 
in seeking to influence the outcome of domestic conflict in 
its own favour will be examined further in chapters IV and 
V. 
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The Idea of National Interest 
If rationalization or justifications offered by inter-
venors are to be believed, an act of intervention is pursued 
in defense of "national interest." The rest of this chapter 
will be devoted to an attempt to understand this concept 
both in its theoretical ambiguity and its application by 
nation state actors. "The honest and just interests of 
this country (England) and her inhabitants, are the just 
and honest interests of this world. ,,39 The author of this 
statement in referring to the interests of England as "just 
and honest" also seemed to accept that the interests of 
all the other countries are honest and just, and hence there 
exists an "absence of all clashing interests.,,40 "Interests 
dominate the actions of men~41 For Singer, elites will define 
national interests in terms compatible with their own inter-
national ident:.ty.,,42 Along the same line, Gurtov argues 
that "national interest,,43 or what elites say it is 
39John Bright and James E. Thorold Rogers (eds) , 
"Speeches by Richard Cobben on Questions of Public Policy," 
in R. J. Vincent, Non-Intervention and International Order 
(Princeton: University Press, 1974), p. 46. 
40Lord Salisbury quoted in Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics 
Among'Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: 
A.A. Knopf, 1974), p.8. 
41Max Weber quoted in'Morgenthau, Politics Among 
Nations, p.9. 
42M. R. Singer, Weak States in A World of Powers (New 
York: The Free Press), 1972. 
43Gurtov, The United States Against the Third World, p.4. 
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explains or rationalizes "governmental behavior in specific 
cases," while encompassing universalistic hopes and ambi-
tions. 
Predictably these authors have demonstrated some wari-
ness in telling us precisely what they mean by national 
interest, because of the emotive connotative and denotative 
meaning the concept evokes in practice. However, Seabury 
provides us with a definition sufficiently abstract that 
we feel comfortable enough to adopt it as a working defini-
tion for the purpose of this study. "The idea of national 
interests may refer to some ideal set of purposes which a 
nation •... should seek to realize in the conduct of its 
foreign relations.,,44 Then, obviously in agreement with 
Singer, Seabury suggested further, "it might similarly 
be said that the national interest is what foreign policy-
makers say it is.,,45 
The ambiguity shown by these authors is a recognition 
of the fact that a nation's interest or national interest 
as a conceptual tool, does not lend itself to neat and tidy 
precision or terminological exactitude. National interest 
as a guiding principle for some weaker actors in the inter-
national system is much more focused than for others, for 
whom the term lends itself to expansionist or imperialist 
44Paul Seabury, "Power, Freedom and Diplomacy: The 
Foreign P.licy of the United States of America," quoted in 
K.J. Holsti, International Politics: A Framework for / 
Analysis (Englewood Cliff: Prentice-Hall, 1977), p. 139. 
45 Ibid • 
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interpretation. In pursuits of their interests, states 
generally tend to prioritize the range and category of such 
interests to which finite resources can be deployed. The 
core interest obviously will be the preservation of the 
corporate entity, that is the inviolability or non-
negotiability of the territorial integrity and sovereignty. 
In the sphere of foreign policy it is certainly the doctrine 
of national interest or the pursuit of same that impels 
transnational action and reaction. To be sure, the ideology 
of national interest as the underpinning philosophy of 
transnational action may be cloaked under such messianic 
and crusading jargon as, "manifest destiny," "proletarian 
internationalism" or such strategic doctrines as 
"deterrence," "containment", "massive retaliation," 
"salie.nce of power" or "domino theory." As an analytic 
concept, the term national interest is truly an amorphous 
one that lends itself to eclectic and ever-changing inter-
pretations and definitions. For the Soviet Union, in 
1919, the pursuit of the objective of world revolution was 
of prime national interest, as Trotsky wrote, "our task 
is to mobilize the forces of all genuinely revolutionary 
parties of the world proletariat and thereby hasten the 
victory of the communist revolution throughout the world.,,46 
However, by 1927, the thesis of world revolution even at 
the level of rhetorics, as an objective of national interest 
46 . h d . d l' ( Ric ar Barnet, Intervent10n an Revo ut10n New York: 
The World Publishing Company), p. 63. 
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had been abandoned. For Joseph Stalin, the thesis is an 
"idiotic phrase" and "a revolutionary," according to the 
Stalinist definition of Russian nationalist interest, 
'is one who is ready to protect, to defend the USSR without 
reservation, without qualification openly and honestly ••• 
An internationalist is one who is ready to defend the USSR 
~ , ! • • , without wavering, unconditionally: for," 
Stalin's messianic nationalism now runneth over, "the 
USSR is the base of the world revolutionary movement and 
this revolutionary movement cannot be defended and promoted 
unless USSR is defended.,,47 Thus, for many states, the 
doctrine of national interest serves an open-ended catch-all 
purpose that serves to neatly justify or rationalize their 
behavior on the international scene. It's meaning and 
acceptance of same commands no universal allegiance. The 
eclectic nature of the definition and interpretation of what 
·constitutes national interest transcends ideology, common 
culture or national heritage. 
The self-serving propensity that characterizes trans~ 
national action and interaction in pursuit of what all 
actors describe as national interest has been guided by 
what an author has described as the "seesaw of class and 
national motive force.,,48 According to this author, there 
exists an everchanging, continually undulating phenomenon 
47 
Joseph Stalin, Works (Moscow: Progress, 1927), Vol. 
X, pp. 53-54. 
48Silviu Brucan, The Dialecties of World Politics 
(New York: The Free Press, 1978); p. 21. 
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that defies ideological, cultural or national categoriza-
tion, that pits nations of varying and conflicting ideologi-
cal persuasion and economic structure against each other in 
one era and then in an expedient alliance in another. For 
example, the U.S., Britain and France, while remaining 
bitter enemies of the Soviet Union found themselves allies 
of the same Soviet Union during Norld War II. In the modern 
era, the problems that divide the Soviet Union and China, 
include both their respective national interpretation and 
adaptation of Marxism, as well as their boundary problems. 
Inspite of the fact that they both claim to be socialist 
states, these problems have not been resolved within a 
socialist fraternal accommodation. 49 During the Vietnam 
war, both the Soviet Union and China provided diplomatic, 
moral and material support to the Vietnamese people in 
their struggle against French colonial hegemony and later 
U.S. imperialist aggression, even though deep antipathy 
and suspicion characterized their bilateral relation. Dur-
ing the Vietnam war, the late Chairman Mao-Tse Tung 
characterized the close fraternal relations between China 
and Vietnam as one between the mouth and the tongue. Today 
49For an analysis of the protracted nature of the 
issues that divide the Soviet Union and the Peoples Republic 
of China, see Walter s. Jones, The Logic of International 
Relations (Boston: Little Brown & Coy, 1982), pp. 37-41; 
Hans J. Margenthau, Politics· Among Nations: The Struggle 
for Power and Peace (New York: A.A. Knopf, 1968) I 
p. 351. 
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boundary problems and differences over their Kampuchea 
policies have led to armed hostilities between China and 
Vietnam. Perhaps, no event, within the spectrum of the 
international relations of Africa captured the essence of 
the phenomenon of the "seesaw of class and national motive 
force" more than the Chinese role in the Angolan war of 
1976. The Peoples Republic of China, under the leadership 
of Mao Tse-Tung and Chou-En-Lai, had built an image of 
friendship, fraternity and solidarity with the people of 
Latin America, Asia and Africa, in their struggles to throw 
off the yoke of colonialism and imperialism since the 
establishment of the Chinese regime in 1949 to the 1960's 
when most African countries became·:·formally independent. 
Having not been a colonial power in Africa, and only having 
recently cast off the yoke of imperialist domination them-
selves, the Chinese in the inte-rnational fora had tried to 
cast their lot with progressive African aspirations and had 
played an important role in Afro-Asian solidarity. China 
had had long-standing association with most Africa libera-
tion movements and to cap its feathers of fraternity with 
African struggle against imperialism of the West, Chinese 
expertise and materials, built the Tan-Zan railway that 
linked Tanzania and Zambia in 1971. This singular act 
enabled landlocked Zambia to break its dependence on 
white-supremacist ruled Zimbabwe for use of the Zimbabwean 
port facilities to transport the Zambian major foreign 
exchangeearner -- copper. However, by 1976, the leadership 
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of the Peoples Republic of China had passed into the hands 
of Hua Kuo Feng and Deng Xiao Peng who apparently had a 
much narrower conception of Chinese national interest that 
transcends any ideological affinity with any nation in the 
world. 
The maximization of Chinese foreign policy objective 
appears to have been reduced to one immutable thesis 
the sustained and inflexible hostility to any Soviet action 
on the international arena,irrespective of the objective 
merits or demerits of the issue involved and the sacrifice 
of the two decades of Chinese solidarity and fraternity 
with all peoples struggling to regain their national destiny 
and place in the comity of nations. In pursuance of this 
policy of seemingly implacable hostility to Soviet Union 
the Peoples Republic of China found itself against all 
progressive forces and its traditional friends in Africa, 
especially Tanzania and in the company of the pariah of 
the international system, South Africa, and its allies like 
the United States, Britain, etc., during the crisis prompted 
by the South African invasion of Angola in 1975. Chinese 
national interest and its strategic objective as now 
defined by the new rulership was then to counter what it 
saw as an ascendancy of Soviet influence in the new state. 
If we count this instance as one determinee more by 
national interest (national motive force in Brucan's 
term), then by the same token, Chinese cooperation with 




explained on the grounds of ideological affinity and 
geopolitical considerations. It is the Byzantine irregular-
ity that defies both constancy and consistency that makes 
it difficult to state precisely what objectively consti-
tutes a nation's national interest. Be that as it may, 
the enunciation of a particular policy in the pursuit of 
what any given actor states to be its national interest 
clearly has to be made with a clear and unambiguous sense 
and acknowledgement of the nation's capability to defend 
that interest. Anything short of that is mere wishful 
thinking. The aggregate of weight given to a particular 
'interest' varies, because some interests are so generalized 
and unimportant to the survival of the actor that their 
defense is hardly ever contemplated. All the same, the idea 
or the doctrine of national interest is clearly the lynchpin 
of the most rudimentary understanding of the actions of 
nation-states. The fact that what constitutes that particu-
lar interest is hardly ever fixed or resources (human and 
material) deployed towards its pursuit are finite notwith-
standing, nations do indeed act according to however it is 
defined. We apply the world finite here because no nation 
on earth can defend any interest forever, otherwise nations 
will never surrender in wars. For example, Japan could 
not forever defend itself in the War of 1939-45; if it did 
not surrender, the outcome may have been too ghastly to 
contemplate. Likewise, when the United States devoted 
billions of dollars and lost 58,000 soldiemin Vietnam and 
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saw its national fabric bitterly divided, it learned that 
no matter how mighty or powerful an actor may be, the 
concept of national interest even when defined strategically 
as national security, can suffer irrevocable dimunition 
that it be either fundamentally modified or completely 
jettisoned and abandoned. 
In pursuit of the national interest or specific foreign 
policy objective, nations utilize means, channels and proce-
dures, to realize or maximize the particular objective. 
Since all actors are in some form of contention or another, 
it is necessary to delineate the nature of the objective 
to be realized. Contention between actors ranges from 
friendly contention to one of acrimony, bitterness, hosti-
lity and mutual distrust. Therefore, relationships might 
range from one of relaxed competition, to a relation of 
coercion and intimidation. Diplomatic negotiations, 
co~unications direct and indirect, may attend a relation 
of friendly contention. Relations of coercion, though, 
are specifically addressed to adversarial contention. The 
means at the service of an actor in securing a change in 
the behavior of another actor might range from hostile 
propaganda, economic warfare (e.g., economic sabotage, 
quarantine and blockage of harbors), clandestine subversive 
action, outright military intervention and counterrevolu-
tionary activities. That is to say intervention is based 
on the perception by an actor that its interest is 
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threatened, hence an intervenor directs its energies towards 
securing a change of behavior in the target. 
We have suggested earlier that the nature of African 
articulation with the world system is conflict prone; the 
following chapter will attempt to provide the historical 
background of this conflictual relationship. We have also 
hypothesized earlier that it is the realist conception of 
power -- its acquisition in the pursuit of interest that 
characterizes action and interaction in the international 
system. But the acquisition of power by one actor in inter-
action with others posits at least theoretically a negation 
or "loss" by another, hence interaction becomes asymmetri-
cal. But power though is not pursued for its own sake, 
it is pursued with an objective in mind, for a purpose. 
The chapter will attempt to analyze why extra African powers 
intervene in Africa -- why self interest and not order or 
peace motivates intervention. And if order and peace are 
to be maintained, they will be maintained on the terms. and 
preferences desired by the intervenor. What we suggest 
is that order and peace are not abstract in practice, i.e., 
a certain order and the kind of peace that is conducive to 
the interests of the intervenor. The broad overview on 
power and conflict vis-a-vis Africa and extra-African powers 
will enable us to perceive that the problem of external 
intervention (to influence the outcome of domestic conflict 
in Zaire and Angola) is a continent-wide phenomenon, because 
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of the role and place of Africa in the world system as 
markets for finished goods and source of critical metals 
for Western capitalist nations. We trace the long history 
of the subordination of African resources (human and 
material) and suggest that intervention to influence 
domestic conflict in Angola and Zaire serve only: (1) as 
case studies of a continent wide phenomenon; and (2) to 
strengthen and consolidate this subordinate relation and 
prevent its termination. 
--- ----------------------------
CHAPTER III 
AFRICA IN THE WORLD SYSTEM: DEPENDENCE, DEPENDENCY, 
INTERDEPENDENCE AND RELATIONAL ASYMMETRY 
Africa as a subordinate unit in the international 
system meets all the identifiable characteristics advanced 
by system integration theorists and scholars. l Let us 
look at the characteristics of the subordinate regional 
system. 
1. There is a clear and manifest geographical 
land mass which is clearly identifiable 
and recognized by the international system 
as an integral part. 
2. There is an identity of systematic percep-
tion by the international community and 
the members of the subordi~ate system. 
3. Little horizontal contact within the sub-
system; contact is vertical -- towards the 
centre. 
When treating Africa as a sUb-system here, two caveats 
are in order; (a) the phenomenon of intractable colonial 
racial hegemony within the sub-system, and (b) the over-
lapping Mid-East and African land mass within the same 
sub-system. 
lsee for example, I.W. Zartman, "Africa As A Subordi-
nate State System in International Relations," International 




In the case of (a) above, we argue that the sub-system 
is still evolving and has not fully realized the limits of 
its land base. This is borne out by the fact that the last 
racial/colonial outpost is under international assault and 
is considered within the international system a pariah. 
Its enduring intractability notwithstanding, its inclusion 
ultimately within the sUb-system is a matter of time. The 
lesson of history is that when the human and material cost 
of hegemony based on race becomes prohibitive for the whites 
of South Africa and their external collaborators, accomoda-
tion will be reached. 
For (b) above, there is a convergence and confluence 
of interests partly based on colonial experience, religious 
identification and more importantly on the shared experience 
of neo-colonial subjugation. This is not to dismiss the 
arguments of those who see a mutual exclusi vi ty of interests 
in Afro-Arab relations. But Algeria, Morocco, Egypt, Sudan 
and Libya can be African as well as Arab. The underlying 
referent for the black exclusive school is essentially race. 
But such a position conveniently overlooks the fact that 
Algeria2 has consistently championed the cause of "black" 
African liberation while such "black" countries like Malawi 
actively colluded with Portugal to frustrate the efforts 
of the Frelimo during the l!ozambican independence struggle 
2Ali A. Mazrui, Africa's International Relations: 
The Diplomacy of Dependency and Change (London: Heinemann, 
1977), pp. 150-155. 
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Having looked at these two caveats, the African 
subregion in the international system for our purpose in 
this analysis, refers to the continental land mass proper 
and the outlying waters and islands. The term "black 
Africa" coined by Euro-American writers has no analytic 
utility whatsoever beyond that of a racial connotation. 
It emanates historically from the attempt of Euro-American 
historiography to divorce the Afro-Mediterranean subregion 
from its African continuum. It does become convenient 
to ascribe different social forces for the "black" African· 
polity and thus its "uniqueness." 
In the contemporary epoch, terms like "mutual 
dependence," "interdependence," "association," "partnership," 
and "mutual responsiveness," are the new conceptual tools 
being bandied about by scholars and lay people alike to 
describe and characterize the role and nature of the 
relationship of Africa vis-a-vis the world system. This 
is not simply a matter of terminological indiscipline or 
analytic confusion but it betrays an unwillingness to 
systematize the study of the role and place of Africa in a 
multi-polar or bi-polar system analysis. Perhaps attempts 
to explain or rationalize, as the case may be, the place of 
Africa in the world system has gotten quite sophisticated. 
After all, it was not so long ago, that the accepted 
conventional notion was that there was nothing really worth 
explaining. Euro-American scholars were uniformly convinced 
that Africa and her inhabitants were marginal in virtually 
• 
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all spheres of human development. The accepted historio-
graphic and scientific scholarship confirmed that "·Seul de 
tous les continents, l'Afrique n'a pas d'histcire" 3 Qr 
in the quite definitive words of Sir Hugh Trevor-Roper, 
the Regius Professor of Modern History at Oxford University, 
Maybe, in the future there will be some African 
history, but ~t the moment there is none ••• 
There is only the history of Europeans in Africa 
••• The rest is darkness, and darkness is not 
a subject of history.4 
Nowadays it is no longer so socially acceptable to 
brazenly substitute bigotry and prejudice or cultural 
arrogance for scholarship. 
This is not to suggest that terms like "association," 
"interdependence," etc., yield us any analytical or 
explanatory value in explaining the place of Africa in 
the world system. Our first duty is to attempt a con-
ceptual clarity or definitional precision. 
James Caporoso, in reviewing the nature of 'dependence 
. 5 
and dependency' in the world system, drew an analytic 
3Quoted in W.E. Burghardt DuBois, The World and Africa: 
An Inquiry Into the Part Which Africa has Played in World 
History (New York: International Publishers, 1975), p. 8. 
Also see Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma: The Negro 
Problem and Modern Democracy (New York: Pantheon Books, 
1972), this work is in two volumes. For a fairly compre-
hensive historical and sociological analysis of Euro-
American view of Africa and Africans, the two volumes aught 
to be read together. 
4Quoted in Ali A. Mazrui, The African Condition 
(London: Cambridge University Press, 1980), p. 6. 
5 James A. Caporoso, "Dependency, Dependency and Power 
in the Global System: A Structural and Behavioral Analysis," 
International Organization 32 (Winter 1978): 13-43. 
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distinction between the two concepts. According to Caporoso, 
"dependence" can be broadly defined as "external reliance 
on other actors" and "dependency" as "the process of 
incorporation of less developed countries (LDCs) into the 
world system. ,,6 While conceding strong affinity between 
the two concepts and accepting the theme of relational 
asymmetry and vulnerabilities between actors as the main 
focus, he concludes that an analytic distinction is however, 
necessary because there are dissimilarities in the theoreti-
cal framework. Caporoso sees dependence as being focused 
on individual state actor and thus lending itself to 
empiricism, while dependency is concerned with the class 
structure. 
A discourse, however cursory of the conflicting 
theories of the state, plus some analysis of the structure 
of the state in the hands of a particular class, would have 
been helpful in further clarifying Caporoso's position 
here. However, as an abstract intellectual distinction, 
Caporoso's explanation might be useful, but he himself 
concedes that "dependence" and "dependency" have relational 
asymmetry as their main focus. The distinctions between 
6Following Marx and Lenin, Immanuel Wallerstein sees 
the development of the mercantilist/capitalist era in 
global terms -- hence, the term world system. For an 
understanding of the world system and its development see, 
Wallerstein, The Modern World System; Amin, Accumulation 
On A World Scale; Andre Gunder Frank, World Accumulation, 
1492-1789 (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1978). 
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them assumes a semantic form when one realizes that they 
both have the same theoretical antecedents and the basic 
conceptualization accepts the "chain of historical causa-
tion,,7 that gave birth to both dependence and dependency. 
What is clearly important is that we ·see the central concern 
of dependence and dependency as the "asymmetric properties 
of the structure of the relationship among social entities. ,,8 
This is the proper and fitting context to analyze trans-
national or international relationship before we embark on 
a review of the constraints, possibilities, schisms and 
structure of that relationship. It is crucial to bear in 
mind that it is the question of relational inequality, and 
the uneven burden of vulnerability contained therein that 
lie at the centre of dependence/dependency theory. Various 
writers in their attempt to critique the theory have 
allowed their analysis to degenerate into circular argument a-
tion by refusing to acknowledge the existence of relational 
asymmetry between the centre and periphery of the world 
system. Or in instances where relational inequality is 
acknowledged, insufficient or superficial attention has been 
7There is an implicit and sometimes quite explicit 
agreement in virtually all the works of the dependencia 
school that both dependence and dependency are both world-
wide and historical. For a good review of the historical 
root or basis of the phenomena, see, for example, 
Peter C.W. Gutking and Immanuel Wallerstein, The Political 
Economy of Contemporary Africa (Beverly Hills: Sage 
Publications, 1976), pp. 7-29. 
8 Raymond D. Duvall, "Dependence and Dependencia Theory: 
Notes Towards Precision of Concept and Argument," Inter-
national Organization 32 (Winter 1978): 51-78. 
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9 paid to it and hence the analysis lacks coherence. The 
obfuscation and inconsistency often betrayed by many of 
these writers is best illustrated by David A. Baldwin in 
an article that oddly enough claims to attempt a con-
10 ceptual analysis of interdependence and power. Baldwin's 
attempt at analyzing dependence/dependency vis-a-vis 
relational power in' the world system is flawed in a number 
of important respects. First, it would have served 
Baldwin's purpose better if he had stated his theoretical 
position at the onset, rather than alluding to it in the 
middle of his essay. Baldwin subscribes to the classical 
theory of international relations; says he, 
This theory constitutes a powerful conceptual 
tool for the student of international politics 
• • • It should not be necessary to develop a 
separate theory to cover each issue area of 
international exchange relations. ll 
But Baldwin's normative bias is concealed under a 
supposedly fresh and objective attempt to analyze what he 
sees as toe analytic and conceptual confusion in the 
dependence/dependency theory. Baldwin's main fixation and 
9see for example, Sanjaya Lall, "Is Dependence a Use-
ful Concept in Analyzing Underdevelopment," World Develop-
ment 3 (November 1975): 808. Lall pays little or no 
attention to relational asymmetry in transnational inter-
action, having made that fundamental error, he failed to 
grasp the crux of the dependence/dependencia theory. 
100avid A. Baldwin, "Interdependence and Power: A 
Conceptual Analysis," International Organization 4 (Autumn 
1980): 471-506. 
IlIbid., p. 489. 
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preoccupation concerns what he sees as the distortion 
of the "conventional" and "normal" usage of the term 
interdependence by the dependencia school. "In explicating 
the concept of dependence, the simple most important 
question concerns conventional usage. ,,12 He accepts the 
etymological ancestry of the terms dependence and depen-
dency but finds "rather mystifying" Caporoso's assertion 
that dependency, since it has no basis or roots in Baldwin's 
"conventional" fixation, "can only be understood within a 
certain body of historical, political, and sociological 
thought. ,,13 Caporoso's certain body of sociological 
thought is, of course, the analytic framework of dependency 
school. Granted, Caporoso's coyness in not acknowledging 
that he was actually referring to this school of thought, 
what does one make of Baldwin's pretensions of a disinte-
rested analysis? Was Baldwin aware of his own normative 
disposition with which his analysis is thoroughly informed? 
One would have to look long and hard to answer that in 
the affirmative. Baldwin refers approvingly and selectively 
to the concept of dependency in his own words, as employed 
by "Machiavelli, Montequieu, Rousseau, Adam Smith and 
14 Malthus." His so-called'conceptual analysis is really 
12 b'd 475 I ~ ., p. . 
13Caporaso, "Dependence, Dependency and Power in the 
Global System: A Structural and Behavioral Analysis," p. 19. 
14Baldwin, "Interdependence and Power: A Conceptual 
Analysis," p. 484. 
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an unsophisticated defense of the orthodox school of 
international relations, his objective pretensions notwith-
standing. According to Gunnar Myrdal, 
Every study of a social problem, however limited 
in scope, is and must be determined by valua-
tions. A 'disinterested' social science has 
never existed and for logical reasons, can never 
exist. 15 
Scholars and lay people alike are indeed entitled to 
subscribe to whatever normative and analytic perspectives 
that best illuminate the dynamics of social reality to them. 
What we are saying is that characterizing analytic terms 
as being of conventional or normal usage clarifies nothing. 
"Normalcy" and "conventionality" are based on specific 
valuations and norms, not on an immutable datum, like the 
order of nature itself. 16 
Beyond the theoretical exposition though, the ultimate 
irrelevance of Baldwin's analysis is his position on the 
use or non-use of power in international politics. Even at 
the level of ideas and abstraction, Baldwin's analysis 
approaches the fringes of irrationality and illogicality. 
In parts, it is nothing short of amazing. Conceptually he 
subscribes to the idealist conception of history, ignoring 
the fact that, according to Morgenthau, "the main signpost 
that helps political realism to find its way through the 
l5Gunnar Mydral, Objectivity in Social Research 
(New York: Pantheon Books, 1969), p. 55. 
l6Kenneth R. Hoover, Elements of Social Scientific 
Thinking (New York: St. Martins Press, 1976). 
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landscape of international polities is the concept of 
17 interest defined as power." Rosen and Jones, for example, 
characterize power as, 
The ability of an international actor to use 
its tangible and intangible resources and 
assets in such a way as to influence the out-
come of events in the international system in 
the direction of improving its own satis-
faction within the system. 18 
Contrarily, according to Baldwin, there is an analytic 
distinction between potential power and actual power. 
Granted, but what do nations seek power for? It could be 
for national aggrandizement, prestige, but more importantly 
for the pursuit of the interests of that nation in the 
international system. Baldwin seems to suggest the contrary, 
"if some states find themselves dependent in some respects 
on other states, it does not follow that this situation is 
attributable to the preferences of the dominant states.,,19 
Baldwin does ~ot tell us how and why some nations become 
vulnerable to the machination of other nations in the 
international system, whether through the act of God or just 
the "natural" hierarchy of power. Furthermore, he goes on, 
"the dependency of children on their parents with respect 
to livelihood is probably more by biology and society than 
17Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for 
Power and Peace, p. 5. 
l8Walter S. Jones and Steven J. Rosen, The Logic of 
International Relations (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 
1982), p. l8I. 
19Baldwin, "Interdependence and Power: A Conceptual 
Analysis," p. 499. 
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20 preference of the parents." Properly understood, this is 
a Rostowian evolutionary concept of society/history. The 
dependency of some nations on others is therefore attri-
buted to natural evolution (biology in Baldwin's analogy) 
rather than by the conscious machination of actors in the 
pursuit of their interests. Baldwin characterized this as 
"unintended influence." In analyzing motivation/intentions 
in power relations, he questions "whether the exercise of 
power must always be intentional on the part of the power 
wielder."21 Baldwin is in the company of Professor 
.. 22 .. Peter Du~gnan who argued that the pursu~t of colon~al 
domination was simply fueled by feelings of national senti-
ments. He argued erroneously that Germany paid little or 
no attention to colonial acquisition and expansion. In 
fact, Otto von Bismark on whose initiative the Berlin 
Conference on the partition of Africa was convened, carne 
to believe that acquisition of colonies was essential "for 
winning new markets for German industries, the expansion of 
trade and a new field for German activity, civilization and 
capital. ,,23 This need for world domination throUGh 
20Ibid., p. 499. 
21Ibid., p. 499. 
22p. Duignan, "Africa's Colonial History and American 
Policy in Southern Africa," in Working Papers No. I 
(New Jersey: Africa Research and Publication, 1982). 
23claude Ake, A Political Economy of Africa (Essex: 
Longman, 1981), p. 29. 
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expansion and conquest had reached such a plateau that 
by 1914, European colonial hegemony had 'extended over 
24 
approximately 85 percent of the earth's surface.' It is 
quite tempting to dismiss these authors' subjective and 
idyllic view of imperatives of relations between states off 
hand. It is hard to see how the subjugation of African 
peoples and resources for European capitalist expansion 
could be characterized as "unintended". Various scholars 
have written extensively on how the contemporary world 
25 system came to be. 
There is nothing unintended nor idyllic about the 
systematic subjugation of Africans through slavery, colonial 
partition and ultimately neo-colonial exploitation for the 
ultimate benefit of Euro-American finance capital. Indeed 
contrary to Baldwin, various European powers had clear and 
unambiguous reasons and rationalizations vis-a-vis Africa 
and had no illusions of any neutral engagement. True 
enough the reasons are concealed under such trite statements 
as the French "mission civilatrice," the British "white 
man's burden," or religious mission to Christianize the 
24Harry Magdoff, Imperialism: From the Colonial Aqe 
to the Present (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1978), pp. 
34-35, 
25see among various works: Magdoff, Imperialism: From 
the Colonial Age to the Present; Frank, World Accumulation: 
1492-1789; Amin, Imperialism and Unequal Develcpment; 
Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa; Sau, Unequal 
Exchange: Imperialism and Underdevelopment; Dan Nabudere, 
The political Economy of Imperialism (Dar-es-Salaam: 
Tanzania Publishing House, 1977). 
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natives. By and large the Europeans in their bid to subju-
gate Africa and secure first free labor for European econo-
26 mic development and later raw materials and markets for 
manufactured goods were secure in their knowledge that 
"their gain shall be the knowledge of our faith, and ours 
27 such riches as the(ir) country hath." In subduing the 
East A:e'rican city states, -for example, European plunder and 
evangelizing went hand in hand, and not hand in glove. Here 
is how the Portuguese converted a city to Christiandom, 
In Kilwa, there are many strong houses several 
stories high. They are built of stone and mortar 
and plastered with various designs. As soon as 
the town had been taken without opposition, the 
Vicar-General and some of the Franciscan fathers 
came ashore carrying two crosses in procession 
and singing Te Deum. They went to the palace, 
and there the cross was put down and the Grand-
Captain prayed. Then everyone started to plund~r 
the town of all its merchandise and provisions. 8 
Nzongola-Ntalaja had periodized the gradual but 
29 systematic incorporation of Africa into the world system. 
The first period 1500/1-1885, the epoch of European mercan-
tilist expansion, falls within and into what Wallerstein 
- 30 has characterized as "the long sixteenth century." This 
26Eric Williams, Capitalism and Slavery (New York: 
Putham, 1980). 
27Sir Francis Drake, quoted by Chinweizu in, The 
West and the Rest of Us (New York: Vintage, 1975), p.~. 
28Mai Palmberg, The Struggle for Africa (London: 
Zed Press, 1982), p. 25. 
29Nzogola-Ntalaja, Class Struggle and National 
Liberation in Africa (Roxbury: Omena, 1982), p. 5. 
~OImmanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World System 
(New York: 1976). 
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ruinous encounter virtually assured the doom of Africa as 
it facilitated the complete subjugation of social institu-
tions and enterprises to the colonizing powers. More 
importantly, the most essential engine of social-economic 
advancement, the most important resource--people, were now 
the object of sale to provide cheap and free labor for Euro-
American mercantilist expansion. When it is estimated that 
Africa lost 20-30 million people to the European slave trade 
and its attendant implications like social disequili-brium . 
and stagnation, the net effect of this loss can hardly be 
gauged. 
O h 1 h ' th f' 31 1 h' h ' d' ne sc 0 ar as g1ven e 19ures be ow w 1C 1n 1-
cate the virtual depopulation of the continent for two cen-
turies: 
1650 1750 1850 1900 
Africa 100* 100* 100* 120* 
Europe 103* 144* 274* 423* 
Asia 257* 437* 656* 857* 
*million 
Naturally, depopulation of the continent is compounded 
by widespread socio-economic stagnation. 
The colonial period (the second period) of 1885-1920 
merely put a juridical seal of international approval to the 
European de ~acto conquests. 
Germany, Britain and France, the most industrially 
advanced countries, were now in possession of 80% of African 
31Rodney, HO\l'l Europe Underdeveloped Africa, :9 .1"0 6. 
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32 land mass, and they together with Portugal, Spain, Italy, 
and Belgium exercised the decisive formative influence on 
socio-economic and political development on the continent. 
contrary to Baldwin's ludicrous notion of unintended 
influence and power in international relations, Frederick 
Lugard, the Briton who did more than most to bring Nigeria 
and Uganda under British rule was very succinct and clear 
about the nature of power and the pursuit of national 
interest. Regarding the European interest in Africa, Luggard 
had this to say, "the partition of Africa was, as we all 
recognize, due primarily to the economic necessity of in-
creasing the supplies of raw materials and food to meet the 
33 needs of the industrialized nations of Europe." Nzongola 
characterized 1920-1945 as "the high colonial period," and 
1945-1960 as the era of nationalism and decolonization. 
Apart from the trade economy of the colonial era and 
the virtual subordination of African economies to European 
industrial development, colonialism has a much more per-
vasive influence, including the subjugation of African 
sovereignty. Intellectually, the colonial epoch saw the 
birth of such notions of the alleged complementarity and 
interdependence of Africa and European destinies in economic 
32palmberg, The Struggle for Africa, p. 15. 
33chinweizu, The West and the Rest of Us, p. 55. On 
the role of power in international relations, an opposing 
school of thought, see Arnold Wolfers, "The Role of Power 
and Pole of Indifference," in George H. Quester, Power, 
Action and Interaction--Readings in International Politics 
(Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1971). 
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and political levels. Thinkers and politicians alike began 
to espouse the great cause of "Eurafrica,'" then a new word. 
According to Guy Martin, 
The ideology of Eurafrica is a body of thought, 
originating in the colonial period, according to 
which the fate of Europe and Af:rica is seen as 
being naturally inextricably linked at the po~!­
tical, economic, social, and cultural levels. 
According to its proponents,. this included military as 
well. What is the origin of this idea? It would appear that 
its earliest usage was in a 1925 survey by the General Elec-
tric Company on a proposal for a hydroelectric project in 
European-owned Africa. A Frenchman, Eugene Guernier, dis-
putes this claim and credits himself as the genius who con-
ceived the noble idea. Another German writer, Franz Anspren-
ger, claimed the idea as his in his 1933 work, "Politic in 
Schwarzen Afrika." All the same, it is quite evident the 
concept was a c.loak for a national and colonial policy of an 
American hydropower finance spectator and some European states 
bl d B · . 35 nota y Germany, France, an r~ta~n. 
The rationalization for "Eurafrica" ranges from the 
absurd to the facile. For example, some speculators opined 
thus, "the African soil is too poor to be able to do without 
Europe. The African subsoil is too rich for Europe to be able 
to do without Africa. Thus, it must be admitted that Africa 
34Guy Martin, "Africa and the Ideology of Eurafrica: 
Neocolonialism or Pan-Africanism," The Journal of Modern 
African Studies, 20:2 (1982), p. 222. 
35vernon McKay, A'frica in World politics (London: 
Harper and ROW, 1963), pp. 134-149. 
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is an indispensible complement to Europe. ,,36 
Such rationalization provided justification for con-
tinued European exploitation of African labor and resources. 
Having created colonial preferential trade exchange 
via the Berlin conference of 1885, the Euro-African trade 
exchange was set up under the following regulations for the 
African colonies. 
1. They could only admit goods that originated 
from the metropole. 
2. They could only export to the metropole on 
a duty-free basis. 
3. They could not set up their own manufacturing 
industries. 
4. They had to rely on the carriers of the metro-
pole for the transportation of both their 
exports and imports. 
Thus was born and enforced an international division 
of labor in which the African colonies were reduced to the 
role of suppliers of raw materials while the Europeans arro-
gated to themselves in exclusivity the role of industrial 
production/export. This aspect only explains the unequal 
trade. What about unequal exchange? The most graphic mani-
festation of that is in the underpricing of African exports 
and overpricing imports from the metropole, paying slave 
wages for the African labor force and preventing them from 
growing food crops in order to free their labor for export 
'crops. Another method was to draw more people into the 
36Guy Martin, "Africa and the Ideology of Eurafrica," 
p. 226. 
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money economy by introducing the capitalist mode of produc-
tion in ever wider areas of the continent. British foreign 
trade (especially its infant industries) reaped bounteous 
harvests; the colonial trade which was less than 15% of the 
British total at the beginning of the 16th century, doubled, 
rising to 33% by 1775. 37 The colonial trade allowed British 
industries the possibility of expanded production and spe-
cialisation while the prices of the raw materials coming from 
the colonies were determined by the colonial state. It 
further allowed the accumulation of the economic surplus to 
further finance the industrial revolution. 38 
This is the reality of socio-economic and political 
dependency which the apologies for Eurafrica call inter-
dependence or cooperation. In our periodization here, we 
shall treat both the neocolonial era, i.e., from 1960 to the 
. 
present, and the epoch of nationalism and decolonization 
together. This is because the nationalism/decolonization 
era was the gestation for the neocolonial era; one gives 
birth to the other, they are both intricately and organ-
ically linked. The devastation of Europe after the War of 
1939-45 created widespread renewed impetus for the fruitifi-
cation and institutionalization of the Eurafrica concept and 
many European countries, including Italy, Germany and 
Netherlands were desperate to recoup their economic position. 
37W• Schloete, British OVerseas Trade from 1700 to 
193'Os (Oxford: Blackwell, 1938). See also J. Callagher and 
R. Robinson, "The Imperialism of Free Trade," in A. G. Shaw 
(ed.), Great Britian and the Colonies (London: 1970). 
38Ibid. 
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To suggest that it was only the economic need for post 
war reconstruction that spurred this renewed interest would 
be misleading indeed; there were political as well as mili-
tary aspects. A dialectic juxtaposition and confluence of 
events, the economic imperative being only one of them, made 
the continuation of the subjugation/domination of Africa for 
European hegemony a matter of paramount interest in the post 
war era. Europe lay in splended ruin; old imperial Britain 
bloodied by massive Nazi air power; Germany divided in ruins; 
France laboring under political instability and unable to 
provide jobs for the citizens; but more strategically for the 
Western world, the bogey of communism and the hysterical fear 
of the vigorious assertive self-determination of the colonized 
people in Africa and Asia. 
On the economic front, Europe started to devise strate-
gies and tactics to fit the new era of neo-colonialism and 
grant juridical independence to the African countries while 
retaining economic leverage. According to Kwame Nkrumah, 
The essence of neo-colonialism is that the state 
which is subject to it is in theory independent 
and has all the outward trappings of international 
sovereignty. In reality its economic system and 
thus its political policy is directed from the 
outside. 39 
In a foreign policy speech in 1948, Ernest Bevin, the 
then British Foreign Secretary in looking for economic support 
for the nascent idea of a European Union said, "In the first 
39Kwame Nkrumah, Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of 
Imperialism (London: 1965), p. 9. 
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place, we turn our eyes to Africa We need the closest 
possible collaboration with the •.• overseas territories, 
not only British, but French, Dutch, Belgium and Portu-
40 guese." From the inception of the Consultative Assembly 
of the Council of Europe in 1949, the need to forge the 
closest links with Europe's African colonies was stressed. 
In 1952, the Strassburg Plan4l was born. This plan called 
for coordination of the economics of Western Europe with the 
colonial territories and dominions having constitutional ties 
with these same European states. This then is the genesis of 
the Eurafrica concept in the economic field which manifests 
itself in early years of independence of African countries 
in such neo-colonial contractual and institutionalized 
multilateral arrangements, namely Yaounde I (1964-1969), 
Yaounde II (1969-1975), Lome I (1975-1980), Lome II (1980-
1985). Indeed the linking of these African colonies to the 
EEC was a condition for French agreement to the Treaty of 
Rome in 1957. Having exercised decisive formative influence 
in Africa from the era of primitive accumulation to that of 
colonialist unequal trade/exchange, the modern neo-colonial 
era is thus designed to ensure, as Tables IV and V show, 
unimpeded access to primary commodities, markets, and 
minerals of the African states. France and Belgium negotiated 
40 . . 1 . h k . McKay c1tes an art1c e 1n t e New Yor T1mes, 
January 23, 1948~ McKay, Africa in World politics, p. 138. 
41 
Ibid., p. 144. 
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and signed the agreement that associated their respective 
African dependencies to the EEC. Doing away with the myths 
of "complimentarity," "cooperation," or "interdependence" 
between European and African economies, it was the need to 
continue the vertical international division of labor, unim-
peded and unfettered access to, and free flow of African raw 
materials and minerals to Europe and the need for the security 
and defence of these SOllrces that lie at the root of the 
concept of Eurafrica. 
The EEC is resource deficient and dependent, especially 
in the fields of energy, raw materials and more importantly 
strategic metals and minerals. The .near wholesale dependence 
on, and maintenance of African resources has been a corner-
stone of European foreign economic policy since post World 
War II. One single African country--Zaire--produces 60% of 
the cobalt needs of the Euro-American, Japanese industrial 
complex and 39% of its industrial diamonds. Moreover, in 
Africa lies 97% of the total known world deposit of chromium 
--a steel hardener that has no known substitute in metal-
lurgical and some chemical uses. The Western World ideolo-
gical and political adversary, that is, the Soviet Union has 
the remaining 2.9% and is at best an unreliable and at worst 
a hostile supplier of this critical metal. 
As Table V shows, the EEC is dependent exclusively on 
Africa for chromium importation. Japan is also 100% depen-
dent, while the U.S. is 46% dependent on African chromium. 
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Thus, it takes no genius to deduce that even given allowance 
for massive stockpiling by these Western countries, a with-
drawal of these critical raw materials and minerals will 
very likely cripple the modern industrial sectors of these 
countries. 
The first part of this chapter has been devoted to an 
analysis of the genesis of the concept of Eurafrica which 
manifests itself in such terms as complementarity of interest; 
convergence of interest; interdependence between Europe and 
Africa. Our task here is to demonstrate how such terms are 
not only misleading, but they gloss over the brutal reality 
of subjugation of African interests to Euro-American (Western) 
interests. 
The essential features of African economy can be charac-
terized by three distinct and yet interlocking features. 42 
An economic triad that is both distorted and disarticulated. 
(I) Its domestic features are characterized by highly capi-
talized enclaves existing side by side with backward subsis-
tence economies. Both the capitalized enclaves and subsis-
tence agricultural sector do not articulate with one another, 
but with the world capitalist economy. (II) Mineral export 
and commodity production (for export) as opposed to food 
production for local consumption is the second feature. 
Africa produces 97% of the world's chromite; 62% of its 
42For an incisive theoretical exposition of African 
political economy, see Claude Ake, A Political Economy of 
Africa (Essex: Longman, 1981). 
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gOld; 73% of the plantinum group metals; 34% of the uranium; 
82% of phosphate rock; 43% of the cobalt; 21% of the copper; 
53% of the manganese; 25% of the asbestos; 36% of the vana-
dium; and 66% of tantalum. 43 Indeed Southern Africa--the 
region that encompasses all the countries from Zaire to South 
Africa, has appropriately been termed the "Persian Gulf" of 
44 the mineral world, nearly all of which are exported to the 
Western capitalist industrialized states, while the continent 
itself has produced, in the modern industrial manufacturing 
sector, an unenviable 0.6% of the world output since 1960. 45 
(III) Extra African Control: Africa consumes only 
one-sixth of its oil output (the rest being exported) and yet 
paradoxically Africa is not even self-reliant in the oil sec-
tor because of reliance on foreign markets, technology and 
capital. The region is served by unreliable and highly 
costly supply of petroleum products through multinational 
sales and distribution network. More importantly, Africa'a 
vulnerability to extra-African control is manifested in the 
absence of any significant increase in intra-African trade 
and commerce. As our Table IV shows, the continent is vir-
tually a captive market for EEC import/export trade. The 
economies of Africa depend primarily on extra-African trade, 
43wolfgang Michalski, "Industrial Raw Materials," 
The OECD Observer, No. 93 (July 1978), p. 14. 
44Tony Hughes, "Africa's Uranium: Few Gains, Big 
Dangers," Africa, 51 (November 1975), pp. 18-20. 
45surve¥ of Economic Conditions in Africa: Part I 
(New York: Un1ted Nations, 1974), E.75.11K. 
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paradoxically, in a continent with an internal market in 
excess of 500 million. The trade dependency reflects the 
exploitative structural integration of the neo-colonial 
economy to the capitalist system of the metropole. The EEC, 
to which the African economy is anchored in the capitalist 
system also has its own equivalent of the International Mone-
tary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (IBRD). These are the European Development 
Fund (EDF) and the European Investment Bank (EIB). The EDF 
is capitalized by EEC members and Germany and France are to 
EDF what the united States is to IMF. 
contrary to McKay, Rivkin, Padeiford and Emerson46 who 
wrote optimistically in the early years of African juridical 
independence of "cooperation"between Europe and Africa, and 
Cosgrove Twitchett47 who characterized the EIB and EDG as 
agents of economic advancement, Africa remains a veritable 
appendage of the European Economic Community into which its 
economy has been progressively integrated from 1400 onwards. 
The continent remains a subordinate unit of an external system 
46vernon McKay, Africa in World Politics (New York: 
Harper and RoW, 1963); Arnold Rivkin, Africa and the West 
(New York: Praeger Publishers, 1962); Norman Padeiford and 
Rupert Emerson, Africa and ~vorld Order (New York: Praeger 
Publishers, 1963). These three publications belong to the 
liberal historiography of the Western World that was wide-
spread in the early 60s. They generally gloss over the real 
and direct role of African economy in the Post World War II 
reconstruction of Europe and the need therefore to maintain 
this unequal relationship. 
47Cosgrove Twitchett, Europe and Africa: From Associa-
tion to Partnership (London: Saxon House, 1979). 
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whose controlling levers are located in the center of 
EurOpean-American finance capital. 
Having elaborated earlier on the position of the 
realist conception of interest and pursuit of power in 
furtherance of that interest, let us see how relationa148 
asymmetry and dependency is exercised in practice. 
Dependency is defined as 'an asymmetrical struc-
ture of control or relations wherein a controller 
such as a state, a multinational enterprise, or a 
parent regularly and hence predictably, changes 
or maintains the behavior of a control lee such as 
another state 49 
In defining power in the global system we define power as 
ability to control the outcome of events or the capability 
of an actor in the system to "manipulate the choices, capa-
bilities, alliance opportunities and pay-off that actors 
may utilize. IISO 
Caporoso in distinguishing bargaining power from 
structural power defined structural power as a "higher 
order power" in that "it is a power to govern the rules 
which shape bargaining power."Sl 
Caporoso also analyses dependency in terms of the 
48James A. Caporoso, IlIntroduction to the Special 
Issue of International Organization on Dependence and 
Dependency in the Global System," Internatinal Organiza-
tion (Winter 1978), p. 1. 
49patrick J. McGowan and Dale L. Smith, "Economic 
Dependency in Black Africa: An Analysis of Competing 
Theories," International Organization (Winter 1978). 
SOcaporoso, "Introduction to the Special Issue of 
International Organisation on Dependence and Dependency 
in the Global System," p. 1. 
Sllbid., p. 4 • 
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structural distortions,52 that is, distortions resulting from 
relational asymmetry. It is the structural power located in 
dependency that manifests itself in dependence as relational 
control. That is when an actor or a group of actors have the 
capability (that is really located in the forceful subjuga-
tion of other areas, in the case of Africa, through slavery, 
colonialism or neo-colonialism) to manipulate the choices, 
capabilities or alliance opportunities of other actors. All 
the multilateral institutions through whose agencies systemic 
monetary commercial and trade transactions are regulated in 
the modern era work in a complementary and not in a conflict-
ing manner; in fact they work in a cycle. These include the 
General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT); International 
Monetary Fund (IMP), and other affiliates of the World Bank 
like the International Finance Corporation (IFC) or the 
International Development Association (IDA); all were created 
by the dominant transnational actors to regulate a system in 
which Africa is necessarily a subordinate unit. 
For example, when the World Bank lays down its regula-
tions such as the elimination of subsidies, wage-freeze, 
retrenchment in the labour force, devaluation of domestic 
currency, imposition of more liberal terms for foreign 
investment; all these are usually the conditions that need 
to be met before coming to a country's aid in adjusting a 
particular balance of payment situation. The World Bank 
52Ibid . 
-8·0-
which regulates the imperial system into which Africa is a 
subordinate unit, is controlled essentially by five major 
capitalist powers. It, along with the International Mone-
tary Fund, acts as the clearing house and coordinator of the 
system's finance. Working in conjunction with the Organiza-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and 
the European Economic Community (EEC), it oversees an inter-
locking world-wide empire to whom the chances, and options 
of Af~ican economics are subordinated. 
In the World Bank's choice of target or allocation, 
the motif is profit and not necessarily need. In the Euro-
pean Development Fund (EDF) , established ostensibly to pro-
53 mote development of the associated states, the EEC has 
absolute control over the management of the fund and alloca-
tion to any project in any of the African states. It is 
this leverage inherent in the structural power to determine 
choices of options within the system, that captures the 
subordinate nature of Africa in the capitalist world sys·tern. 
According to Tony Smith, the international system, 
••• has at its disposal sanctions for transgres-
sing its basic rules which are all the more power-
ful since their greatest force comes not from an 
active threat of invention so much as from a threat 
of withdrawal which would abandon ••• (these coun-
tries) to civil and violent conflict. 54 
s3Monique Garrity, "African and European Economic 
Community," The Review of Black POlitical Economy, Vol. 2, 
No. 1 (1971), p.' 97. 
s4Tony Smith, "The Underdevelopment of Development 
Literature: The Case of Dependency Theory," World 
Politics (31 Janaury 1979), pp. 247-248. 
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This is a most curious statement indeed! Smith seems to be 
suggesting that Third World states were incorporated into 
the capitalist world system not for profit but to quell 
regional and conflict and civil war. 
This seems to be a modern version of "La mission 
civila.trice of French colonialism, "The white man's burden" 
apology of British imperialism or the jingoism of "the 
manifest destiny" of the United States expansionism. That 
apart, Smith's assertion flies in the face of historical 
fact and reality. The sanction he alluded to carne from not 
a threat of withdrawal, but from that of active intervention· 
in various guises from covert manipulation to outright 
military intervention. The Belgian~Western ruse for mili-
tary intervention 1964 in Zaire was to "save European lives" 
and not "stabilize" the situation for continued access to 
zaire mineral wealth. Contrary to Smith, there is no evi-
dence that the international system withdraws. The inter-
national system by which we mean the international capi-
talist system reproduces itself by expansion and further 
expansion, or in the definitive words of Henry Grade, "The 
capitalist system is essentially an international system. 
If it cannot function internationally, it will break down 
55 completely." 
The term interdependence whic~ is often used to 
characterize the relationship between African economy and 
550an NabudGre, The Political Economy of Imperialism 
(London: Zed Press, Ltd., 1977), p. 144. 
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that of the West does not enjoy a universally acceptable 
definition. For Edward Morse, the term refers to a situa-
tion where the action of one nation directly affects other 
56 actors. Obviously this definition does not address the 
nature of the relations between actors, neither does it 
analyze the symmetry of power that informs the relationship. 
For Rosecrance, Alexander Koehler, Kroll, Laquer, and 
Stocker,S7 interdependence refers to "the direct and posi-
tive linkage of the interests of states where a change in 
the position of one state affects the position of others and 
in the same direction." Interdependence obviously, as a 
concept posits a mutuality of interest and reciprocity or 
mutual sensitivity to the sensibilities of the entities that 
are supposed to be interdependent. In our analysis here, 
this definition will suffice as an abstract notion. In the 
international relations of Africa though, it is both a mis-
leading and an unilluminating concept with regards to the 
subordinate nature of Africa in the world system. A break-
down by percentage of vote of the International Monetary Fund 
will further reveal the nature of the power asymmetry in this 
interdependence. While the African bloc commands the numeri-
cal majority, the continent only has 7.54% of the votes of 
the Fund and successive quota reviews have not affected the 
S6Edward Morse, "Transnational Economic Processes," in 
R. Koehane and J. Nye, Jr., Transnationalism in World Poli-
tics (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1972). 
S7R• Rosecrance; A. Alexandroff; W. Koehler; J. Kroll; 
S. Laqueur and J. Stocker, "Whither Interdependence," in 
International Organisation, Vol. 31, No. 3 (Summer 1977). 
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basis for the quota distribution. Contrarily, five indus-
trial capitalist nations, led by the United States, have 41% 
of the votes in the Fund. 58 In a system of weighted voting 
in which the voting rights of members are determined by the 
size of the quotas, the subordinate status of Africa in the 
World system is assured. When the Fund puts together, or 
refuses to do same, a "stabilization scheme" for a country, 
its decision is based more on the strategic geo-political 
calculus of those who hold the decisive vote in the Fund and 
what they perceive to be the zero-sum derivation to their 
own systemic interests and less on the African country who 
to begin with had a negligible vote. 
On the African continent, Mobutu's regime, for these 
strategic reasons, has been maintained and defended by a 
plethora of western financial interests including both the 
IMF, IBRD, and a consortia of Western private lending insti-
tutions. In the absence of any other compliant Zairen to 
oversee Western interests and make available unimpeded 
Western access to Zaire's formidable wealth, Mobutu's 
. h b . . d 59 reg~me as to e ma~nta~ne • 
Perhaps nowhere does the concept of "interdependence" 
as an explanatory or analytic term become so misleading 
58E• I. M., M=t:ei, "Africa and the IMF: An Evolving 
Relationship," Africa Report (Septernber':'October 1984). 
59see Thomas M. Ca11aghy, "The Ritual of the Debt 
Game," Africa Report (September-October 1984), Guy Gran 
(ed.), Zaire: The Political Economy of Underdevelopment 
(New York: Praeger Publishers, 1979), pp. 301-309. 
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than in the political economy of Franco-African relations. 
The structural power in the whole range of the properties 
of relational asymmetry vis-a-vis Africa in the world 
system is perhaps best captured in the mechanisms and 
modalities of this relational control. Structural power 
is necessarily both variegated and multifaceted and within 
the broad spectrum of relational control, its influence is 
both far-reaching in the decisive sectors of the subordi-
nate power. The CFA Franc monetary zone is a case in point. 
The CFA Franc-zone is a monetary economic entity that links 
France and twelve African countries that used to be French 
West and Equatorial Africa. All these countries became, 
juridically at least, independent of France in 1960. In 
the present neo-colonial era, let us examine how their 
subordinate relationship is now mounted, indeed institu-
tionalized. Before their independence, Mali, Benin, Togo, 
Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Niger, and Senegal grouped them-
selves into an organization called the West African Monetary 
Union which goes by the French acronym of UMOA. Gabon, Cen-
tral Africaa Republic Chad, Cameroon, and the Congo formed 
the Customs and Economic Union of Central Africa (UDEAC). . 
The two organizations have a uniform monetary unit, the CFA 
franc which since 1948 has been fixed by the French treasury 
to the French franc (FF) at the rate of 1 FF to 50 CFA. 
Furthermore, as a reflection of this unequal relationship, 
the CFA franc convertibility is guaranteed by the French 
franc. The UMOA and UDEAC countries have to deposit two-
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thirds of their foreign exchange earnings into the French 
60 treasury. Therefore, control of these countries reserves, 
and the issue of currency rests with France; that is to say, 
the CFA franc is merely an extension of the French franc. 
Such unbridled manipulation is justified by suggesting that 
it gives CFA franc stability and international status. But 
this is monetary dependence, a means of exploitation which 
put those countries' reserves at the disposal of France. 
African savings can now be loaned to French investors seeking 
to invest in the countries where the capital had come from 
the first place. 
Contrary to the myth of Euro-African "mutual" interests, 
61 or the misrepresentation of Zartman who states that "decolo-
nization has its own logic, wherein each step creates pres-
sures for the next and reduces the possibility of counter-
action by retreating post-colonial forces," neither UDEAC or 
UMOA could influence French monetary policy. More impor-
tantly, all of the countries inherit the fluctuations and 
vagaries of French economy since FF guarantees the CFA franc. 
All of them with the exception of Gabon, Cameroon and Congo, 
are petroleum product importers, whose exports as well as 
those of other mineral products, are denominated in u.S 
dollars against which French franc has been losing value. 
60Antonio-Ganriel M. Cunha, "The CFA Franc Zone: The 
Other Side of the Coin," Africa Report (October 1984). 
6lI • William Zartman, "The Future of Europe and Africa: 
Decolonization or Dependency," in Timothy M. Shaw (ed.), 
Alternative Futures for Africa (Boulder, 1982), p. 261. 
-86-
The FF cannot provide any cushioning against the rapid upward 
spiral in the price of petroleum products and other manufac-
tured goods; they continue to experience downward trends in 
their terms of trade. It places a heavy burden of proof on 
those who characterize Euro-African economic relations as 
one of interdependence when all the UMOA and UDEAC countries 
within the Franc monetary zone have virtually given up their 
sovereignty over monetary, trade, and ecomomic Planning. 62 
Interdependence posits self-reliance between independent, 
units, it is not characterized by relational asymmetry. A 
nation that has no control over its own affairs cannot enter 
any interdependent relationship. the relationship then will 
be characterized by exploitation and manipulation rather than 
by mutuality of interest and meaningful cooperation. 
It is fashionable in Western liberal and conservative 
historiography on Africa to define the problematic of African 
international relations in strictly globalist terms shaped 
63 by the big power detente. Both perspectives do share an 
62For a rigorous analysis of the political economy of 
Franco-African relations, see Olasupo Adedokun, "Franco-
African Relations and the Use of Intervention as an Instru-
ment of Foreign Policy Objectives," {Ph.D. dissertation, 
Political Science Department, Atlanta University, Atlanta, 
1982)i M. Corbett (ed.), French Presence in Black Africa 
(Washington, D.C.: Black Orpheus Press, 1972). 
63For the liberal historiography in this context, see 
William Zartman, "Coming Political Problems in Black Africa," 
in Jennifer Seymour Whitaker, Africa and the United States: 
Vital Interests {New York: University Press, 1978}i Colin 
Legum, "Communal Conflict and International Intervention in 
Africa," in Colin Legum~ I. William Zartman~ Steven Langdon 
and Lynn K. Mytekla, Africa in the 1980s: A Continent in 
Crisis (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979). For the conservative 
-87-
orientation in their understanding of internal African poli-
tics, they are both obsessed with what they see as consuming 
ethnic rivalry and conflict. Apart from the fact that their 
understanding is not based on any theoretically informed 
insights, it is rooted in an ahistorical, subjective and 
impressionistic framework. Both perspectives fail to grasp 
the fact that the basis of any reliable analysis of a social 
reality is historical data. Their understanding is there-
fore then more often than not factually flawed. Let us con-
sider for example this trite observation: 
Even if the major Western powers should wish to 
disengage from an interventionist role in Africa, 
it is hard to see how other global interests will 
allow this to happen so long as the Soviets, at 
least, remain ~nwilling to match such a Western 
disengagemen t.6 
This position rests on a number of interrelated but utterly 
fallacious assumptions: 
1. The problematic of African international 
relations are shaped by the state of 
East/West ideological and strategic rivalry. 
2. Any geo-political unit on the globe is a 
battle area for the conflict which is pri-
marily on a zero-sum calculus. In other 
words there is a vacuum in any and every 
geographical area of the world which if the 
Western nations do not fill, the Soviets 
and their allies will. 
perspective, see W. Scott Thompson, "U.S .. Policy Toward 
Africa: At America's Service," in Orbis, 25:4 (Winter 
1982): Roger Pearson (ed.), Sino soviet Intervention in 
Africa (Washington, D.C.: Council on American Affairs, 
1977) . 
64Colin Legum, "Communal Conflict and International 
Intervention in Africa," p. 66. 
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3. The Western countries can simply disengage 
themselves from an interventionist role in 
Africa and are only there to counter the 
Soviets; the Western nations have no self 
interest of a pre-existing pattern of impe-
rialist domination in Africa. 
The assumption underlying these perspectives are 
utterly untenable because they cannot be supported by any 
historical fact. At the Berlin Conference of 1884, six 
European nations carved up the entire African continent 
among themselves into exclusive preserves of imperial over-
seas empire. Britain carved for itself 3~ million miles of 
African territory; France got 4~ million miles of African 
territory; while Germany, Portugal, Belgium and Italy 
divided among themselves in about equal proportion, 
900,000 square miles to each nation. At this empire build-
ing exercise, the united States and Tsarist Russia were 
present as observers. 65 At the end of this exercise only 
4~ percent of the entire continent remained under tenuous 
African sovereignty--the Ethiopian Empire and the Republic 
of Liberia. The fact is that Western interventionism in 
Africa is no dog-in-the-manger policy based simply on how 
to counter Soviet machinations. As tables IV and V show, 
Africa in the modern era has assumed a strategic importance 
in Western calculation as a market for its goods, and source 
of strategic minerals and metals, some of which have no 
known substitutes. The fact is that for five hundred years, 
65See Anthony Nutting, Scramble for Africa (New York: 
E. P. Dutton And Co., Inc., 1971); Arthur Gavshan, Crisis 
in Africa: Battleground of East and West (New York: Pen-
guin, 1981). 
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the Western nations have exercised decisive formative influ-
ence on the continent. It is a useful ploy for domestic con-
sumption to flaunt the bogey of a communist influence in 
order to conceal the formidable self-interests these Western 
nations seek to protect and to thwart African justifiable 
determination to control their own affairs and resources. 
Thus it is useful to play down or completely disregard African 
aspirations to regain control over their continent and to 
begin to take steps to regain African initiative and reassess 
all unequal relations that infringe on the sovereignty and 
integrity of the continent. In order to retain Africa as the 
exclusive preserve of the Western world and to frustrate 
genuine African aspirations, Western scholars often go to 
great lengths to flaunt the bogey of communism but the contra-
dictions of their dependence on Africa is often difficult for 
them to ignore. For example, 
A communist take over in any African country would 
be a dangerous opening wedge for entry into a con-
tinent that has hitherto been held as an inviolate 
preserve of the free world. To Europe, Africa holds 
the promise of a frontier land still susceptible of 
great expansion, better as a market and as a source 
of unexplored industrial potential. Its riches in 
strategic and other minerals are impressive. In 
industrial diamonds, columbrium, cobalt, chromium 
and beryllium, Africa either leads the list of world 
producers or stands close to the top. It is a sig-
nificant producer of tin, manganese, copper, anti-
mony, and its reserves of iron ore and bauxite are 
just beginning to be tapped. The uranium of the 
Congo and South Africa has contributed to the 
unfolding of the atomic age .... To this mineral 
wealth, Africa adds through its agriculture a 
variety of foodstuffs and industrial materials 
such as cocoa, coffee, tea, vegetable oil, cotton, 
and pyretheum. The united States has a direct 
interest in many of these products, but it is 
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probably of less importance to preserve its own 
access to Africa's resources and markets than to 
make sure that its European allies are not cut 
off from them. 66 
This statement by Rupert Emerson is free to some extent 
of the usual obfuscation that often emanates from the Western 
liberal and conservative historiography on Africa. But it 
completely ignores the fact that the Western collaborative 
protracted interventionism is really designed to frustrate 
and thwart any African initiatives to terminate all unequal 
relations and existing imperialist domination. 
It serves Western interests quite well to flaunt the 
old bogey of communist expansion to cover their own real 
interest to maintain neo-colonial imperialist relations of 
exploitation in Africa. Indeed it is an old game in the 
conduct and practice of transnational/international affairs 
to ascribe a thing to what is not, in order to deflect criti-
cisms or conceal your own interest in the maintenance and 
strengthening of the status quo. In fact, before the War of 
1939-45, no African country had any standing relations with 
the Soviet Union. Besides, much of the continent lay under 
the colonial tutelage of Britain, France, Belgium and Portu-
gal, and the Western dominated League of Nations had shared 
out the trust territories of Somaliland, Togo, and South 
West Africa among Britain, France, and South Africa. By 
1954, only Ethiopia, Egypt, and Liberia were independent on 
66Rupert Emerson, The United States and Africa, 
Walter Goldschmidt (ed.) (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1963), 
p. 28. 
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the continent. And only Ethiopia and Egypt had relations with 
th S . t U· 67 e ov~e n~on. All actors in the international system, 
pursue actions that are deemed necessary in the pursuit of 
their national objectives; the communist nations are not 
immune from this cardinal principle of international rela-
tions. Having consolidated their system in their homelands, 
the Warsaw Pact nations and China could be said to be guided 
by the following interlocking imperatives immediately after 
the War of 1939-45, in the conduct of their international 
relations vis-a-vis the countries that were emerging from 
colonial tutelage. Among others, these could be: 
a. A desire to promote their national influence 
while assailing that of their ideological 
adversaries. 
b. Present themselves as proponents of anti-
colonialism to the people yearning for 
freedom from Western colonialism. 
c. Gain strategic facilities for their own geo-
political objectives. 
Neither the Soviet Union nor the Peoples' Republic of 
China is different from any other actors in the system, in 
spite of the principle of proletarian internationalism which 
they pay lip service to, when it suits their national in-
terests and objectives. For example, during the struggle for 
the independence of Angola, Chinese action under the reac-
tionary leadership of Deng Xiao Peng in allying itself with 
South Africa, the Western imperialist nations and UNITA, was 
a function of its hostility to the Soviet Union which was an 
67vernon McKay, Africa in World Politics, p. 227. 
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ally of the MPLA. Chinese action was decided less on the 
objective merits or demerits of the situation, than by a 
desire to combat what it perceives as a potentially ascen-
dancy of Soviet influence. Chinese objectives consequently 
dovetailed with Western objective in this particular in-
stance. Soviet objective to counter Western influence dove-
tails with genuine and just African revolutionary objective 
to regain their own initiative in Angola, deny the Western 
alliance and its settler surrogate in South Africa, the bene-
fit of a neo-colonial suppliant government in Angola, that 
would later be used to frustrate and thwart the forward march 
of the African liberation struggle in Namibia and South 
Africa. To be sure, the African and Soviet objectives here 
might be judged to be similar: that does not make them one 
and the same. They might indeed appear to have particular 
and related characteristics and hence not mutually exclusive 
at a given period in history. But Soviet opportunism and 
chauvinism during the Stalin era when policies were subject 
to whimsical, arbitrary and capricious fluctuations, in the 
name of "socialism in one country first" is well known. Its 
attempt to subvert and manipulate the African nationalist 
aspirations, to frustrate their agitation, and blow hot and 
cold, according to the status of its relations with the 
Western nations is well documented. 68 Having said all this, 
it must be firmly borne in mind that, when we speak of the 
68see especially, George Padmore, Pan-Africanism or 
Communism (New York: Doubleday, 1972). 
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world system, we mean by that the capitalist world system 
into which Africa has been incorporated during the 16th cen-
tury to the present. The Soviet Union is not a member of the 
capitalist world system: the convergence and confluence of 
the systemic and structural power within that system lies in 
the hands of the Western nations. 
The various multilateral institutions through whose 
agencies the monetary, commercial and economic relations of 
the system are regulated and transacted, like GATT, IMB/IBRD, 
EEC-ACP axis and the plethora of variegated consortia of 
Western banks, the British owned Exports Credits Guarantee 
Departments (ECGD), etc., provide the institutionalized 
framework of unequal relations through which African in-
terests are subordinated to Euro-American finance capital. 
Perhaps this convoluted statement by Zartman of the liberal 
wing of American Africanist historiography captures the 
essence of Africa's place in the international system. 
"Africa is a non-aligned part of the Western world. Its 
background, values, dependencies, exchanges and aspirations 
are primarily with the West as it works out its own 
69 future." Never mind the gobbledegook that part of a 
whole is also not aligned to that whole. Apparently the 
distinguished professor does not recognize the contradic-
tion of his claim of Africa being nonaligned, and yet a part 
of the Western world. Be that as it may, the statement is 
69 I . William Zartman, "Issues of African Diplomacy 
in the 1980s," Orbis, 25:4 (Winter 1982), p. 1028. 
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true in essentials, except that Africa is not nonaligned and 
the professor did not tell how African aspirations came to 
be primarily with the West. 
Even though the Soviet Union achieved near nuclear 
parity vis-a-vis its Western ideological adversary, the bal-
ance of strategic advantages, in so far as both sides see the 
African continent as a theatre of competition, is still very 
heavily tilted to the Western nations for the historical and 
present day structural reasons we have advanced. Relative to 
immediate post independence era of African countries, there 
has been a net increase of Soviet capability to project its 
power and influence to aid progressive and revolutionary 
states in the world. The upshot of the strategic parity 
though is that the Soviet Union now has the nuclear shield 
that provides a certain confidence to act boldly in defence 
of its own interest, or, when as the case of Angola, for 
example, provides, its interests and that of a given local 
ally are similar~ Improvement in Soviet assistance delivery 
capacity apart, the most important change that has nothing 
to do with Soviet capability or absence of same is the sus-
tained agitation for self determination that pervades coun-
tries under the yoke of neo-colonial tutelage of the Western 
nations. 
It is the internal dynamics within these territories 
and the contradictions of theirneo-colonial status that 
brings forth new and mounting challenges to the imperialist 
camp. Even if it wished to, the Soviet Union has not been 
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able to sustain any credible alliance in any African country, 
and in fact has nothing to compare to Western imperialist 
domination that has been present on the continent for five 
hundred years. Also, stiff and bitter systemic penalities 
whose efficiency lay in the structural power that the Western 
nations possess in the capitalist system in which Africa is a 
subordinate unit await any transgressor nation. For example, 
no African nation can default on loans of the IMP or the con-
sortia of Western banks that dominate the international lend-
ing institutions. But Egypt can expel all Soviet diplomats 
within a week and Egypt can default on billion's worth of 
loans from the Soviet Union without fear of systemic reper-
cussion or punishment. Conversely, one can argue that no 
Soviet-dominated state can do this but the point is that it 
is utterly nonsensical to begin to chart a possible compara-
tive study of East/West imperialism in Africa. The fact is, 
for all practical purposes, imperialist domination in Africa 
is Euro-American in form, content, and substance. The Soviet 
Union, having not been a colonial power in Africa, does not 
have that historical leverage and advantage of an organic 
infrastructural base for imperialistic manouevres in Africa. 
Lacking this infrastructual base, it could only hope to gain 
influence by arming its clients. The Sov~et's attempt to 
capitalize on whatever leverage it had in Guinea-Conakry, 
during the years of Western ostracism of that country met 
with premptory rebuff and expulsion of its diplomats. All 
the same, the Soviet Union is an actor that seeks to advance 
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its own interes~ and its action in Africa as well as the rest 
of the world is geared towards the maximization of that 
interest. 70 But it could not even remotely begin to come 
near the kind of decisive and dominant influence the capita-
list Western nations have exercised in Africa from the era of 
primitive accumulation. For example, after the inter-European 
tribal war of 1914-18, that engulfed the colonial peoples of 
Africa and Asia, the European dominated League of Nations 
dispossessed Italy and Germany of their African colonial pos-
sessions. Togo, which used to be a German colony was first 
turned to an Anglo-French condominium and then later a Trust 
Territory of France. Britian took Tanganyika and also Italian 
Somalia and Belgium administered Rwanda-Urundi, as a Trust 
territory. The, sustained and protracted nature of the 
struggle Africans are now waging to free Namibia from neo-
Nazi apartheid terror is a clear manifestation of the hypo-
crisy and bankruptcy of the position of the very powers who in 
the first place took away Namibia from German colonizers and 
handed the governance of the territory to an equally odious 
settler white supremacist state. The Russians had no way to 
build socio-economic and political institutions that parallel 
such entities in the colonizing countries and no 
70He1en D. Cohn, Soviet Policy ~wards Black Africa: 
The Focus on National Integration (New York: Praeger, 1972); 
Charles McLane, Soviet-Third World Relations, Vol. 3, Soviet 
African Relations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974); 
Edward Wilson, Russian and Black Africa Before World War II 
(New York: Holmes and Meir, 1974). 
-------------------------------
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entrepreneurial managerial class in the Army, Civil Service, 
bureaucracy who look to Russian society as the apex of civi-
lization and therefore the source of their inspiration and 
example of what kind of society their own nations will 
evolve into. The fact is that the first generation of post-
independence elites were often Sorbornne or London School of 
Economics--educated Africans who were unashamedly Jnglo-
philes and Francophiles. Many indeed openly celebrate their 
"Frenchness" and "Westness." More importantly, for many of 
these leaders, Euro-American societies and system of govern-
ment constitute the essential point of departure of their 
understanding of the evolution of any society.7l Many share 
the world outlook and ideological perspective of the ruling 
class of the Western world, whose orphans, they indeed are. 
More importantly, we suggest, having been firmly esconced 
within the Western capitalist system, it is crucial to under-
stand the interlocking and reinforcing mechanisms that pro-
duce a condition where African elites as children of the 
system often act in the service of the system that has 
brought about the underdevelopment of their nations. Many 
see their reward and status attainment within the context of 
the system and really do have difficulty in distinguishing 
71For example, after World War II, Lamine Gueye of 
Senegal, working in the directive organs of the Section 
Francaise de l'Internationale Ouvriere (SPlO) in defending 
the idea of a French Community and denouncing the African 
nationalist aspiration for independence, thought France was 
the "inventor of liberty". Lamine, "Etape et perspectives de 
l'Union francaise" quoted in Claude Wanthier, Literature and 
Thought of Modern Africa (London: Pall Mall, 1966), p. 117. 
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what constitutes the objective national interests of their 
own country and the interest of the system they bow serve. 
For example, from 1969 to 1972, Ghana's economic policy 
planning was effectively coopted by an interlocking inter-
national network comprising, (1) Harvard Development Advis-
ory Service (DAS), (2) The International Bank for Reconstruc-
tion and Development--The World Bank, and (3) The Inter-
72 national Monetary Fund--The Fund. This network was backed 
by an internal coalition headed by four Ghanaians who were 
either then, former executive officers of the aforementioned 
international lending institutions, or had been coopted into 
administrative positions in the Busia government. The eco-
nomic stabilization scheme they counselled which included a 
massive devaluation of Ghanaian currency, reduction in 
domestic spending and removal of constraints in investment 
policy, could not be sustained politically. But these are 
the standard prescriptions of the International Monetary 
Fund, or perhaps more directly, the countries that control 
"the controlling three-quarters of the contributed quotas 
and two-thirds of the votes." The question of economic 
planning thus becomes an exercise in a futile attempt to 
reconcile the political-economic destiny of a given nation 
with the stated interest and objective of those who control 
these international institutions. The inter-government 
organization (IGO), IMB/IBRD axis and the Ghanaian internal 
72J • K. Thompson, "External Cooptation of the Eco-
nomic Planning in Ghana, 1967-1969," World Politics, Vol. 
X (July 1977). 
-99-
connection cannot represent the interests of these institu-
tions and at the same time represent the interest of Ghana. 
If every administrative strategy fails, the Army, the verit-
able praetorian guards that defend by force the interest of 
the government against the interest of the people can always 
be used to make sure the patient takes his medicine "tout 
suite. II 
Imperialism in Africa in the contemporary era, of 
which interventionism in various guises is only one aspect, 
is premised on a zero-sum calculus. Its specific objective 
is to maximize the policy interests of the intervenor. In 
the modern neo-colonial era, interventionism as a foreign 
policy tool, emanates conceptually from a post World War II 
domino theory that postulates that the II loss:" of Euro-American 
hegemony in one country will ipso facto lead to a chain reac-
tion, where the whole region or sub-region as the case may 
be, will be radicalized and forces that do not make Euro-
American business their own business will come to power. 
Interventionism, consequently is designed to contain, or 
neutralize the possibility of change in the status quo. 
For example, the geo-political importance of Southern 
Africa to the Western nation rests on two critical and inter-
locking factors--
I. The abundance of the strategic and critical 
resources concentration in countries stretch-
ing from Zaire in the North to South Africa 
in the Southern most tip. Consequently, con-
tinued and unimpeded access to these resources 
is to be maintained by guaranteeing that what-
ever government is in power in any of these 
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countries (Zaire, Zambia, Angola, Zimbabwe, 
Namibia and South Africa) is aligned to the 
West. 
2. The need to maintain control of the sea lane 
around the Cape of Good Hope, for unimpeded 
transportation of Strategic raw materials to 
Western economy.73 
In the contemporary era--the epoch of neo-colonialism 
which began as we earlier stated in 1960--Zaire then was and 
still is, the acid confirmation of the extent to which the 
Western nations would go to maintain their ideological/ 
political and economic domination of Africa. Our contention 
is that Western policy is premised on a hard-headed recogni-
tion of the place and role of Africa in the economic and 
strategic configuration of the world capitalist system. The 
Western economies hold the African extractive industry in 
exclusive preserve. Nigeria produces 95 percent of the 
world's cOlumbium,74 Zaire and Zambia hold two-thirds of the 
world reserves of cobalt75 while Guinea has the world's lar-
gest deposit of bauxite. Of the thirty minerals deemed 
73See Alvin J. Cottrell, "Strategic Routes, Key Pas-
sages and Choke Points in and Around Southern Africa: 
Threats Posed to them By Hostile Local and External Forces," 
Sinoo-Soviet Intervention in Africa (Washington: Council on 
American Affairs, 1977), pp. 44-57: Larry P. Bowman, "The 
Strategic Importance of South Africa to the United States; 
An Appraisal and Policy Analysis~ African Affairs, Vol. 81, 
No. 323 (~~ril 1982), pp. 159-191. 
74Africa South of the Sahara (London: Europa Publica-
tions, 1980), p. 766. 
75u. s . Department of the Interior, Bureau of Mines, 
Mineral Commodity SOummary 1°9°80 (Washington, D.C.: Government 
printing Office, 1980), p. 96; U.S. Department of the In-
terior, Bureau of Mines, Mineral Industries of Africa 
(Washigton, D.C.: Government printing Office, 1976), p. 13. 
--- --------------------
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critical to u.s. national survival, Africa has no less than 
twenty of these metals and Table V provides the degrees of 
Western dependence on some of them. The table below iden-
tifies these critical metals and their percentage of world 
reserves. 
TABLE I 
AFRICAN MINERALS DEEMED CRITICAL FOR U. S. SURVIVAL 
Mineral % of Estimated 1978 % of World Production World Reserves 
Arsenic 8.0 25.0 
Asbestos 
(Crocedolite) 100.0 100.0 
Bauxite 15.0 30.0 
Cesium 30.0 
Chromium 40.0 97.0 
Cobalt 66.0 40.0 
Corundum 85.0 78.0 
Dr amend 65.0 90.0 
Flouspar 13.5 32.0 
Gemstones 75.0 65.0 
Germanium 30.0 22.0 
Gold 57.0 48.0 
Kyanite 35.0 5.0 
Manganese 31.0 50.0 
Phosphate 25.0 75.0 
-10.2-
TABLE I continued 
Mineral % of Estimated 1978 % of World Produc.t.i.on World Reserves 
Platinum Group 45.0. 72.0. 
Tantalum 22.0. 70..0. 
Uranium 20..0. 32.0. 
Vanadium 41.0. 49.0. 
Venniculite 40..0. 40..0. 
Source: U.S. Bureau of Mines, U.S. Department of the 
Interior, Bureau of Mines, Minerals Year Book 
(Washington, D.C., 1977). 
The policy is therefore designed to contain and if need be, 
to eliminate radical African nationalism that might seek to 
redress the systemic imbalance, regain African initiative, 
and end the relation of exploitation. The following chapter 
is an analysis of the evaluation of this policy in practi.ce 
in Zaire. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE CRISIS OF STABILIZING A NEO-COLONIAL 
AFRICA: INTERVENTIONISM IN ZAIRE 
Background of the Conflict - The Cold War Factor 
The end of the War of 1939-45 presented Western capi-
talism with fundamental strategic, geopolitical and economic 
problems of great magnitude and complexity. European expan-
sionist and colonial hegemony which began in the l400s had 
brought about the founding of ruling European settlements in 
North and South America, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and 
the European colonial occupation or rulership of almost 
virtually all of Africa, all of South East Asia and also 
India (which then included Pakistan) Ceylon and Malaysia. 
Japan had occupied Korea and parts of China. This juxtapo-
sition of expansionism and colonialism had crystalized in 
a world view which rests on a socio-cultural and political 
theory. The basic philosophical assumptions l of this theory 
are: 
(a) that the Western European nations and 
peoples represent the Zenith of civili-
zation and advancement (a supremacist 
ideology) • 
1 These theses or paradigmatic assumptions are borrowed 
very heavily from.Mack H. Jones, The Existing Paradigm of 
Amer'ic'a:n P'ol'itical S'cienc'e--Some' Inferences (Atlanta: 
Atlanta University, 1978). 
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(b) that the material gap between European 
peoples and non-European has nothing to 
do with the European policy of extermi-
nation of these peoples, their subjuga-
tion and the subjection of their resources 
to European economic expansionism but that 
the perceived gap is due to certain vir-
tues (thrift, for example) uniquely pos-
sessed by European peoples. 
(c) a belief in the hierarchy of people with 
Europeans at one end and non-Europeans 
at the other. 
(d) the acceptance of the economic system of 
Capitalism as the most efficient and 
rewarding, and reconcilable with the idea 
of human freedom and dignity. 
In virtually all instances, European colonialism advanced 
sophisticated supremacist rationalizations for the sub-
jugation of non-white people of the world. The official 
sloganeering of "manifest destiny," "white man's burden" 
was complemented by theological altruism. 2 Assumptions 
(a), (b), (c), and (d) were held true for the whole world 
but(d} was shattered by the Bolshevik revolution of 1917. 
Until 1917, the entire international system was controlled 
and dominated by the world's capitalist countries who had 
also carved up the whole world as their respective spheres 
of political and economic hegemony. Euphemisms like 
"sphere of influence," "Her majesty's empire" were the pre-
ferred terms under which national policies of aggrandize-
ment, colonial subjugation and exploitation were cloaked. 
The Bokshevik revolution opened the first crack in the 
2Edwin Smith (ed.), The Christian Mission in Africa 
(London: International Missionary Council, 1926). 
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hitherto seemingly impregnable armor of invincibility of 
the imperial system. 
Theoretically, the new Soviet nation, armed with the 
revolutionary ideology of Marxism-Leninism rejected the 
Euro-American liberal and Republican definition of demo-
cracy which flows from a subjective idealist conception of 
society or "social contract" as developed from the writings 
of Locke and Rousseau. The Soviet people rejected the 
class mediation pluralist thesis and embraced the class 
domination position, believing that the ruling ideas in the 
society are the ideas of the ruling class. 3 It rejected 
the false consciousness that has been fostered and perpet-
uated by the class control of all the major organs of the 
socialization process--the school curriculum especially, 
but also including the media and culture. From 1917, until 
the outbreak of the World War II, the United States sub-
jected ~e budding new state to sustained and scurrilous 
hostility, first for defecting from the capita.list camp and 
perhaps more ominously, for the example it clearly portends 
for the world and the strategic problem it posed for the 
capitalist world. For example, it was not until 1933 that 
the United States recognized the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republic after it had invaded it, along with Britain, 
France, Germany, Japan and Canada from 1917-21. The 
3See Maurice Cornforth, The Theory of Knowledge (New 
York: International Publishers, 1977); Karl Marx and 
Frederick Engels, The communist Manifesto (New York: 
Washington Square Press, Inc., 1967). 
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Soviets pursued an inward-looking economic policy of 
autarky, as a matter of survival and a strategic policy in 
line with century-old European balance of power dogma. All 
the same, the Soviet Union was in splended isolation from 
1917 to the end of World War II, except for the brief 
period of the policy of mutual expediency that led to accom-
modation between it and capitalist countries during World 
"-
War II. The Soviet people successfully rid themselves of 
this capitalist encirclement by (a) insulating their state 
from any political, cultural and economic penetration from 
the capitalist powers and (b) more importantly, in contra-
distinction to the United States which resurrected capitalist 
relations of production and attendant socio-political insti-
tutions in areas under its occupation after the war, the 
Soviet Union opted for the establishment of socialist govern-
ments in areas under its occupation. 4 The establishment of 
socialist states in Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hun-
gary, Poland, Rumania, East Germany, Yugoslavia and China, 
with minimum, maximum or no Soviet aid, heralded a funda-
mental realignment of power and a different correlation of 
forces from the one the world knew before 1939. The socio-
economic system that the West had tried to destroy by mili-
tary intervention or limit to the Soviet state by propaganda5 
4Robert E. Osgood et al., A:mericaand the" World, From 
the Truman Doctrine to Vietnam (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins" 
Press, 1970). . 
5James Nathan and James Oliver, United States Foreign 
Policy and World Order (Boston: Little, Brown, 1981), pp. 
14-15. 
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and encirclement had now taken hold and come to fruition in 
ni~e countries by 1949. The united States came out of the 
Second War, its economic strength bouyed by record-level 
produc5ionin its war effort and its casualities and lost 
infinitesimal compared to those of Japan, Britain, Germany, 
France and the Soviet Union. While the United States lost 
only 300,000 soldiers, one out of every 10 Russians was 
either wounded in the war or died. 6 Strategically, the 
United S"tates inherited the legacy of the erstwhile Euro-
pean powers as imperial hegemonic regulator,7 and an 
essentially doctrinaire bipolar division of the world came 
into being. A consensus began to develop within the foreign 
policy establishment of Western governments in which the 
world has come to be seen as divided between two mutually 
exclusive socio-economic and political systems--theirs, 
based on freedom and liberty, the socialist world, as the 
West understands it, based on coercion and intimidation. S 
More importantly, strategicaliy, the view had cry-
stalized in which American interest now goes far beyond the 
physical security of its land mass and waters but is 
6K•J • Holsti, International Relations: A Framework 
of Analysis (Englewood Cliffs: prentice-Hall, Inc., 1977), 
p. 70. 
7 Joseph M. Jones, The F"ifteen Weeks (New York: Har-
court, Brace and World, 1965), pp. 40-47. 
SHarry S. Truman, .rTheTruman Doctrine: Special 
Message to the Congress on Greece and Turkey~ March 12, 
1947, public Papers of the Presidents of" the United 




intertwined with balance of power and an American concep-
tion of international order. To the prostrate countries of 
Western Europe, where American hegemony was unquestioned 
and American allies were in control of government, the co-
conjunction of this world view was easy enough, but with 
the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe where 
Soviet influence was dominant; even with the American 
economic coercion manifested in the brief termination of 
lend-lease aid to the Soviets, a world imperial system 
based on the hegemony of finance capital and backed by the 
coercive power of the state dominated by the same class 
was not reconcilable to the communist doctrine. 
For the African world, the impact of the continent en 
the world scene was both parlous and emphemeral. There was 
the reality of the unfettered and uncontested European 
colonial hegemony as sanctioned by the Berlin Conference 
of 1884-85. Henceforth, the modalities for any change in 
the status of Africa would now have to contend with the 
prescriptions of those who hold the decisive formative 
influence on the continent--the colonial powers. Africa 
had come to be regarded in the European world as an object 
of history and Africans as pawns and cannon fodders in 
European wars. If, for example, in African historiography, 
(both of liberal or conservative genres) the wars of 1914-
1918 and 1939-1945 have come to be regarded ·or termed 
"World Wars," the only rational and sane explanation is 
that a phenomenon, even when it has all the qualities and 
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elements that render its basic suppositions and assumptions 
invalid or questionable, if repeatedly asserted as true and 
constant, henceforth comes to be seen popularly and unques-
tioningly as being so. Objectively, the dominant African 
historiography which flows from the colonial historiography 
is, in the present neo-colonial era, in the hands of alie-
9 nated elites and their mentors from the metropoles. 
While it is now quite true that Africa is now part of 
the world system, it is truer to say it is part of the Euro-
pean created world system, because the essential character 
of ' the problems that face that system, the range of options 
open, even the definition of what constitutes an inter-
national problem, are questions that Africa has no influence 
worth speaking of in defining, not to talk of proposing 
solutions. Objectively, the two were European wars that 
Africans as objects/victims of European colonial expan-
sionist hegemony were conscripted into various European 
armies, to fight for the respective colonial powers fighting 
among themselves to settle a problem that was of no direct 
relevance to the objective colonial reality. Both wars 
were fought to contain German expansionism in Europe. Indeed, 
the German chauvinistic Aryan race supremacist theory only 
particularizes to themselves the cultural supremacist 
9we take this position, without prejudice to the fact 
that some tentative attempt at reconstruction has been made 
by some African scholars. See for example A. Temu and B. 
Swai, Historians and Afrioanist History: A Critique 
(London: Zed Press, 1981). 
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outlook common to the expansionist hegemonic ideology of 
virtually all colonial imperialist countries of Europe--
Itlay, Belgium, England, France, Portugal, Spain, and the 
Netherlands. 
The offence of German expansionism was two-fold: first 
it sought to invalidate and destroy theEuro~ean balance of 
power by supplanting it with German hegemony in Europe. The 
second offence was attempting to bring colonialism to Europe. 
Colonialism, after all, had been rationalized as the natural 
hegemony of a superior people over an inferior one - a 
theory that was acceptable to all the colonizing powers lO 
and justified by the leading intellectual elites of the era. 
Africa's involvement in the wars of 1914-1918 and 1939-1945 
can thus only be meaningfully understood in the light of the 
fact that these were European wars, which by the virtue of 
European hegemony and sovereignty over Africa, Africans were 
now conscripted to fight. It is thus then both a function 
of Europeffi partition of the continent, and colonialization 
of its people that can give any sensible meaning to the two 
wars being called world wars. Objectively, for Africans 
and Africans, both were intra-European wars brought to 
African soil and each European imperial power in despera-
tion used African manpower to achieve its military 
10See for example, Winthrop D. Jordan, White Over 
Black: American Attitudes Toward the Negro (Marylapd: 
Penguin Books, Inc., 1969), Chapters VI and IV; Claude Ake, 
Revolutionary Pressures in Africa (London: Zed Press, 1977), 
pp. 83-84. 
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objective. Hence, we see, the victims of European colonial 
expansionsim now at war not to liquidate the colonial 
presence, but on opposite sides of intra-imperialist wars, 
forced to make common cause with his own enemy and indeed 
to defend him and his homeland. We are not by any stretch 
of the imagination stating that Africans did not militarily 
resist colonialism, nor making the claim that these two wars 
represent the first time Africans were conscri~ted to fight 
European wars. In the first place, active military resist-
ance against colonialism had by then been long contained, or 
neutralized, and indeed Africans were used by France in the 
Franco-Russian War of 1870. 11 But now, it was on a scale 
unparalleled before, and a magnitude that brings into sharp 
relief the massive subjugation of African manpower in further-
ance of European interest world wide. A grand total of 
500,000 African soldiers fough~ to free France from German 
domination in the first war. In both Namibia and Tanganyika, 
both then German" colonies, German resistance was composed of 
11,000 Africans out of a total of 14,000 soldiers. French 
defence mobilisation policy called for annual supply of 
12,000 African soldiers when the German threat grew in 1938. 
Africans were arrayed on both sides of the battle in North-
west Africa in 1940. France, after the war of 1939-45, its 
German problem now neutralized/contained, sought to revert 
lIe. M. Andrew and A. S. Kanya-Forster, "France, 
Africa and the First World War," Journal of Modern African 
History, No. XIX (1978), p. 14. 
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to its imperial colony-owing status, by maintaining the 
fiction of Algeria as a southern end of France and also 
trying to regain Indo-China as her colony. In the Indo-
Chinese campaign, 15,000 Africans were conscripted to 
h ' h' h" 1 b' t' 12 h ac 1eve t 1S Frenc 1mper1a 0 Jec 1ve. It was t e 
battle of Dien Bien Phu that finally convinced France 
that the sun had set on its colonial adventures in Indo-
China. 
Large scale and organized insurrection in the immed-
iate post-war era did break out in some of these African 
colonies, notably in Algeria, Kenya and Cameroon. Both 
the Cameroon insurrection led by the Union Popu1aire du 
Cameroun (UPC) and the Mau-Mau resistance in Kenya were 
effectively neutralized and destroyed by French and British 
colonial administrations respectively. However, the 
Algerian War of Liberation, assumed a protracted nature 
and lasted from 1954-1962. The colonialists now clearly 
perceived that they faced two strategic problems in Africa 
in the immediate post war period. One was how to reconcile 
their hegemonic control to the nationalist drive on the 
continent; the other was the Western fear of communist 
12see James Mayall, Africa: The Cold War and After 
(London: E1ek Books, 1971), pp.54-55; Ruth First, Power 
in Africa (New York: Penguin Books, 1971); Jean Suret-
Canale, "The Economic Balance Sheet of French Colonialism 
in West Africa," in Peter Gutkind and Peter Waterman, 
African Social Studies: A Radical Reader (New York: 
Monthly Review, 1977). 
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doctrine both as a body of thought and ideology, and their 
perceived aggressive design of the communist bloc. Conse-
quent1y, in 1957, when the European Economic Community was 
about to be established, France, for example, made the 
granting of associate membership to her African colonies a 
condition for her signing the EEC treaty. Both France and 
Britain insisted on, even though the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) ostensibly covered a given geographic 
area, incorporating their overseas colonies into the 
defence perimeters of NATO. 13 Juridically, therefore, 
these colonies, including virtually almost the whole of 
Africa, were deemed to be overseas extensions of Britain, 
France and Belgium. The idea of overseas extensions of 
the metropole served French imperial resistance well during 
the second war, because the African city of Brazzaville 
served as the sanctuary and headquarters for defeated 
Frenchmen fleeing German occupation of their land. Since 
the Germans had effective occupation of France, Barazza-
ville served also as the provisional capital of the French 
resistance. It has to be one of the ironies of the unmiti-
gated colonial arrogance that in spite of the massive 
sacrifice Africa payed in the liberation of France, the 
post-war French government asked Belgium to hand over the 
. 13K. J. Holsti, International Politics: A Framework 
for Analysis (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1977), 
p. 124. 
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Congo (Zaire) to France on the strength of a provision 
contained in the articles of partition of 1884. 14 Be that 
as it may, by the end of 1960, the colonial powers had 
granted juridical independence to Nigeria, Ghana, Dahomey 
(now Benin), Togo, Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso), Congo-
Leopoldville (now Zaire) and Congo-(Brazzaville), Mali, 
Senegal, Ivory Coast, Sudan, Libya, Niger, Chad, Cameroon, 
and Gabon. The British had delayed the process in East 
Africa, and pursued a policy of accommodation and continuity 
in Rhodesia. But it was the crisis that erupted in the then 
Congo-Leopoldville almost immediately after the granting of 
constitutional independence by Belgium that brought forcibly 
horne the inadequacy and limitation of this independence and 
the peripheral nature of the African states as actors in the 
international system. It brought into clearer relief the 
contradictions between objective African interests and the 
systemic interest of extra-African powers. 
Interventionism in Zaire 
Belgium did not before 1959 design a carefully articu-
lated vision of a prospective terminal goal of the colonial 
rule15 in the Congo, which effectively was from 1878-1960. 
l4Arthur Gavshan, Crisis in Africa: Battleground of 
East and West (New York: Penguin, 1981), p. 42. 
lSon the colonial background of Zaire and genocidal 
nature of Belgian rule, see Alan Merriam, Congo--Back-
ground of Conflict (Northwestern University Press, ~l) . 
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Consequently, from the very beginning, prolonged Belgian 
tutelage was the goal, though the justification for this 
now required finer and finer refurbishment. Belgian colo-
nialism was premised on a conviction that theirs was a 
mission to civilize the African. For example, the colonial 
settler minimg company, Union Miniere echoed the philosophy 
on which colonialism of all European countries is based, 
The colonisers must never lose sight of the fact 
that the Negroes have the soul of children, souls 
which mold themselves to the methods of the educa-
tor; they watch, listen, feel and imitate. The 
European must, in all circumstances, show himself 
a chief without weakness, goodwilled without 
familiarity, active in behavior and especially 
just in the punishment of bad misbehavior, as in 
the regard of good deed ••.. (The European camp 
head) must interest himself constantly in the life 
of the native, in their well.being; must guide 
them, examine their complaints; punish them when 
necessary with the tact, the calm and the firmness 
which are required. 16 
Kwame Nkrumah, The Challenge of the Congo (New York: Inter-
national PUblishers), Chapter Ii Crawford Young, Politics 
in the Congo (Princeton, 1965); Arthur Gavshan, Crisis in 
Africa: Battleground of East and West (New York: Penguin 
Books, 1981), pp. 57-58; Phillipa Schuyler, Who Killed the 
Congo? (New York: The Devin-Adair Co., 1962), Chapter 4. 
There exists no agreement on the number of the Congolese 
who perished in this period. The figures given by Gavshan 
and Schuyler range from 5 million to 33 million. Schuyler 
wrote that Congolese children and women were at the lustful 
mercy of Belgian officials. The Belgians forced, publicly, 
Congolese rulers to submit to sodomy in order to humiliate 
them in the eyes of the citizens. Schuyler remarked further 
that Belgian atrocities in the Congo and the international 
scandal that erupted when it became public was on.ly exceeded 
in scope by those of Nazi death camps. 
16 
Young, Politics in the Congo, pp. 61-62. 
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Belgium faced its administrative problem in the Congo 
by first setting up a consultative organ-Conseil Colonial 
du Gouvernmement in 1914 to deflect criticisms from its 
brutality in the Congo. But, with the end of the Second 
War and the nationalist struggles that had broken out in 
Asia and Europe, it was clear that a new plan had to be 
devised to stem the tide of the nationalist awakening that 
had broken out in all the colonies. Belgian then decided 
on a policy of controlled gradualism and a Belgo-Congolese 
Community was born in 1946, on the premise of internal 
autonomy for the Congo. The Belgo-Congolese Community idea 
was amended to suggest a parity association between two 
nations but linked by the Belgium crown. This Eurafrican 
idea found acceptance even among Congolese leaders, and 
Patrice Lumumba, later to become the first Congolese Prime 
Minister, wrote in 1956, 
The New Eurafrican society which we are building 
today must be administered and directed jointly 
by Belgium and Congolese. Neither of the two 
factions of the Belgo-Colgolese Community should 
dominate or oppress the other .••. 17 
Still popular insurrections broke out in the Congolese 
capital of Leopoldville and also in Stanleyville, Octo-
ber 30-31, 1959. Again, Belgium, in order to contain the 
rising tide of Congolese nationism settled for the fami-
liar neo-colonial arrangement whose basic thesis had been 
l7 Ibid ., p. 47. 
----------------................... ........ 
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formulated in a confidential memorandum by the European 
settler organization (Fedacol), to the colonial government 
in 1955. The document said: 
We must organize a class of evolue natives, who 
will declare their acceptance of the ideals and 
the principle of our Western civilization, and 
who will be, if on equal standing, our equals in 
rights and duties, less numerous than the native 
mass, but powerful and influential, they will be 
allies it is indispensable for us to find in the 
native communities. These middle classes will 
be the black bourgeoisie which is beginning to 
develop everywhere, which we must help to enrich 
itself and organize itself and which like all the 
bourgeoisie of the world will be opposed to any 
disruption, internal or external. 18 
Political party activity accelerated in 1958 and 
indeed as many as 100 sprouted up when political party 
formation was finally allowed. Ideological split within 
the nationalist movement was immediately apparent. The 
schism within the bourgeois leadership was essentially one 
between progressive nationalists with country-wide fol-
lowership with reformist ideological outlook and the con-
servative group who favored a highly decentralized state 
power with a confederal status or even secession of their 
power base from the national government. The conservative 
group enjoyed even at this initial state, considerable sup-
port and encouragement from Belgium colonial administration, 
the settler community, its mining sector and other western 
governments. 
18 
Ibid., p. 44. 
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Patrice Emery Lumurnba became the first Prime Minister 
of the independent Congo despit~ and in spite 04 manoeuvres 
of the Belgium colonial administration, the Catholic church 
and the settler mining community corporate power. Ganshof 
van de Meersch, Belgium African Affairs Minister and Resi-
dent Minister to the Congo, confirmed that he did every-
thing possible to avoid a Lumumba government "at any cost.n1 9 
Lumurnba represented in Western eyes the personifica-
tion of what they saw as the threat to Western economic, 
ideological, geopolitical and strategic interest in Zaire 
(Congo) and Africa. 
The paternalism of Western colonialism as cited by 
Lumurnba himself "is the influence of a civilized people, on 
a people of lower civilisation, exercised with the aim of 
steadily transforming the latter by the development of its 
natural resources and the improvements of the moral and 
maternal conditions of the native people. ,,20 Western govern-
ments implicitly accepted this definition as the United 
States government had cause to "congratulate the government 
and people of Belgium on the many constructuive contribu-
tions made to the well-being of the Congolese people. ,,21 
That is to say, European colonialism was a fiduciary and 
19Young, Politics i~_~he Congo, p. 309. 
20patrice Lumumba, Congo, My Country (New York: 
Praeger, 1962), p. 11. 
210epartment of State Bulletin, Volume XLIII, No. 110~ 
July 25, 1960, p. 152. 
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the West envisaged, during the era of the Cold War, a Eur-
africa with close ties. 22 Lumumba on the other hand saw the 
Congo as a"focal point of African independence."23 At the 
Pan-African Conference of December 11, 1958, in Ghana, 
Lumumba had this to say, 
despite the boundaries that separate us, despite 
our ethnic differences ... , we share the same aware-
ness, the same anxious desire to make this African 
continent a free and happy continent that has rid 
itself of unrest and of fear and of any sort of 
colonial domination. 24 
He called for "a struggle against all those internal and 
external factors standing in the way of the emancipation 
of our respective countries and the unification of 
Africa. ,,25 For Lumumba, as he himself defined it, the idea 
of Eurafrica, is rooted in a relationship o~ "subjugation 
and subordination.,,26 Indeed on August 8, 1960, less than 
a month after Zairois (Congolese) independence, Lumumba 
entered into a secret agreement with President Kwame 




Thomas Kanza, The Rise and Fall of Patrice Lumumba 
(Cambridge: Schenkman Publishing Co., 1977), p. 58. 
24Jean Van Lierde (ed.), Lumumba Speaks: The Speeches 
and Writin~s of Patrice Lumumba 1958-61 (Boston: Little, 
Brown and Company, 1972), p. 58. 
25 
Jean Van Lierde (ed.), Lumumba Speaks, p. 23. 
26 
Ibid., p. 73. 
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African States with the capital at Kinshasa (Leopold-
ville).27 
Domestically, Lumumba had become head of government 
on a platform that stressed centralized authority as 
opposed to the separatist or loose federation of Zairois 
(Congolese) provinces and a strong federal control over the 
mining sector of the national economy. Twice before the 
attainment of independence, the Belgian mining interests 
in the colonial state attempted to force the secession of 
the mineral rich Shaba (Katanga) province. 28 Lumumbals 
f II • d f' . t' 11 29 f h d" . program 0 rap~ A r~can~sa ~on 0 tea m~n~strat~ve, 
managerial and officer corps of the Zairois (Congolese) 
bureaucracy and the army also directly threatened Belgian 
interest. As we shall see, apart from the loyalty of the 
10,000 colonial cadres in Zaire (Congo) in 1960 to the 
Belgian interest in the country, their replacement by 
Africans as planned by Lumumba would cost Belg~um $140-$156 
millions:ayear because these colonial cadres would now have 
to be reabsorbed into the Belgian economy recovering from 
the ruins of the European War of 1939-45. 
The Congo became independent on June 30, 1960 and on 
27For a text of this pact, see Kwame Nkrumah, The 
Challenge of the Congo (New York: International Publishers, 
1965), pp. 30-31. 
28crawford Young, Politics in the Congo, p. 309. 




July 5 elements of the army -- Armee Nationale Congolais 
(ANC), revolted against their Belgium officers over the 
slow pace of Africanisation of the officer corp. The fol-
lowing day Belgium troops invaded the country, beginning 
from the mineral-rich (Katanga) Shaba province. Tshombe, 
the provincial pzemier declared the province an independent 
state and elements of the Belgian army began to train a 
defence force for Shaba. 
Lumumba attempted to resolve the situation by weighing 
the merits of seeking assistance from: (1) the Afro-Asian 
nations in the world community; (2) the United States; (3) 
the Soviet Union and (4) the United Nations Organization. 
Lumumba had one single objective, the maintenance of the 
territorial integrity of the Congo and the expuLsion of 
the Belgium troops. Having in conjunction with President 
Kasavubu appealed in vain to the united States to help in 
achieving this objective and been directed to the United 
Nations, the Prime Minister was to learn a grave and ulti-
mately fatal lesson in real politik. Beginning with the 
arrival of the UN forces on July 15, 1960 and progressively 
there from, Lumumba's power and influence, both as Prime 
Minister and consequently as an effective force in the 
Congo suffered dimunition and finally became extinguished. 
By his failure in not paying proper attention to the power 
configuration, both at the UN and in the global system, he 
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learned only too late that the UN does not exist in a 
vacuum--its objective and that of the Congolese people as 
personified by the Prime Minister were not the same. It 
will be necessary to go beyond the customary charter-based 
analysis of the role and place of the United Nations in the 
present neo-colonial epoch in order to unmask and reveal 
the forces at work, because the United Nations' role in the 
Congo carne to be a victory for those who had the decisive 
influence 30within the organization or as a United States 
official was reported to have said "it was really a U.S. 
operation but using outstanding U.N. persona1ities.,,31 
Zaire Crisis and U.S. Strategic 
and Ideological Interest 
The American operation in Zaire rested on a hard-
headed recognition of its place and role as the foremost 
capitalist Western hegemonic power. In the fifteenth cen-
tury, Spain had played this role, France had supplanted 
Spain in both the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries,and 
Britain, both in Europe and especially in the forcible and 
brutal hegemony it had fostered in the colonized world, 
was foremost power till the end of the first general Euro-
pean War (1914-1918), a war which incidentally laid the 
30Evan Luard, A History of the United Nations: The 
Years of Western Domination, 1945-1955, Vol I (New York: 
St. Martin's Press, 1982), Chapters, I-III. 
31Stephen R. Weissman, American Foreign Policy in the 
Congo: 1960-1964 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1974), 
p. 147. 
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ground work for the destruction of the European balance of 
power, and the emergence of the United States from a 
regional hemispheric power to a world power. The United 
States foreign policy establishment took proper stock of 
the insurrectionary trends in the colonized world, where 
European hegemony had held sway for centuries and its own 
hegemony in the western hemisphere. It viewed with extreme 
foreboding the emergence and strengthening of the rival 
social system in the world. Out of this rumification, came 
the National Security Council Document No. 68 (NSC-68). 
This document, whose central thesis provided the ideological 
guideline for western foreign policy and has survived to the 
present neo-colonial era, was drawn up in 1950, after the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was born in Brus-
sels. The opening pages of this revealing document acknow-
ledged the role that wars, revolutions and social upheavals 
played in the demise of other empires--notably the Ottoman, 
the German, the Austro-Hungarian, the Italian, the Japanese, 
and the relegation of both Britain and France to second-rate 
powers. The document further acknowledged the Soviet Union 
as the principal hegemonic adversary of the United States. 
According to the authors, in order for the United States 
not to go the way of the aforementioned empires, the country 
must employ "any means, covert or overt, violent or non-violent" 32 
32National Security Council, "A Report to the National 
Security Council by the Executive Secretary on United States 
Objectives and Programs for National Secuity, Spril 14, 1950," 
-124-
to achieve its global objective. 
Two concepts underlie United States hegemonic drive 
here. One is ideology~ the other is interest - both 
economic/material and also strategic. For our purpose, we 
may define ideology as "a set of fundamental convictions 
more or less consciously held as the truth about the nature 
and destiny of man and the universe, with the explicit 
implication that every thing at variance with them :is false. ,,33 
Central to these convictions is the paramountcy of capi-
talism as an economic system and the socio-political insti-
tutions that sustain it worldwide. The document sees any 
upheaval, change, or a potential for same, as a challenge 
to the capitalist order. Interest concerns "material aims 
and the social and physical quality of life.,,34 The U.S. 
interest here is both a combination of economic-material 
and then strategic interests. It is true, as some 35 have 
asserted, that American economic interest--here simply 
narrowly defined in terms of direct investment, in Zaire, 
Naval War College Review, 27 (May-June 1975). 
33Charles H. Malik, "The United Nations as an Ideo-
logical Battleground," in The United Nations in Perspective, 
E. Berkeley Tompkins (ed.), (Stanford: Hoover Institution 
Press, 1972), p. 14. 
34Stephen D. Krasner, Defending the National Interest, 
Raw Materials Investment and U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton: 
university Press, 1978), p. 334. 
35 
Ibid., p. 276. 
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in 1960 was negligible. But such a position conveniently 
ignores the role that the mineral extractive sector of the 
Zairois national economy has played in the world capitalist 
economy since the colonial days. In the areas of three 
strategic metals, notably copper, industrial diamonds and 
cobalt, Zaire has been important. In the area of cobalt, 
Zaire is the world's primary producer; its 35.3% of total 
world cobalt production dwarfs that of its closest rival, 
as the Table below shows. 
TABLE II 
WORLD COBALT MINE PRODUCTION (1978) 
(Estimated % of Total World Production) 
Country Percentage of total world production 
Zaire 35.3 
New Caledonia 13. 5 




Source: U.S. Department of Interior, Mineral 
Commodity Summaries (Washington, D.C., 
1979). 
Zairois economic structure established under the 
colonial tutelage of Belgium,"was centrally designed to 
establish in Zarie, industries extracting minerals needed 
by Belgium industries first and other countries of the 
Western bloc,,,36 Of the total non-communist cobalt 
36Ghifem Katwals, "Export-Led Growth, The Copper 
Sector," in Zaire: The Political Economy of Underdevelopment 
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consumption, in 1972, the countries of the Organization of 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)--the United 
states, Western Europe and Japan, consumed 85% of the 
total while the so-called developing countries took 5.8%.37 
The mining-led economy of colonial Zaire furnished the 
uranium that enabled the United States to build the first 
atomic bombs. 38 The introduction of the atomic bomb in 
the history of warfare, not only signalled, at least tem-
porarily, the supremacy of the United States within the 
allied ranks that fought the war of 1939-45, but from 1945 
to 1949 when the Soviet acquired the nuclear capability, 
the strategic offensive and initiative was clearly and 
uncontestably with the United States. 
Strategic interest of the United States in Zaire 
refers to the preservation and maintenance of a preferred 
socio-political and economic system. What is crucial to 
the strategic interest, 
••• to the business system as a whole, is 
that the option of foreign investment (and 
foreign trade) should remain available. For 
this to be meaningful, the business system re-
quires, as a minimum that the political and 
economic principles of capitalism should pre-
vail and that the door be fully open for foreign 
capital at all times •••• 39 
37Ibid ., p. 126. 
38weissman, American Foreign Policy in the Congo, 
p. 47. 
39Harry Magdoff, The Age of Imperialism (New York: 
Monthly Review Press, 1969), p. 20. 
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The strategic interest here is the systemic interest. The 
systemic interest transcends the narrow interest of any 
particular actor, for example, a state, or a transnational 
conglomerate. It may transcend it but it is not irrecon-
ci1ab1e with or exclusive to it. Hence, in Zaire, in spite 
of the superficialities of intra-imperial manoeuvering, 
there was a confluence and congruence of agreement--interest 
to maintain the strategic systemic order. To the Western 
world, the crisis of state power that developed a week 
after Belgium ceded juridical independence to Zaire, when 
Zairois soldiers mutinied and Belgium reinvaded the country, 
was a crisis of (1) how best to contain radical nationalism 
in an enclave where Western hegemony and capital has exer-
cised decisive formative influence since 1492, and (2) how 
best to counter the USSR from making common cause with the 
Africans, and in the Western eyes from gaining influence and 
displacing them from a terrain where their influence and 
hegemony had been paramount and whose strategic minerals are 
sorely needed by Western economies. 
The United Nations as an Instrument of Western 
Response to zairois Crisis and Ultimately as an 
Instrument of American Foreign policy 
All members of the United Nations subscribe to an 
abstract notion of collective security. According to Sec-
tion 1 of Article 24 of the United Nations charter. "In 
order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United 
-128-· 
Nations, its members confer on the Security Counci~ the 
primary responsibility for the maintenance of international 
peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its 
duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts 
on its behalL'~O Section 2 of the same Article 24 further 
adds, "In carrying out these duties, the Security Council 
shall act with Purposes and Principles of the United Na-
tions.,,4l But, in reality, all of the Security Council 
members saw the Uni ted Nations as merely a legalized form 
of their victory in the war of 1939-45. In a way there 
was a definite truth to this position; after all, the com-
position of the five permanent members of the Security 
Council was essentially a recognition of the power configu-
ration that emerged from the ruins of the war. The UN was 
born at the onset of the cold war, when votes in the General 
Assembly were usually 55 to 5 in favor of the Western na-
tions, "the UN had within it and in all its constituent 
bodies, a clear majority supporting Western position.,,42 
Having created the Security Council as essentially the 
executive arm of the United Nations and having granted its 
40Leland M. Goodrich, Eduard Hambro, and Ann Patricia 
Simons, Charter of the United Nations: Commentary and 
Documents (New York: Columbia university Press, 1969), p. 
202. 
4lIbid ., p. 202. 
42Evan Luard, A History of the United Nations: The 
Years of Western Domination, Vol. I (New York: St. Martin's 
Press, 1982), p. 93. 
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five permanent members the right of veto on matters of 
peace, aggression or collective security, the world was 
treated by all the powers to a veritable display of capri-
cious, arbitrary use and misuse of this power, since among 
none of these nations singularly and oftentimes collectively, 
was there a conceptual congruence and consensus of what 
"collective security" means. For example, the Western domi-
nated United Nations in coming to the aid of their local 
ally and United States satellite, South Korea, in the 
Korean civil war thought they were"uniting for Peace," and 
consequently their UN resolution empowering them to take 
action was so dubbed. Thus, collective security was not a 
universal phenomenon but a crusade against "communist expan-
sionism and the United Nations went as far as characterizing 
both North Korea and the Peoples Republic of China as the 
"enemy." For the Soviet Union, "imperialism" was the threat 
to what it sees as "Collective Security," consistently out-
voted, and out-manoeuvred, the Soviet position became in-
creasingly obscurantist. Earlier in UN history, to protect 
itself against the tyranny of the western majority, it had 
made the wild suggestion that its sixteen autonomous 
republics be admitted to the UN as individual members. 
That, of course, was tantamount to the United States asking 
that its forty-eight states in 1948 be admitted as individual 
members. But the composition in the General Assembly was 
five communist states out of fifty-one members. 
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The Western powers, therefore, could normally 
expect to win each vote. They had no need to 
negotiate compromise solutions; they had only 
to mobilize the majority permanently for their 
own view. On most issues they would support 
strong action by the UN, since they knew they 
could contol the action the UN took and they 
then proudly presented themselves, almost taut-
ologically, as the supporters and upholders of 
the organization, and of its declared views; for 
to support the UN was to support themselves and 
their decisions. 43 
To get around the incessant use of the veto in the Security 
Council by the Soviet Union, a process was established whereby 
the General Assembly was empowered to sanction the use of 
force, a usurpation of the powers of Security Council and 
violation of the organization's charter. 
Uninhibited by the inconvenient veto power, 
inevitably Western views prevailed over the 
majority of the issues. This was not, of 
course how Western countries themselves viewed 
the matter. In thei·r eyes, it was the majority 
w:ithin the UN whose views prevailed and if 
these happened to coincide with those of lead-
ing Western governments, this was happy coin-
'd 114 Cl. ence •••• 
In the effort in Korea, supposedly under the UN flag, only 
sixteen nations sent military assistance; all were either 
NATO members or clients of the same. 
The command and control of UN forces were struc-
tured in such a manner, that the United States 
had total control. All forces committed to the 
UN effort were under U.S. command. The UN flag 
was to be used, but the UN resolution in no way 
required that the U.S. commander report to the 
43 Ibid ., p. 94. 
44Ibid ., p. 96. 
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United Nations. Indeed the Security Council 
established no machinery for administering the 
military effort. It was clear, therefore that 
the UN effort in Korea would be United States 
conceived, administered and implemented. 45 
The Soviet Union cast 110 vetoes in the UN between 1946 and 
1976. On the face of it this figure is staggering; in 
actuality, it does not tell the whole story and is therefore 
misleading. In the first place, three-quarters of the votes 
were circumvented, as for example, when the Western coali-
tion used a special procedure to allow a special session 
of the General Assembly to empower the UN to an armed 
response in Korea. The Soviet Union in this case was absent, 
and its action, whether in the General Assembly or in the 
Security Council, could not have mattered in the light of 
the realities of the day. Secondly, those were the days of 
automatic majority and automatic leadership of the Western 
alliance. Before 1966, when the Security Council membership 
was enlarged, a majority were political/military clients of 
the United States, a situation which provided a "hidden 
veto" to the u.s. 46 When the ideological bi-polarity that 
characterized these manoeuvres became less rigid, with the 
entrance of many third world nations who attempted to move 
45See James A. Nathan and James K. Oliver, United 
States Foreign policy and World Order (Boston: Little, Brown 
and Co., 1981), p. 126; John G. Stoessinger, Why Nations Go 
to War (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981), p. 79. 
46John G. Stessinger, The United Nations and the 
Super Powers, China, Russia and Atrier~ca (New York: Random 
House, 1977), Chapter I. 
----------------........................ .. 
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their own agenda to the international forum, the ideologica~ 
economic and strategic objective of the western world became 
more obvious. The United States cast its first veto in 1970 
to block the censure of the Smith rebel regime of Zimbabwe. 
The United States, France and the United Kingdom collectively 
blocked the expulsion of South Africa from the world commu-
nity in 1974. It is against this background of the use of 
the United Nations as a forum for the advancement of ideolo-
gical and strategic interest that most African states became 
juridically independent in 1960. 
The Economic and Geo-political 
Dimension of Western Interest 
The Western strategy for the Zairois crisis was a 
response of coalition diplomacy or solidarity based on a 
hard-headed recognition of the geo-po1itical, strategic and 
economic calculus. Belgium's Societe' Generale, directly 
or indirectly controlled 70% of Zairois economy and it had 
near-absolute control of the copper, uranium, diamond and 
47 cobalt mining complex. In 1960, the termination of Be1-
gian economic strangle hold on Zaire would mean losing 
"about 30 percent of the overseas operations of transport 
and insurance firms, and the loss of about $77 million in 
f · t ,,48 revenue rom 1nvestmen .•.. Belgian public sector would 
49. 
47We issman, American Foreign Policy in the Congo, p. 
48ca therine Hoskyns, The Congo Since Independence: 
January 1960 - December 1961 (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1965), pp. 52-53. 
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have to come up with an "$140-$156 million a year" from the 
reabsorption of 100,000 colonial cadres manning its venture 
in Zaire. France, along with West Germany and Italy 
depended heavily on Zairois copper. A French colony, Congo-
Brazzaville, shared continuous land mass with Zaire; a radi-
cal, non-western oriented neighbor to a conservative pro-
perly assimile' French-oriented state was viewed with alarm 
in France. Britain had put together an unstable settler-
dominated Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland as her answer 
to African nationalism in South-Central Africa. The monopoly 
of economic and political power lay in the hands of the 
settler community in Salisbury and one of them, Roy Wellensky 
had indeed become the Prime-Minister of the ill-fated Federa-
tiona The other parts of the federation were Northern Rho-
desia (now Zambia) and Nyasaland (Malawi). The Federation 
was also territorally contiguous with Zaire and the resolu-
tion of the Zaire crisis along the terms that pleased the 
settler interests was also in the best interest of British 
colonialism. In Zaire, Britain also had investment interest 
in the Belgian mining firm of Uhion Miniere. Union Miniere, 
produced 22 percent of Zaire's gross national product and 60 
percent of the export, and the British investment included 
h ,. '1 1 t 49 t 1 tt t' t e ub~qu~tous Un~ ever cong omera e. Por uga a emp ~ng 




to hold on to its spurious and ultimately jettisoned theory 
of Angola and Mozambique as overseas extensions of its main-
land was also concerned about what the outcome of the Zaire 
crisis portended for settler expansionism in Africa. Angola, 
a Portuguese Colony, shared a border too with Zaire. For the 
United States, the Zairois province of 5haba (Katanga) pro-
videa almost three-quarters of the U.S. cobalt imports in 
1960 and the Katanga-Rhodesia mining complex provided 10 per-
cent of u.S. copper import. While direct u.s. investment 
was small, the United States with a military strategic in-
terest in the ec~nomy of Western European countries, also 
clearly had a strategic interest in keeping Zairois resources 
accessible. Also, American companies maintained a plethora 
of hidden and not-so-hidden interests in the complex Euro-
American financial and investment interest in Zaire: Amer-
ican Metal Climax (AMAX) controlled 50-60 percent of Rhode-
sian-Katanga mining complex, and Mobil <H:l had a $12,000,000 
investment in oil storage and distribution network in Zaire 
in 1960. 50 The Morgan Guaranty Trust, was "the traditional 
fiscal agent in the united States for the Belgian Congo 
government and often served as "banker to the Belgian govern-
ment," according to weissman. 51 When Zaire became juridically 
independent of Belgium in 1960, Dwight Eisenhower was 
50 b'd 29 I ~ ., p. • 
51w ' Am' F ' P l' , h C e~ssman, . er~can ore~gno ~cy ~n t eongo, p. 
35. 
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President of the United States. Eisenhower was properly 
imbued with the supremacist impulse that characterized the 
colonial hegemony of his political allies. His own pedes-
trian approach to the civil rights struggle of American 
racial minorities is well known. The 34th President of the 
united States thought that some things (civil and social 
inequality of the African-American included) "are not best 
handled by punitive or compulsory federal law.,,52 Eisen-
hower thought Zairois existed "in a state of gross ignor-
ance,,53 and his State Department forbade African-Americans 
from travelling to Zaire54 lest they arouse the "natives." 
The President recognized the paramountcy of Belgium economic 
interests and thought it was best that independent Zaire 
should let Europeans control strategic positions in the 
armed forces and government. Many of the President's 
advisors, including cabinet members, had extensive banking 
and mining interests tied up in Zaire and feared "that a 
pro-Communist Congo would jeopardize Western sources of 
strategic raw materials. 11 55 Their counsel and view were 
52Quoted in C. Vann Woodward, The Strange Career of 
Jim Crow (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 139. 
530wight Eisenhower, Waging Peace (New York: Double-
day, 1965). 
54weissman,American Foreign Policy in the Congo, p. 
44. 
55Ibid ., pp. 9, 48-51; on U.S. favorable assessment 
of Western colonialism in Africa and Belgium in Zaire, see 
Department of S'tate Bulletin, Vol. XLII, No. 1100, July 25, 
1960, p. 152; Vol. XLIII, No. 1110, October 3, 1960,p. 509. 
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therefore not unrelated to both their material and systemic 
interest. 
The UN Secretariat, the UN S'ecretary 
and Interpre't'ationof S'ecuri ty 
Council Resolutions 
The second article of the Security Council resolution 
empowering the United l~ations to commit troops to Zaire read, 
••• decides to authorize the Secretary-General to 
take the necessary steps, in consultation with the 
Government with such military assistance as may be 
neces,sary until, through the efforts of the Congo-
lese Government with the technical assistance of 
the United Nations, the national security forces 
may be able in the opinion of the government, to 
meet fully its task. 56 
This cynical and deliberately vague document, glossing over 
the fundamental differences in policy options internally 
among the Zairois leaders and seemingly oblivious to the 
external dimension of the crisis, was perhaps so worded in 
order to assume easy passage by all partisan interests repre-
sented in the Security Council. Thus, the character, extent, 
nature and modalities of assistance to be rendered to the 
Zairois government would now have to be determined by the UN 
Secretariat under Secretary Hammarskjold. It was from this 
Security Council resolution that Organization des Nations 
Unies du Congo (ONUC) was born. 
Dag Mammarskjold, a Swedish national who served as 
Secretary-General of the United Nations from 1953 to 1961, 
56 
Security Council Document 4387, 1960. 
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was uniquely instrumental and positioned to advance and con-
solidate the cause of Western interests in Zaire. The secre-
tary, politically, has been characterized as a "tory Demo-
crat.,,57 Hammarskjold saw Marxist theory of imperialism 
"as a generalization in absurdum,,,58 and was, according to 
one worshipful account, "culturally and politically a Westerner 
59 and a European," who, in the opinion of an officer who 
worked with him, "shared the very widespread and sometimes 
unconsicuous European assumption that order in Africa ,is pri-
marily a matter of safeguarding European lives and property. ,,60 
Lippman thought Hammarskjold, 
••• was in fact the embodiment of noblest Western 
achievement--that laws can be administered by judges 
and civil servants who have their first allegiance 
to the law, and not to their personal, their class, 
or even their national interest. G1 
While conceding the intractable and complex nature of the 
severe limitations of the UN attempt to arbitrate in disputes 
between the dominant power blocs, Hammarskjold thought the 
57Mark W. Zacher, Dag Hammarskjold's United 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), p. 12. 





58Harnmarskjold, quoted in Mark Zacher, Dag Hammar-
skjold's United Nations~ p. 19. 
59Ibid ., p. 10. 
GOconnor Cruise O'Brien, "The United Nations and the 
Congo," Studies on the Left, VI (May-June 1966), pp. 7-8. 
6lwalter Lippman, "Dag Hammarskjold, United t;ations 
Pioneer," in Internatinal Organisation, IV (Autumn 1961), p. 
548. 
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area of UN action and possibility of success might be in the 
"uncommitted areas"--Asia, Latin America and Africa. 
In the Annual Report to the 15th General Assembly for 
the Year 1959-60, in which the Secretary characterized Africa 
as an uncommitted area, virtually all of sub-Sahara Africa, 
with the exception of Ghana, were colonies of Britain, France, 
and Belgium. With particular reference to Zaire in 1960, the 
country was ringed by a plethora of European colonies, in the 
Southwest by the Portuguese colony of Angola, in the South-
east by the British colony of the Federation of Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland, in the West by Congo-Brazzaville, a French colony, 
in the East by Uganda, a British colony; Ruanda-Urundi, a 
Belgian Trust territory, and Tanganyika, a British Trust ter-
ritory. Hammarskjold was, in 1948, head of Sweden's delega-
tion to the Organization for European Economic Cooperation 
(OEEC) that prepared the institutional fora for the establish-
ment of EEC; he was in fact Vice-Chairman of the EEC's Execu-
. C . t 62 . f . t . 1 . bl t~ve omm~t ee. It ~s, 0 course, qu~ e ent~re y poss~ e 
that a man so intimately associated with the founding of the 
EEC was not privy to the protracted negotiations that attended 
the birth of the Community and the vehement insistence of both 
Belgium and France that their A~rican Colonies be admitted as 
associated members. To describe as Hammarskjold did, the 
African continent as an uncommitted area in which the United 




Nations "has tried to counter tendencies to introduce Big 
Power Conflict ••• and put the young African countries under 
shadow of the Cold War ••• " will be a truly sUbjective read-
ing and indeed a gross distortion of the UN activity in Zaire. 
The U.S. president also saw the UN role in Zaire this way.63 
In the first place, Africa could hardly, in 1960, be called 
an uncommitted area, having been wholly colonized by one of 
the ideological blocs of the Cold War. Secondly, political, 
economic and strategic role/place of Africa at the height of 
the cold war was. determined by one of the partisan blocs 
under whose political and economic tutelage Africa had been 
at least since 1884, and whose hegemonic suzerainty had been 
uncontested and internationally recognized since that period. 
It will be truer and far more objective to suggest that the 
United Nations' intervention in Zaire was a crystallization 
of Western Coalition effort, maintained and sustained under 
the umbrella of the united Nations, to maintain and retain 
Western hegemonic initiative as a matter of economic, ideo-
logical and strategic imperative, in a continent where 
Western economic and political interests have been dominant 
and decisive since the advent of the European industrial 
revolution. 
The mandate (The Security Council Mandate)--given to 
63For Hammarskjold's position, see Wilder Foote (ed.), 
Servant of Peace: A Selection of the S eeches and Statements 
of Dag Hammarskjold, Secretar General of t e Un~ted Nat~ons, 
1953-1961 New York: Harper an ROW, 1962), pp. 327-328. 
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the Secretary General gave him the latitude of interpetation 
and implementation. The Secretary General came up with, as 
the basis of his understanding and interpretation of the 
Security Council resolution, a complex series of interpreta-
tions which he refined and refurbished as the UN activity 
progressed. According to Ralph Bunche,Hammarskjold held the 
firm conviction that it was not only possible to 
conceive, but that actually have been built up 
at the United Nations--at the very heart of world 
events--a body of thoroughly objective if not 
"neutral" international officers who, under his 
leadership, when given opportunity and resources 
and the confidence of enough governments could 
play a vital role and at times even decisive role 
in averting conflict. 64 
Hammarskjold thought himself an independent agent of the 
United Nations, a representative of the general will of the 
international community--"independent of the will of any 
individual member Or group members and under him the 
Secretariat, could be and ought to be, trusted to act in 
the general interest of all.,,65 Of the 102 high level or 
senior administrative positions in the United Nations Secre-
tariat, 42 were held by American, French and British 
For the U.S.position, see the U.S. president's speech in, 
Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XLIII, No. 1111, Octo-
ber 10, 1960, p. 552. 
64 
Ralph J. Bunche, "The United Nations Operation in 
the Congo," in The Quest for Peace, Andrew W. Cordier and 
Wilder Foote (eds.), (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1965), p. 122. 
65connor Cruise O'Bried, as quoted by Mark Zacher, 
Dag Hammarskjold's United Nations, pp. 240-241. 
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d . 66 a vJ.sers. Policy positions in the Secretariat with regard 
to Zaire were in the hands of Hammarskjold and three Ameri-
cans--Ralph Bunche, Andrew Cordier and Heinrich Wieschhoff--
all the members of the Congo Club. Ralph Bunche was Under-
Secretary for Political Affairs, Heinrich Wieschhoff was the 
Congo Club's African expert and Andrew Cordier the Executive 
Assistant to the Secretary General. The Under-Secretary for 
political and Security Affairs, a Soviet National, Georgia 
Arkader, was splendidly isolated,67 had no policy input to 
UN activity in Zaire, his own subordinate--Wieschhoff by-
passed him and reported directly to Hammerskjold. Arkader 
had no access to the information gathered by the UN apparatus 
on which ostensibly at least, the UN policy was based. When 
the Soviet Union offered material for the UN operation,: the 
Secretary-General of the world body refused, proposing that 
the Soviet Union make financial contributions instead, but 
accepted, politicaL financial and logistical assistance from 
the United states. 68 One cannot run away from the conclu-
sion that at least for Hammarskjold, he, himself and his 
66connor Cruise O'Brien, To Katanga and Back (New 
York: Simon and Schuster, 1962), p. 50. 
670n the Congo Club composition and operation see 
Connor Cruise O'Brien, To Katanga and Back, pp. 45-58; 
Rajeshwar Dayal, Mission for Hammarskjold (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 308. 
68Earnest Lefever, Uncertain Mandate: Politics of 
the UN Congo Operation (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 
1967), p. 30. 
£ 
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three American collaborators met the thesis of "objectivity" 
and "neutrality" advanced in his fatuous and grandiloquent 
essay in Oxford in that they are "guided solely by the 
common aims and rules laid down for, and by, the organiza-
tion,,69 they serve. The Security Council resolution of 
July 14, 1960, called for the Secretary General working with 
the government of Zaire, to provide the technical assistance, 
as necessary, until Zairois Security forces may in the 
opinion of the Zairois government meet their tasks. But 
Britain, France the United States and Italy, all members of 
the Security Council adopted the Belgian position that its 
military intervention without the invitation of the Zairois 
government was a humanitarian action. Belgium had tried to 
secure a retroactive legitimation by seeking to collaborate 
with the UN force. The United States position was that 
indeed Belgium had committed no aggression, even after its 
troops captured the Zairois bases of Kamina and Kitona. 
Hammarskjold took a position identical to the Western powers. 
While the central government of Lumumba and Kasavubu 
were exploring ways of preventing the Katanga secession from 
consolidating into a fait accompli with Western Coalition 
support, Hammarskjold took the position that, 
••• the situation in Katanga does not have its root 
in the Belgian attitude •.•• Nor is the problem a 
69Dag Hammarskjold, "The International Civil Servant 
in Law and in Fact." Lecture at Oxford University, May 13, 
1961. 
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desire on the part of the authorities of the 
province to secede from the Congo. The ques-
tion is a constitutional one with strong 
undercurrents of individual and collective 
political aims. 70 
Thus, a clear and fundamental difference had now risen on 
the purpose and role of UNOC. Whereas the maintenance of 
corporate entity of Zaire, i.e., its territorial integrity 
and the termination of Belgian invasion, and support of the 
secession was the government's interpretation, Hammarskjold 
interpreted his mandate from the Security Council differ-
ent1y, going so far as to suggest a confedera1 system in 
order to placate Tshombe and his allies. 
The United Nations had come to Zaire under the exp1i-
cit invitation of Lumumba government, whose central objec-
tive was to protect its newly-won independence and the ter-
ritorial integrity of the sovereign state. It was for this 
cardinal objective that the UN assistance was requested; if 
the UN now felt it had a different set of priorities in 
Zaire, Lumumba now came to the conclusion that his govern-
ment would now act independently of the United Nations. 
Lumumba now requested for and on August 29, 1960, in his 
provincial capital of Kisangani (Stanleyville), received 
military aid from the Soviet Union and on August 31, 1960, 
troops of the central government commenced action against 
the secessionist enclaves of Shaba (Katanga) and Oriental 
70Security Council Document 4417, August 1960. 
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Kasai. The aid included sixteen Ilyushin transport planes 
and one hundred trucks to transport troops to the areas of 
hostility. 71 For this action, Hammarskjold denounced 
Lumumba as an irresponsible politician and "an incipient 
dictator who in his drive for power was prepared to wreck 
the Congo and the UN.,,72 The Prime Minister noted that since 
Zaire was not a trusteeship of the UN, it could seek assist-
ance wherever it could. Now both the Western coalition and 
. k" t 73 b t k d d' 1 d . the UN wor 1ng 1n concer egan 0 wor towar s 1S 0 g1ng 
Lumumba from power and/or eliminating him completely from 
the scene. 
Meanwhile Ralph Bunche on whose recommendation Hammar-
skjold had based his Shaba policy of non-interference was 
now leaving to return "to UN headquarters. A new Special 
Representative of UN Secretary in Zaire, Rajashwar Dayal, 
an Indian national had been appointed to take this place. 
t h . 74 f 1 hId . However, 0 t e surpr1se 0 even Daya , w 0 was a rea y 1n 
New York, Andrew Cordier, one of the American trio who along 
with Hammarskjold made up the Congo Club in the UN Secretariat 
7lThomas Kanzas, The Rise and Fall of Patrice Lumumba 
(Cambridge: Schenkman, 1~9~7~7~)-,~p-.~2~7~6~.------------------------
72Ibid ., pp. 174-175. 
7'), 
rv1'a.deleine Kalb, The Congo Cables (New York: 
Macmillan, 1982), pp. 50-53; weissman, American Foreign 
Policy in the Co"ngo, pp. 88-89. 
74Rajeshwar Dayal, Missionfo r Hammarskjold (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 22. 
-145-
was sent to Zaire. Cordier was sent to Zaire even without 
the knowledge of Dayal who Hammarskjold had publicly 
appointed at his Special Representative. Cordier was in 
Zaire for one week--September 1st - 8th, 1960, as the 
Special Representative of Hammarskjold and Head of the UN 
operations. His activities and actions during the spate of 
one week enabled the UN, working in concert with Western 
nations, to consolidate their opposition to Lumumba and set 
in motion both the legal, and military coercive process that 
led to his downfall from power and ultimately to his phy-
sical demise. According to Kanza, Cordier in effect became 
the Zairois head of State with American Ambassador Clare 
'mb 1 k h'" 1 d ' d' 'd ,,75 T~ er a e ~s persona a v~ser an v~ce-pres~ ent. 
Cordier, upon arrival in Zaire, refused to meet with Prime 
Minister Lumumbai he sent "an urgent recommendation" 
through Hammarskjold76 to the government of the United States 
to boost its intelligence network in Zaire. Cordier, now 
acting for Hammarskjold under the UN plan, with the CIA, 
French emissaries77 and Belgian advisers began to advise 
that Article 22 of the Loi Fondomentale--the Republican 
constitution of Zaire--empowered Kasavubu to dismiss Lumumba 
75Thomas Kanza, The Rise and Fall of Patrice Lumumba, 
p. 276. 
76Madeleine Kalb, The Congo Cables, pp. 74-75. 
77weissman, American Foreign Policy in the Congo, 
pp. 88-90. 
-----------;;"".--- -------- " 
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from the post of Prime Minister. Kasavubu accepted this 
interpretation of the constitution but asked for certain 
guarantees. On the night of September 5, 1960 Kasavubu 
announced the dismissal of Lumumba. Cordier immediately 
closed the airports and the radio station the following day. 
With the airport closed, Lumumba could not airlift troops 
who were engaged in action against the secessionists and 
cabinet members wishing to return to the capital were pre-
vented from doing so. But Belgian planes operating in support 
of the Secessionist regime in Shaba were allowed to fly by the 
UN command. Kasavubu too had access to the radio station of 
Congo-Brazzaville. Though Lumumba countered by dismissing 
Kasavubu, the two leaders tendered their cases before the 
Zairois joint houses of parliament on September 7, and 8, 
1960. The parliament annulled the dismissal and counter dis-
missal and opted for national reconciliation. Clearly caught 
off guard by Lumumba's parliamentary support, the UN and the 
United States began to look towards the army. Unwilling to 
abide by the choice of Lumumba again being returned as Prime 
Minister, the Western coalition working under the UN aus-
pices began to court assiduously the Zairois Army. As 
Western contact and infiltration of the Zairois Army began 
to mature, the Kasavubu-Ileo governmental pretension was 
abandoned. Through the auspices provided by the Deputy Com-
mander of UN forces in Zaire, Major General Kettani, a Mor-
rocan general who served France well in the Second general 
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European War, the U.S., through the United Nations began to 
take over the payments and emoluments of units of Zairois 
Army, using Joseph Mobutu as conduit. Joseph Desire Mobutu 
was, in the words of Kanza, "the closest official collabo-
rator Lumumba had," and as one of his two private Secretaries 
"had access to all the information, public or confidential., 
official or personal, that Lumumba was given.,,78 During the 
initial army mutiny over the slow pace of the Africanization 
of the Officer Corp, Lumumba ,had upgraded Sergeant Mobutu to 
the rank of Colonel of the Army and Chief of Army Staff. But 
his loyalty had been sufficiently questionable, that he was 
excluded from the planning and execution of the military 
action against the secessionist enclaves. Kettani became 
Mobutu's military adviser and with U.S. diplomatic, moral 
and most importantly pecuniary support, Mobutu secured the 
necessary support of the Army--neutrality between Lumumba 
and Kasavubu and ultimately answerable to Mobutu only. On 
September 13th, Zairois parliament voted full powers to the 
Lumurnba government •. Hammarskjold acknowledged the political 
dominance and influence of Lumumba in the country and he had 
confided to the U.S. that he was trying to remove Lurnurnba 
without having to do so by "extra constitutional means," in 
a sort of "gamesmanship--how to win without actually 
78Thomas Kanza, The Rise and Fall of Lurnurnba (Cam-
bridge: Schenkrnan Publishing House, 1977), p. 112. 
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cheating. ,,79 A day later, the Western coalition and the 
United Nations finally abandoned all constitutinal and 
legal pretension and niceties. Mobutu now came to the fore. 
He arrested the General Officer commanding the Zairois 
Army, General Lundula, his superior officer, and announced 
the take-over of power by the army. He simultaneously 
expelled all Russian and Czechoslovakian diplomats and 
gave them forty-eight hours to leave the country.SO The 
national radio and the airports were now reopened, the 
military action against the secessionists enclaves of 
Oriental Kasai and Shaba (Katanga) were halted. Mobutu 
purported to rule the country thorugh a college of commis-
sioners and more importantly he was now the pay masterSl 
of the ANC, with the generous support of UN liaison offi-
cers and Western military attaches, and the CIA. After the 
inauguration of the commissioners, they issued jointly a 
proclamation expressing gratitude to Mobutu as the "man who 
has delivered us from Communist colonialism and Marxist-
Leninist imperialism" while giving their full support to 
Kasavubu as "sole head of state."S2 
79 
Kalb, The Congo Cables, p. SO. 
80 b'd 90 I ~., p •• 
Congo 
81 1 ' , f naya , M~ss~on or 
Cables, pp. 96-97. 
Hammarskjold, p. 66; Kalb, The 
82 
Ibid., p. 9 S . 
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Meanwhile Rajeshwar Dayal of India had now assumed 
office as Special Representative to Zaire. .When the African 
diplomats produced a reconciliatory document for Lumumba 
and Kasavubu to sign, Dayal hailed it "an excellent and 
entirely workable compromise. ,,83 The Zairois parliamentary 
group and African diplomats continued with their efforts at 
reconciliation, but the u.S. government's reaction to the 
possibility of reconciliation bordered on hysteria. Forged 
84 documents began to appear in the Zairois press alluding 
to Lumumba's alleged attempt to expel the UN and replace it 
with Soviet aid. Even though American Ambassador Timberlake 
told Dayal that he was keeping his distance and not giving 
Mobutu85 any more funds, the American state departmemt 
insisted that Kasavubu publicly renounce any deal with 
Lumumba. 86 One can quote ad nauseum, the Charter of the 
United Nations, the Staff Regulations of the UN Secretariat, 
the principle of sovereignty of nations and non-interference, 
but objectively all these abstract precepts have no bearing 
on nor explain the forces at work, because , 
••• having agreed to pay a third of the cost of 
the UN operation in the Congo, to say nothing 
of the invisible expenditure needed to keep 
the country within the Western sphere of influence, 
83Dayal, Mission for Hammarskjold, p. 86. 
84 Ibid ., p. 88. 
85Ibid ., p. 86. 
86Ka1b , The Congo Cables, p. 100. 
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the Americans were in command. The Congo became 
rather like a business company, in which the 
largest shareholder could determine how the govern-
ing board was to act. 87 
When Dayal issued his progress report in November 
1960, he returned to the theme of returning the country to 
legality. The Americans then decided to bring Kasavubu to 
New York to face the General Assembly. With Lumumba vir-
tually incarcerated under house arrest, Thomas Kanza was 
chosen to represent the Lumumba government. The"Western 
alliance was able to convert Chile, EI-Salvador, Per~ 
Senegal, Chad, Austria, Bolivia, Brazil, Cyprus, Denmark, 
Greece, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Israel, Japan, Norway, 
Thailand, Uruguay, Dominican Republic, Ecuador and most of 
the African members of the French Community to vote for the 
Kasavubu delegation which was confirmed 53-24-19. 88 The 
United States had co-opted the UN organ as part of its 
crusade against communism, and acting in collusion with 
Kasavubu-Bomboko and especially Mobutu had rendered the 
sovereign decision of the Zairois parliament invalid; and 
had used cajoling, intimidation and out-right bribery to 
force Kasavubu government as the only one it was willing to 
accept. On November 27, 1960, Lumumba, having recognized 
87Kanza,· The Rise and Fall of Patrice Lumumba, p. 305. 
88weissman, American Foreign Policy in the Congo, pp. 
105-107; Kabl, The Congo Cables, pp. 154-155; on U.s. sup-
port of Kasavubu, see Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 
XLIII, No. 1110, October 3, 1960, p. 527; Vol. XLIII, No. 
1120, December 12, 1960, pp. 907-908. 
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the legal implication of the UN vote and in spite of the 
personal assurances of Daya189 as to his safety under UN 
command, decided to move to his home base of Kisangani. 
Lumumba was captured by Mobutu troops on December 2. Kasa-
vubu met Lumumba in captivity with an offer of a ministerial 
appointment in his government. Lumumba refused and on 
January 17, 1961, Lumumba and Okito and Mpolo, two of his 
Ministers, were transferred to Tshombe in Shaba, where they 
were put to death. 90 
Change and Continuity: The Kennedy Policy 
By the time of the demise of Lumumba, John Fitzgerald 
Kennedy had assumed the presidency of the United States. 
Contrary to the mythology of open-minded engagement and New 
Frontier ideology entertained bysome9l and maintained and 
perpetuated by reverential and worshipful renditions of his 
89Ibid ., p. 158. 
900n the relationship between Mobutu-Tshombe govern-
ments and the CIA on plans to assassinate Lumumba, see Rene 
Lemarchand (ed.), American Policy in Southern Africa (Wash-
ington, D.C., 1978), pp. 382-432. Also, Select Committee to 
Study Government Operations with Respect to Intelligence 
Activities, Interim Report, Alleged Assassination Plots 
Involving Foreign Leaders, 94th Congress, 1st Session (Wash-
ington, D.C., November 20, 1975), pp. 13-70. The Church 
Committee tried albeit in vain to play down the CIA role in 
the murder of Lumumba. Also, Madeleine Kalb, Congo Cables, 
Chapters VI-VII. 
9lDayal, for example, failed to grasp the politicio-
strategic basis in which U.S. policy in Zaire was rooted. 
He thought a Kennedy administration would distance itself 
from the Western Coalition strategy. See, Dayal, Mission 
for Hammarskjold, p. 702. 
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publicists and image-makers,92 Kennedy only saw Africa as 
an unoccupied terrain brimming with potential allies or tools 
in his crusade against communist nations. According to a 
secret study which he commissioned at the inception of his 
administration, and which subsequently set the basis for 
policy, Kennedy advisers came to a definitive conclusion: 
••• what we do--or fail to do--in Africa in the 
next year will have profound effect for many 
years •.•• We see Africa as probably the greatest 
open field of maneuver in the worldwide competition 
between the (Communist) Bloc and the non-Communist 
world. 93 
The Kennedy anti-communism was without the bellicosity asso-
ciated with the Eisenhower administration; it was one con-
ducted with flair and grace though this did not prevent it 
from drawing up a contingency plan94 for limited war when 
it feared the creation and consolidation of a rival govern-
ment by Lumumbist forces and the increasing likelihood of 
support by the Soviet bloc and neutral nations. The admin-
istration knew that it needed another Cordier, though without 
92See Roger Hilsman, To Move a :Mation: The Politics 
of Foreign Policy in-- the Administration of John F. Kennedy 
(New York: Doubleday, 1967); Theodore Sorenson, Kennedy 
(New York: Harper and Row, 1965); Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., 
A Thousand Days (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1965). 
93Edgar Lockwood quotes the study in "The Future of 
Carter Policy Toward Southern Africa," in Rene Lemarchand 
(ed.), American Forei n Polic in Southern Africa (Washing-
ton, D.C.: Un~vers~ty Press of Amer~ca, 1 78), pp. 453-436. 
94 , 'p' , P l' , h C We~ssman, Amer~can ore1gn 0 ~cy 1n t e ongo, p. 
142. 
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his blitz approach to policy execution that would only 
direct further attention to the collusion between the UN 
and the u.s. The Americans had now conceded that the par-
liament should be convened; but they wanted to ensure that 
the outcome of the choosing of a new government and a Prime 
Minister would be favorable this time. Neither the Ameri-
cans nor their Zairois clients had any use for Dayal's even-
handed approach towards the Zairois political factions nor 
for what they saw as his excessive obsession with legality. 
Kasavubu began to call for Dayal's withdrawal while Mobutu's 
troops began a campaign of harassment against UN troops in 
order to embarrass Dayal; Western governments began to 
describe him as "muddle-headed neutralist,,,95 and "ineffec-
tual,,,96 and American Ambassador Timberlake had cabled that 
Dayal was not amenable to American pressures. 97 With 
characteristic unctuous hypocrisy, Hammarskjold put out the 
story that Dayal was being recalled for consultation for 
two weeks; Dayal never returned to Zaire. After an interim 
replacement, Hammarskjold and the Western Coalition now 
launched a new command arrangement, naming Sture Linnen, a 
Swedish entrepreneur to be in charge of overall operations 
and assisted by General McKeown in charge of the UN forces. 
York: 
95Kalb , The 
96 h'll' P 1 1ppa 
Delvin-Adair 
Congo Cables, p. 84. 
Schuyler, Who Killed the Congo? (New 
Co., 1962), p. 145. 
97Kalb , The Congo Cables, pp. 247-248. 
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The U.S. now began to call for a reconvening of Parliament. 
Cyrille Adoula was the candidate favored by the UN and the 
U.S. government98 to be Prime Minister, and ten days before 
the parliamentary election, the u.s. preferred list of the 
new leaders of Zaire were already known to the United 
, .,' 99 h 'd mb Nat10ns operat1ons 1n Za1re. T e Un1te States e assy 
officials in Zaire admitted that the purported parliamentary 
election was a result of their working-relationship with UN 
Chief Linner, that "it really was a u.S. operation, but using 
d ' 1" ,,100 outstan 1ng UN persona 1t1es. 
By finally reconvening parliament, Lumumbist forces 
having been decimated or physically eliminated, the u.S. had 
achieved its strategic-political objective by neutralizing 
effectively the forces of radical nationalism; its domestic 
allies, the Mobutu-Kasavubu-Bomboko axis had assumed state 
power in the interim and expelled the entire diplomatic 
missions of the Eastern bloc. NOw, the new government of 
Adoula had won in Parliament on July 31, 1962; the American 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had sponsored both Adoula 
98 Roy Wellensky, Wellensky's 4,000 Days (New York: 
Roy Publishers, 1964), pp. 221-222. 
990 'Brien, To Katanga and Back, p. 189. 
100weissman, American Foreign Policy in the Congo, 
p. 147. The U.S. thought the Adoula government was "mode-
rate;" see Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XLV, No. 1165, 
October 3, 1961, p. 676. 
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and his political organization, Rassemblement des Demo-
101 crates du Congo (RADECO). At the inception of the 
Adoula government, the U.S., bilaterally and through the 
aegis of the UN had invested $178.6 million in the UNI 
Western coalition effort. Indeed, in the four-year effort, 
the u.s. provided 42% of the total $411 million. 102 
However, the political problems of the Adoula govern-
ment were hardly over; it had sought to strengthen itself 
by eliminating the Lumumbists, both in the Parliament, the 
country at large, and the Council of Ministers. Its goal 
was to reduce or eliminate the influence of those who shared 
the late Prime Minister's radical nationalism. By December, 
1963, twenty-one Lumumbist Cabinet members had been removed, 
their political organization dissolved, the Zairois Parlia-
ment had been closed. 
Popular rebellion and insurrection which had broken 
out in July, 1963 in Western Zaire had now spread to the 
East. They were led by the Committee of National Libera-
tion, CLB, and the insurrections in the West were coordi-
nated by Pierre Muele and in the East by Christopher 
lOlJohn Hatch, "Hostages, Mercernaries, and the CIA," 
Nation (December 14, 1964), p. 11 
102Earnest W. Lefever, Crisis in the Congo: A united 
Nations Force in Action (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Insti-
tution, 1965). Also, Lefever, Uncertain Mandate: Politics 
of UN Congo Operations (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1967). 
On u.s. support of financing the UN Congo operation, see, 
Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XLIV, No. 1138, April 17, 
1961. 
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103 Gbenye. In the kiyu province, another Lumumbist, Gaston 
Soumialot organized the Armee Populaire de Liberation (APL). 
The deteriorating political and military situation of its 
client government alarmed the u.s. government. With Cuban 
exiles, European mercenaries and American pilots on con-
tracts to the state department, combat missions began to 
relieve the hard-pressed Mobutu troops; counterinsurgency 
experts, along with C-47s and T-28s planes manned by 100 
advisors were sent to Zaire by the end of June, 1964. That 
~ 
same day, the government of Cyrille Adoula fell and Moise 
Tshombe was brought back from exile from Europe to head a 
new government. 
The United Nations operations had come to an end 
June 30, 1964--aLmost exactly four years after the late 
Prime Minister Lumumba's ill-fated invitation for UN assist-
ance to deal with Belgian invasion and the Tshombe's Belgian-
supported secession. Consequently it was Tshombe's task to 
preside over a post-ONUC government, with Kasavubu as Presi-
dent •. Tshombe,widely regarded as a pariah in Africa {a 
legacy of his role and complicity in Lumumba's murder> was 
sponsored by the U.S., Belgium, and Britajn. For his spon-
sors, Tshombe had impeccable credentials--his former seces-
sionist army hitherto rusticated at the Portuguese colony 
of Angola was needed to supplement the security gap occasioned 
103crawford Young, Politics of the Congo, p. 9. 
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by the UN withdrawal. Tshornbe himself referred to this army 
of South African and Rhodesian mercenaries as foreign volun-
teers. 104 After all, these "volunteers" supplanted by Bel-
gian paratroopers in contrast to Mobutu's dismal perform-
ance, were able to roll back the rapid advances of the 
,~leleGbenye-Soumiolot forces. But Tshombe had to share his 
powers with Kasavubu, who has been a constant factor .·in the 
political configuration since 1960 irrespective of whatever 
regime was in power. Tshombe was not an American candidate; 
his advisers were British and Belgian in contrast to Adoula 
whose regime was sponsored by the Americans. An aspect of 
the American strategy was to break the economic colonial 
monopoly Belgium had hitherto exercised. In order to 
eclipse the rising ascendancy of Tshombe who was poised to 
challenge him in the coming election in 1965, Kasavubu 
refused to renominate Tshombe, and chose Evariste Kumba for 
the position of Prime Minister and a constitutional crisis 
ensued again. On November 24, 1965, Joseph Desire Mobutu, 
the American candidate, intervened, dissolved parliament 
and sacked the government of Kasavubu. 
l04Moise Tshombe, My Fifteen Months in Government 
(Translated) by Lewis Bernays (Plano: University of Plano 
Press, 1967). 
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The Rise of Mobutu: Authoritarianism, 
the l~eocolonial S'tateand Its Defence 
in the Western Strategic Interest 
The second coming of Mobutu finally signalled and 
consolidated American hegemonic interest in the neo-
colonial state; Mobutu had been, after all, the phantom 
discovery of the Eisenhower administration; his role had 
been pivotal in reducing or eliminating perceived communist 
influence in Zaire since 1960. 105 His assistance had been 
acknowledged by successive u.S. presidents, as John Kennedy 
conceded, "General, if it had not been for you, the whole 
thing would have collapsed and the Communists would have 
taken over." Mobutu responded, "I do what I am able to 
d ,,106 o. Mobutu even though not a politician, belongs to 
that arm of the neo-colonial elite which the positivist 
school--the dominant paradigm of the Western social science, 
views as agents of modernization and development in the 
Third World. These societies are said to be in "transi-
tion,,107 to an age of' abundance and prosperity. While frag-
menting the bulk of human history, Rostow, the preeminent 
105In his first coup in 1960, he expelled the entire 
mission of the Eastern bloc of Nations; in 1963, he engine-
ered the expulsion of the USSR mission again; Kalb, The 
Congo Cables, p. 377. 
106I bid., p. 372. This quotation is attributed to a 
memorandum of conversation between Kennedy and Mobutu on 
May 31, 1963. 
107Harvey G. Kbeschull (ed.), Politics in Transi-
tional Societies: The Challenge of Change in Asia, Africa 
and Latin America (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1968) • 
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theorist of this school, grouped all human societies into 
a vulgar linear concept of development, compartmentalized 
into five stages. Rostow sees all societies as lying within 
one of the following five categories: the traditional 
society; the preconditions for take-off; the take-off; the 
drive to maturity; the age of mass-consumption. He suggested 
as absolute, the need for a new elite with an appropriate 
108 value system. According to Lucian pye, 
••• the story of underdeveloped countries is one 
of countless efforts to create organizations by 
which resourcescan be effectively mobilized •••• 
In most of the new emergent countries, armies have 
tended to emphasize a rational outlook and to 
champion responsible change and national develop-
ment. 109 . 
Thus, for pye, the Armed Forces in his newly emergent 
nations, are "the llew elites" with an "appropriate value 
system" in Rostowian terminology~ they are apolitical, and 
"extremely sensitive to the needs of modernization and 
technological advancement.,,110 The bankruptcy of this kind 
of analysis is revealed by the fact that far from being 
apolitical and champoining responsible change, the military 
is in power in twenty of the fifty odd states in Africa. 
The politics of authoritative allocation of resources, how 
108W• W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth 
(Cambridge: University Press, 1960), p. 26. 
109 . W LUC1an • pye, 
Modernization," in H. G. 
Societies, p. 185. 
110Ib'd 186 1 ., p. • 
"Armies in the Process of Political 
Kebschull, Politics in Transitional 
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to divert more of the scarce resources to the military and 
the strategic concerns of Extra-African powers have shown 
that Army is more often than not, the armed faction of the 
ruling elites. Arguably, Mobutu's coup responded to a severe 
crisis of order and authority at its inception. But Zaire 
under Mobutu is not ruled by an organisation dominated by a 
"highly professionalized bureaucratized and development-
, d 'l't "Ill or1ente m1 1 ary. It is a patrimonial organization 
run along authoritarian principles, under the autocratic 
and arbitrary rule of Mobutu. Having said that, it must be 
empahsized that only a truncated reading of the dependency 
theory would allow a simplistic dismissal of Mobutu as a 
Western puppet. He indeed is, but it is a symbiotic rela-
tionship of mutual dependence between the Bonapartistl12 
House of Mobutu in a monarchical sense, in control of the 
Zaire S"tate and the Western Alliance in desperate need of a 
strategic ally. Mobutu's publicists hail him as the "helms-
man," "the guide of the nation," and his rule has been 
characterized as a kleptocracy. He rules over the "unending 
crisis" that is zaire. 113 Behind him is an entire social 
lllThomas Callaghy, The State-Society Struggle: Zaire 
in Comparative Struggle (New York: Columbia university Pres~, 
p. 25. 
l12Nzongola Mtalaja, "The State in Post Colinial 
Africa," in Class StrU~gle and National Liberation in Africa 
(Roxbury: Omenana, 198 ), p. 47. 
ll3This is the characterization of Zaire by C. Young 
in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 57, No.1 (Fall, 1978). 
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class which enriches itself at the expense of the country 
in his name. Mobutu's personal fortune is reportedly $4 
billion with palaces in each region of Zaire and seven man-
. . F d B l' 114 h t t .. t f S10ns 1n rance an e g1um. T e s ra eg1c 1nteres s 0 
the Western alliance compels its support for Mobutu: u.s. 
econom;cand military aid was $468 million in 1977, from $76 
million in 1964, and from $6.1 million in 1964 to $S89 
respectively. In its worst year of indebtedness, 1977, 
Zaire's debt to u.s. public institutions including the Export-
Import Bank (Eximbank), U.S.A.I.D., PL480, was $333.46 
million, while in the private sector, it owed $377.17 million 
to u.s. banks like Bankers Trust, Bank of America, Chase Man-
hattan, CitiBank, Commerce Union Nashville, Equibank, Federal 
Home Loan, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Guaranty, Manufacturers 
Hanover, Private Export, and Continental Illinois. llS It's 
debt to public institutions and private banks was $710.10 
million. Emergency measures to restructure the Zairois 
economy were taken by the Paris Club countries in 1976, 1977, 
1981, and 1983, but still by 1983, Zaire owed over $4 billion 
and $1 billion in arrears on amortization and interest 
l14callaghy, The State-Society Struggle, p. 179. 
11SGuy Gram, "Zaire, 1978: The Intellectual and 
Ethical Bankruptcy of the World System," in Africa Today 
(October-December 1978), p. 18; C. Young and T. Turner, 
The Rise and Decline of the Zairois State (Madison: Univer-
sity of Wisconsin Press, 1985), pp. 378-386. 
116 payments. 
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Twice in 1977 and 1978, the threat of termination 
of Mobutu's rule appeared real; in March 1977, forces of 
the F'ront deLiberation du Congo (FLNC) domiciled in 
Angola, invaded Zaire, and routed Mobutu's army. The 
invasion was put down after eight days by Moroccan troops 
with the logistical and intelligence assistance of France 
and the U.S. The invasion threatened the mining complex--
the key interest that, (1) provides a preponderance of 
Mobutu's revenue, (2) provides key minerals to France and 
Belgium. To supplement the 1,500 Moroccan troops were 
smaller units from Egypt, Gabon, Burundi, Ivory Coast, 
Senegal, Central African Empire, and Kenya. A second 
stronger and better-led invasion ensued in May 1978 and was 
again put down by French Legionnaires, Belgian paratroopers, 
supplemented by logistical and tele-communication equipment 
from the U.S. In a move that only recalls the Berlin Con-
ference of 1884-85, when European nations partitioned Africa 
among themselves, NATO, on May 30-31, 1978, met to discuss 
and coordinate their strategy on containing the crisis in 
Zaire. Present were Greece, Federal Republic of Germany, 
France, Denmark, Canada, Belgium, United Kingdom, Turkey, 
United States of America, Portugal, Norway, Netherlands, 
l16callaghy, "Patrimonial Rule and Absolutist Fin-
ances," in The State Society Sturtgle: Zaire in Compative 
Politics (New York, 19-84), pp. 10 -194. Also see U.S. Govern-
ment, U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1977). 
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117 Luxemborg, Italy and Iceland. Espousing the slogan 
"Africa for Africans," which concealed their strategic 
economic interest, they sought to police Zaire not with 
their own troops, but by raising a spurious Inter-African 
force composed of their client states who would thus perform 
this sub-imperial role. Thus, by June 1980, a total of 
2,500 troopsl18 notably from Egypt, Togo, Morocco, Gabon, 
Senegal, and Central African Republic, replaced the 1,500 
French Legionnaires. The idea of a supposedly Pan-African 
Army sponsored by NATO occasioned a strong rebuttal and 
denunciation from Nyerere of Tanzania who denounced it in 
no uncertain terms~ 
Whatever the agenda, the Paris or Brussels meeting 
are not discussing the freedom of Africa. They are 
discussing the continued domination of Africa by 
Western powers. They are intended to betaken, as a 
second Berlin Conference ••.• There is only one 
reason why the idea of Europe setting up 
initiating a Pan-African Security Force or an African 
Peace Force does not meet with immediate and world-
wide amazement and consternation. It is the continu-
ing assumption that Africa is, and must always remain 
part of Western European 'sphere of influence." This 
assumption is hardly questioned yet ••.• 119 
l17The Department of State Bulletin, The Official 
Records of the United States Forei n policy, Vol. 78, No. 
016 Was ~ngton, D.C., Ju y 9 8 • 
l18Galen Hull, "Zaire in the World System: In Search 
of Sovereignty," in Guy Gran (ed.), Zaire: The Political 
Economy of Underdevelopment (New York: Praeger, 1979), p. 
176. 
l19Julius Nyerere, Foreign Troops in Africa, Text of 
a special message delivered to foreign envoys accredited to 
Tanzania on June 8, 1978, Africa Report (July-August 1978). 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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But for Mobutu, the sovereignty of Zaire is merely an 
article of trade to be used in barter, to further ingra-
tiate himself with his western sponsors, or to improve his 
political position vis-a-vis their reliance on him. By so 
doing, he seeks to so completely interweave his own con-
tinued control/manipulation of state power with continued 
Western domination of Zaire. Occupation of Zaire by Belgian 
paratroopers and French Legionnaires supplemented by a 
spurious African Force is not the most spectacular assault 
on Zairois sovereignty; on March 26, 1976, Mobutu signed a 
document with a German-based firm by the name of Orbital 
Transport un Raketen A. G., more popularly known by its 
acronym OTRAG. According to Article 1, Section 2 of this 
contract, its agreement enjoin$ the Mobutu government to 
provide a suitable site for launching missiles into the 
120 atmosphere. The land area Mobutu ceded to this German 
firm is 150,000 square kilometers, located in the Shaba 
region and Mobutu was "paid 47 percent of the profits by 
the company that transports material to the site •••. ,,121 
Mobutu's kleptocratic autocratic rule in Zaire, while 
guaranteeing the ideological, economic and political affi-
nity between Zaire and the West can be tolerated by these 
l20For the full contract, see, Race and Class, Vol. 
XIX, No.2 (1977), Guy Gran (ed.), ~Z-a~i~r~e~:~-T~h-e __ p-o-l~·-i-t~i~c~a~l 
Economy of Underdevelopment, pp. 214, 280. 
l2lIbid • 
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imperialist countries given that a convergence and conflu-
ence of class, political, economic and strategic interests 
unite them. 
We have stated earlier in Chapter II that the parti-
cular mode of intervention that is the focus of this study 
is politico-military intervention, i.e., the mode of inter-
vention that "seeks to manipulate the outcome of internal 
conflict (insurgency political crises, revolution or civil 
122 war) or through subversion to precipitate such conflict." 
For Zaire, this politico-military intervention has been a 
constant and recurrent feature of the country's existence 
and retention under the political, ideological and economic 
order favorable to the intervenors. The existence of Zaire 
from July 1960 to November 1965 under the UN-Western Coali-
. 123 tion-Binza Group axis was a result of this intervention. 
The existence and resilience of Mobutu regime, from November 
1965 to the present cannot be understood or grasped without 
reference to this intervention. 
122M• Gurtov, The United States Against the Third 
World: Antinationalism and Intervention (New York: Praeger 
Publishers, 1974), p. 2. 
l23The Binza Group refers to the Zairois allies of 
the UN/Western Coaliaiton--Mobutu (Military) Nendaka (Secu-
rity) Kandola (Internal Affairs) Ndele (National Bank) and 
Bomboko (Foreign Affairs). See Nzongola Ntalaja, "The 
Continuing Struggle for National Liberation in Zaire," in 
Class Struggle and National Liberation in Africa (Roxbury: 
Omenana, 1982),. p. 67. See also, Dayal, Mission for Hammar-
skjold, pp. 312, 316; Weissman, American Foreign policy in 
the Congo, p. 109. 
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Zaire in the Western Strategic 
Interest in Africa 
At the core of this politico-military intervention 
are the NATO powers, notably the United States of America, 
France and Belgium. Their coalitional strategic interest, 
and intervention is underlined by the Summit meeting of the 
IS-member NATO alliance called to map a joint response to 
the crisis of stability that faced their ally, Mobutu during 
the second Shaba uprising in 1978. During this second 
uprising, rather than intervene through proxy as in March 
1977, the NATO powers intervened directly, the French Legion-
naires and Belgian paratroopers were now used to repel the 
advances of the forces opposed to Mobutu. The United States 
assisted in the effort by providing "eighteeen C-14l Star-
lifters and C-S Galaxies and crews, plus a sophisticated 
telecommunication system. ,,124 
Supplementing the core interventionist states and. 
operating at the second tier, i.e., acting as proxies for 
the states in the contemporary era are a group of African 
states. The neo-colonial nature of the independence of 
Africa from Europe has meant that this supposed independence 
was no more than a juridical affair, facilitating a residual 
organic base for imperialist assault on Africa which is 
occasioned by the ideological alliance betwen the African 
political class and the core intervenors, "The essence of 
l24Thomas Callaghy, The State Society Struggle, p. 207. 
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neocolonialismf"according to Kwame Nkrumah, 
••• is that the state which is subject to it 
is, in theory, independent and has all the 
outward trappings of international sovereignty. 
In reality, its economic system and thus its 
political policy is dictated from outside. 125 
The phenomenon of neocolonialism has given rise to the rule 
of a political class that acts strategically in the interest 
of imperialist intervention in comtemporary Africa. 
Thus, Senegal, Ivory Coast, Burundi, Gabon, Egypt, 
Kenya, Morocco and Central African Republic constitutes this 
second tier of intervention for the West in Zaire as occa-
sioned by the use of their troops to replace the French and 
Belgian troops in Zaire in- June 1978. They act as proxies 
and thus share the burden of the mutual ideological commit-
ment that binds them and the core intervenors. They are all 
client-states of the NATO powers. Egypt is in an alliance 
of "strategic consensus,,126 with the U.S. in the mediter-
ranean region and provides landing and communication facili-
ties for the U.S rapid deployment force. Kenya provides 
berthing facilities and base for the U.S Armed Forces in the 
Kenya port city of Mombassa. Some authors127 have chronicled 
l25Kwame Nkrumah, Neo-Colonialism (New York: Inter-
national Publishers, 1980), p. ix. 
l26Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., "Arabs, Israelis, and 
Americans," in Foreign Affairs (Summer 1984), pp. 1194-1209. 
l27Edward M. Corbett, French Presence in Black Africa 
(Washington, D.C.: Black Orpheus, 1972); Olasupo Adedokun, 
"Franco-African Relations and the Use of Intervention as an 
Instrument of Foreign Policy Objectives: A Critical Study 
of Victims of French Foreign Policy Objectives," (Ph.D. 
dissertation, Atlanta University, 1982). 
-- ------------
-168-
extensively the pervasive French military, economic, and 
political domination of Senegal, Ivory Coast, Gabon, Central 
African Republic and Morocco. The support of these core 
states and the second tier group is critical to Mobutu's 
rule. At critical junctures in his rule, i.e., when his 
hold on state power is threatened, Mobutu could only rely 
on these intervening forces; he trusts neither his own 
troops nor those trained by his sponsors to support him in 
. f" 128 tllUes 0 crl.Sl.s. 
The most crucial question though is the role and 
place of Zaire, now seemingly firmly ensconced within the 
Western strategic orbit. Zaire is strategically placed in 
Central Africa, sharing a border with no less than nine 
African states. This geopolitical advantage of being 
situated in a position of almost equidistance from any 
given area of Africa could provide a definite strategic 
advantage to the West when pro-Western regimes are threatened. 
Thus Zaire provided support for its ally-Morocco in the 
Western Sahara conflict and was able to send129 a contingent 
of 2,700 of its own troops to a beleaguered pro-Western 
government of Hisne Habre of Chad in 1983. Thus, an 
l28Mobutu announced the discovery of a coup d'etat 
against his government early in 1978. Many of the Zairois 
soldiers trained by American, French and Belgian academies 
after the Shaba I episode "to defend the Mobutu regime were 
executed or dismissed from the Army. Gallaghy, The State-
Society Struggle, p. 208. 
l29Ibid ., p. 203. 
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overextended French security network situated in most French-
speaking African states can rely on supplemental support role 
from countries like Zaire in defence of Western interest. 
This kind of ro.le underlines the strategic and geopolitical 
impact of the success of the West in containing the forces 
of radical African nationalism in Zaire in the period 1960-
1964. Having contained and neutralized these forces and 
installed and supported the arm of the Zairois political 
class willing to make common cause with the West, Zaire could 
now be used as a relay-station and terrain for directing and 
influencing the outcome of similar struggles that pit the 
forces of African 'nationalism against those of the West. 
If the theatre of contention is contiguous with Zaire, 
so much the better for Western interest. Nowhere is this, 
geopolitical advantage of the Western co-option of Zaire so 
manifestly demonstrated as Angola. Zaire shares its south-
western border with Angola. As we shall see, having installed 
a neo-colonial regime in Zaire, the West led by the United 
States of America, as the principal hegemonic systemic regu-
lator, embarked on two interrelated policies towards African 
nationalist aspiration to free Angola from 500 years of brutal 
colonial tyranny of portugal, a fellow member of their NATO al-
liance. But the attempt to decisively influence the outcome of 
the nationalist struggle in Angola by the West failed. It did 
for a number of strategic and political reasons. The most 
important reason is that the forces in contention ultimately 
in the Angolan struggle were qualitatively and quantitatively 
different from those in Zaire in similar periods of struggle, 
especially in the crucial years of 1960-64. The years 1960-64 
were crucial because they marked the crucible of Western 
effort to contain and essentially decimate the forces opposed 
to Western .hegemony in Zaire. Consequently, the years 1965 
to the present have essentially been an era of further con-
solidation of the victory and warding off threats to it as in 
the Shaba uprisings of 1977 and 1978. 
However, the Western effort in Angola is also organic-
ally linked to the same in Zaire. For the Western attempt in 
Angola was one designed to duplicate its work in Zaire. The 
following chapter is an effort to elucidate on this continuum, 
provide points of familarity in the two cases, as well as 
delineate essential factors that facilitate a different out-
come in Angola. 
CHAPTER V 
INTERVENTION IN ANGOLA: THE COLONIAL PAST 
AND THE CONTEMPORARY PRESSURES 
Intervention in Angola can be delineated into two 
phases, corresponding generally to the era of Portuguese 
colonial intervention from 1575-1975 and the post-colonial 
epoch--from 1976 to the present. The post-colonial inter-
ventionist epoch attests to the unique nature of the two 
largest former Portuguese colonies in Africa. The unique-
ness of Angola and Mozambique stems from the fact that while 
the attainment of constitutional independence on the con-
tinent has meant a formal ceding of political power to 
African nationalists, this has been with qualifications in 
both of these countries. This is because there exists a 
continuing armed attempt to influence and penetrate the 
domestic order on the assumption that its existence is not 
compatible with the interest of the intervenor. We shall 
pay some attention to the colonial phase of intervention in 
order to demonstrate the connection between contemporary and 
historical phases of the Western assault on Angola and to 
help us to grasp the fact that the same hegemonic interest 
informs the present continuum. We have suggested earlier in 
Chapter II that our concern in this study is with that mode 
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of intervention that "seeks to manipulate the outcome of 
internal conflict (insurgency, revolution or civil war), or, 
through subversion to precipitate such conflict."l The post-
colonial phase of intervention in Angola can be more narrowly 
defined as the counterrevolutionary phase and the phenomenon 
can thus be characterized as counterrevolutionary intervention. 
Theoretically a counterrevolutionary intervention is based on 
the following interlocking supposition--
1. The need to preserve the status quo or tolerate 
minimal change therein, 
2. The need to control the rate of change in the 
status quo, 
3. A need to reverse the advances of a particular 
social formation whose interest is considered 
to be antithetical to the interest of. the 
countering power--the intervenor. 2 
Supposition number 3 here best characterizes the purpose of 
the sustained U.S.-South African policy towards the Peoples 
Republic of Angola; when interest is reduced to Zero-sum 
calculus, the ascendancy of one is equated with the dimuni-
tion and elimination of the other. Counterrevolutionary 
intervention is thus based on the need to counter the hold 
of the MPLA on State power, dislodge and ultimately supplant 
it. 
lMelvin Gurtov, The United States Against t£e Third 
World (New York: Praeger, 1974), p. 2. 
2Richard Falk, "Exporting Counterrevolution," The 
Nation (June 9, 1974); Adam Yarmolinsky, "The Control of 
Revolution and Counterrevolution," in The Military Establish-
ment (New York: Harper and Row, 1971). 
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The Colonial Phase 
Angola fell under Portuguese tutelage completely 
between 1575 and 1675,3 even though Angolan chiefdoms had 
been allies of the Portuguese in their attempts to subdue 
the Kongo Kingdoms to the north of Angola. However, as the 
military capability of the chiefdoms deteriorated vis-a-vis 
the Portuguese strength, the objective contradictions 
between their own interest--to be free from warfare from 
the Kongo Kingdoms--and the Portuguese interest--slave 
trade--became quite obvious to these chiefdoms. By the time 
the Portuguese gained complete control over Angola, the rul-
ing cliques had been vanquished in the ensuing wars of resis-
tance to Portuguese colonialism, been co-opted as allies or 
vassals, or exiled to Portuguese colonies in America, Asia 
or Africa. 4 The Portuguese then proceeded to pursue their 
real intent in Angola--the consolidation of the monopoly of 
the slave trade, which was so thorough that in the following 
two and a half centuries, four million Angolans 5 were sold 
to work the Porguguese plantations in South America, notably 
in Brazil. The era of Portuguese attempt to consolidate its 
colonial hegemony in Angola was also the period of bitter 
3Douglas Wheeler and Renee Pelisier, Angola (New 
York: Praeger, 1977), pp. 32-34. 
4Ibid • 
5Ibid ., p. 38; James Duffy, portu~uese Angola 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 195 ), pp. 136-141; 
Gerald Bender, Angola Under the Portuguese: The Myth and 
the Reality (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1978), p. 205. 
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rivalry and disputations between contending European powers 
over what part belonged to whom, and when, in Africa. It 
was for this reason Bismark of Germany convened the Berlin 
Conference of 1884-1885. However, from the foremost imperial 
maritime power in the 15th century, Portugal by the time of 
the Berlin Conference had suffered such precipitous decline 
within the intra-imperial expansionist orbit that it very 
nearly came to losing all pretensions of an imperial power 
when it clashed with Britain over rival claims to present 
day Malawi (then Nyasaland) and Zimbabwe (Rhodesia). At the 
end of the Conference, the Angolan territory was juridically 
delimited and recognized as Portuguese. In 1926, after 
Namibia was taken from the vanquished Germany and given to 
South Africa, Portugal and South Africa reached an agreement 
on the disputed question o~ the Namibia-Angolan border. 
Portugal then exported her prison population6 to consolidate 
the Portuguese settler community and proceeded to establish 
decrees, pronouncements and statutes that could guide their 
relationship with the Africans. The justification for this 
was said to be an attempt to establish an egalitarian multi-
racial society. In point of fact and practice, Portuguese 
colonialism in Angola was premised on the same supremacist 
philosophy, as a Portuguese governor of Angola conceded: 
6Bender, Angola Under the Portuguese, pp. 51-57. 
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These so-called civilized Africans, all colonial 
sociologists have recognized, are generally no 
more than grotesque imitations of white men. 
With rare exceptions ••• the 'civilized Africa' 
maintains a primitive mentality, poorly con-
cealed by the speech, gestures and dress copied 
from Europeans. 7 
"'Civilization, II according to Portuguese colonialism was syno-
nymous with a sufficient imbibement of Portuguese culture, 
hence as recently as 1950, Angola colonial census catego-
rized the citizens into "civilized" and "uncivilized." 
8 In 1940, according to these censuses, the degregadoes 
transplanted from the brothels and penitentaries of Port-
ugal were classified 100% civilized, their offsprings from 
miscegenation with Africans--82.9% civilized, the African 
majority was 0.7% civilized. The figures for 1950 were: 
100%~ 88.8%, the mestico did move along on the scale; and 
the African remained frozen and stagnant at 0.7% on this 
spurious unilinear scale of human development. Taking their 
cue from nineteenth-century psuedo-scientific Western poly-
genism, colonial Portuguese socio-psychologists, anthro-
pologists and sociologists marshalled an avalanche of statis-
tics of anatomical and cranial indices that purported to 
d h 'h 'f" f f' 9 emonstrate t e ~n erent ~n er~or~ty 0 A r~cans. This 
social variant of Darwinism consequently informed their 
7Ibid ., p. 7. 
8Ibid ., p. lSI. 
9Gerald Bender and Allen Isaacman, "The Changing 
Historiography of Angola and Mozambique," in Ohristopher 
Fyfe (ed.), African Studies Since 1945: A Tribute to 
Basil Davidson (London: Longman, 1976). 
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colonial policy. The Portuguese were convinced that the 
idyllic interracial community of metropolitan Portugal and 
what they saw as the mere extension of it--the African 
territories of Angola, Mozambique, Sao-Tome and Guinea-
Bissau, was the answer to the virulent and bitter nationalist 
struggles being waged by the peoples of Africa, Asia and the 
Caribbean Islands after the war of 1939-45. Consequently, 
when Belgium, for example, belatedly as we showed in Chapter 
IV, began the process of ceding juridical independence to the 
African colonies, Portugal remained splendidly and smugly 
removed from the mainstream of neo-colonial hegemonic stra-
tegy.10 
In February and March 1961, Angolan nationalists in 
the Union of Angolan Peoples (UPA) , commenced the first gene-
ral armed resistance to Portuguese colonialism. ll Portugal, 
in dealing with the situation, employed a combination of 
reform and militarization of the colonial presence, first by 
abolishing the more odious of its discriminatory practices, 
then by arming the settler community in search and destroy 
operations, and indiscriminate bombing of the African sec-
tions of the country. Within three months, the death toll 
stood as 2,000 whites, and 50,000 Africans, but the most 
traumatic, from the point of view of the Africans, of these 
10For a review of Portuguese colonial intervention 
in Angola, see (1) Bender, Angola Under the Portuguese 
(Berkeley: University of california Press, 1978); (2) James 
Duffy, Portuguese Angola (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1959). 
llGerald Bender, Angola Under the Portuguese, p. 154. 
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pacification campaigns was the forcible regrouping of the 
Africans into artificial villages--'strategic hamlets' as 
the Americans characterized similar schemes in Vietnam. 
Ironically, the Portuguese in Angola called the forced 
resettlement senzalas do paz--peace villages. 12 The Portu-
guese Security Agency (PIDE/DGS) also established cells of 
spies and informers, whose loyalty they thought they could 
obtain by exemption from taxes. The nationalist groups in 
existence at the inception of the armed struggle were the 
Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the 
Union of Angolan Peoples (UP A). The MPLA was founded in 
1956. The UPA, which was founded in 1958, began early to 
seek the moral and material support of the newly independent 
African countries as well as the nationalist groups. It 
attended the first All-African Peoples' Conference in Decem-
ber, 1958, in Ghana, where its leader Holden Roberto met 
Lumumba, Kaunda, Fanon and Mboya. 13 Efforts to merge the 
MPLA and the UPA were unsuccessful. While the UPA was estab-
lished in the capital of the then congo-Leopoldville,14 with 
powerful ethnic affinity in the Bakongo power structure, the 
MPLA was externally based having its headquarters in Guinea-
Conakry. Its leaders had also attended the Second All-
l2Basil Davidson, In the Eye of the Storm (New York: 
Doubleday, 1972), p. 13. 
l3John Marcum, The Angolan Revolution, Vol. I: The 
Anatomy of Explosion (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1969), p. 67. 
l4 Ibid., p. 70. 
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African Peoples' Conference in Tunis in 1960. 15 The decade 
of 1950-1960 was one of universal Nationalist agitation and 
the international community was not unmindful of the Angolan 
situation. 
The brutal Portuguese repression of the nationalist 
struggle in Angola provoked a furor at the UN. On March 15, 
1961, the UN Security Council called for an inquiry into the 
colonial Portuguese handling of the insurrection in Angola. 
By a vote of seventy-three to two (South Africa and Spain 
voted against while Britain, France and Nationalist China 
were among the nine abstentions) the General Assembly called 
on Portugal to introduce measures that would lead Angola to 
independence. Contrary to the practice of the Eisenhower 
administration which usually abstained on issues pertaining 
to European colonialism, the new Kennedy administration 
voted for both reso1utions. 16 However, a combination of 
aggressive pro-Portugal lobby, the Eurocentric nature of the 
U.S. foreign policy, and the strategic utility of the Portu~ 
guese refueling facilities in the Azores military base, led 
to a reconsideration and reversal of the American enlightened 
policy of self-determination. 
Collectively, the NATO alliance now began to support 
Portugal to resist by force of arms the forces of African 
15Ibid ., p. 159. 
l6Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XLIV, No. 1136, 
April 3, 1961, pp. 497-499. 
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nationalism. Diplomatically, they thence acquiesced in the 
Portuguese characterization of the African territories as 
her overseas extensions. For Britian for example, the 
. fl' t . . 1 ff' 17 quest10n 0 Ango an 1nsurrec 10n was an 1nterna a a1r 
of the Portuguese nation and hence not subject to intern-
national arbitration. 
Within the nationalist forces in Angola, Holden 
Roberto of the UPA, whose prO-American stance was now 
u;,;ll-known, received support from the United States, while 
the MPLA doubted from the beginning the sincerity of the 
purported new policy of the American administraiton when in 
fact NATO weapons were being used by Porgugal in Angola. 
The MPLA moved its headquarters to the capital of then Congo-
Leopoldville and began a world-wide campaign to bring the 
problem of Angola to many countries' attention and once 
again renewed its call for a common front to unite the 
nationalist groups. The UPA enjoying the advantage of its 
ethnic affinity with the Bakongo in Zaire, had been able to 
establish some influence' in Northern Angola while North-
Central Angola was MPLA's stronghold. When Jonas Savimbi 
joined the UPA and became its Secretary-General in 1961, the 
l7patrick Wall, "Britain and Angola: The Attitude of 
the British Government," in Angola: A Symposium (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1962), pp.130-137. The U.S. was 
in fact now arming Porgugali see, U.S. Congress, Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations, Angola, Hearings Before the 
Subcommittee on African Affairs, 94th Congress, 2nd Session, 
1976. 
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organization was able to remove its ethnic image, Savimbi 
being of Ovimbundu ethnic stock, from Southern Angola. 
In April 1962, Holden Roberto felt confident enough 
of victory to set up the Revolutionary Government of 
Angola in exile (GRAE) , based in Congo-Leopoldville, even 
though the Portuguese were now bombing and strafing Angolan 
farms and towns with napalm bombs. 18 The Democratic Party 
of Angola (DPA) formed in Leopoldville in January 1962, now 
joined with Holden Roberto's UPA to form the GRAE. The UPA 
and PDA now formed a single organization called the Angolan 
National Liberation Front (FNLA) and proceeded to isolate 
the MPLA by canvassing for recognition of its government in 
exile by the international community. The pseudo-
ideological split that attended intra-African continental 
diplomacy in the early 60's, in which a monarchy like Morocco, 
with Ghana, Guinea, Mali, the United Arab Republic (UAR) , 
represented the Casablanca Bloc while the Monrovia Group 
accounted for the less overtly ~n Africanist countries, 
also spilled into the Angolan intro-nationalist struggle. 
The Casablance bloc backed the MPLA, while the Mon-
rovia Group backed the FNLA-GRAE. But efforts to effect 
unity continued. Augustin Neto, honorary MPLA President, 
was languishing in a Portuguese jail in Lisbon in 1962, 
having been moved there by Portugal due to the international 
18 
John Marcum, The Angolan Revolution, Vol. I, pp. 
229-230. 
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outcry against his treatment when he was being held in Cape 
Verde in 1961. Neto escaped in July 1962, landed in Leopold-
ville and in a face-to-face negotiation with FNLA-GRAE 
leadership, called for union·of all Angolan nationalists,19 
but the unity talks were abortive. 
The inception of armed effort to dislodge Portuguese 
colonialism also coincided with the UN/Western collaborative 
effort to contain the forces of radical African nationalism 
in Zaire. Beginning from July 1960, this cold war outlook 
also began to inform the U.s. perception of the Angolan 
struggle - i.e., western ideological, systemic and strategic 
interest must be given priority over African self determina-
tion, even though the United Nations Special Committee on 
Po'rtuguese territories had characterized the Portuguese con-
tinued rule in Angola as an impediment to world peace. 20 But 
even in trying to place the Angolan struggle before the world, 
the nationalist organisations faced both domestic organisa~ 
tional problems and extra-African infiltration and control of 
their struggle. The MPLA, its leadership structure revamped, 
began a series of attempts to regain the initiative. Neto, 
who was chosen president at the Party congress in December, 
1962, began a major campaign in foreign relations that took 
19John Marcum, The Angolan Revolution, Vol. II, pp. 
263-365. 
20united Nations General Assembly, Report of the 
Special Committee on the Situation in Angola, Document 
A/5l60 (August 15,1962), p. 142. 
-182-
him to New York, London, Paris, Italy, Switzerland and North 
Africa;2l but intra-party struggles within the MPLA punctured 
its new aggressive image. In July 1963, the newly formed 
Organization of African Unity recognized the FNLA-GRAE as 
22 representative of the Angolan.people. In spite of MPLA's 
efforts to gain support in the United States, the U.S. govern-
ment saw the MPLA as a pro-communist organization. The U.S. 
was in actuality conducting a two-face policy. While the 
Kennedy emissary., George Bail, was calling for Eur-African23 
solution to the Angolan situation, the u.S. had in fact 
coopted the leadership of the GRAE and its leader Holden 
Roberto had been retained as an American Central Intelligence 
Agency operative at an annual fee of $10,000. 24 The American 
client government of Cyrille Adoula of the then Congo-
Leopoldville, was the first to grant GRAE recognition and 
th 1 MPLA f 't 't 1 25 Wh'l th bl f en expe rom ~ s cap~ a • ~ e e pro em or 
the MPLA was to gain credibility as a nationalist organisa-
tion, for the FNLA/GRAE the problem was one of personal 
ambition and organisational structure. Jonas Savimbi left 
2lJohn Marcum, The Angolan Revolution, Vol. II 
(Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1978), pp. 14-16. 
22Lawrence Henderson, Angola: Five Centuries of 
Conflict (Ithaca: University Press, 1979), p. 194. 
23Marcum, The Angolan Revolution, Vol. II, p. 127. 
24 John Stockwell, In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story 
(New York: Norton Co., 1978), p. 52. 
25Don Barnett and Roy Harvey, The Revolution in 
Angola (New York: Doubleday, 1972), p. 9. 
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the GRAE in July 1964, and after a two-year educational, 
military and ideological sojourn, that took him to the 
Peoples Republic of China, North Korea, North Vietnam, 
Algeria, the Eastern bloc of nations, and Western Europe, 
he founded, with regegades from both MPLA and Roberto's 
FLNA, the National Union for the Total Independence of 
Angola, UNITA at the Muangai Conference, inside Angola in 
March 1966. 26 Savimbi planned to introduce his forces from 
Zambia, where MPLA was operating. The GRAE fell into decline 
between 1964-1966, a period that marked the military and dip-
lomatic ascendency of the MPA. Unwilling to antagonize its 
European sponsors, the Tshombe government which replaced the 
Adoula administration in July 1964, froze the freedom of 
action of GRAE and put its foreign procurements and assist-
ance under the general supervision of its own government. 
While conceding the illogicality of exile based war of liber-
ation, both UNITA and the MPLA began extensive political, 
ideological and military preparations of their partisans 
between 1966-1970. The GRAE completely floundered and in 
1971, the OAU withdrew its recognition of FNLA/GRAE as the 
sole representative of Angola. The 1971 OAU action vindi-
cated the correctness of Kwame Nkrumah's analysis of the pre-
mature nature of this recognition at the OAU conference in 
Accra in 1965. By the end of 1971, only the Mobutu 
26Marcum, Angolan Revolution, vol. II, p. 1966; 
Henderson, Angola: Five Centuries of Conflict, p. 207. 
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government which had replaced Tshombe in November 1965, in 
the then Congo-Kinshasa recognized GRAE. 
The ethno-linguistic regional and ideological polari-
zation between these three nationalist groups occasioned an 
OAU reconciliation attempt again in 1971. Hopes were raised 
when an accord in principle emerged in 1972; but two years 
later, these hopes were dashed. The FNLA operated in the 
North: the MPLA in Central Angola, and the periphery of the 
Luanda, and UNITA was dominant in the South on the Angolan-
Namibia border. More importantly, and perhaps forebodingly 
for the eventual outcome of the nationalist struggle, the 
Super-powers had corralled each of these nationalist groups 
into their respective ideological camps. The MPLA consist-
ently received Soviet assistance: the FNLA was American-
sponsored with Mobutu's Zaire as conduit, and UNITA was 
, M T T' . t of peasant revolutJ..'on. 27 espousJ..ng ao- se- ung s varJ .an 
Both the united States and the Soviet Union sought to 
influence and induce what could be a favorable outcome of 
the Angolan situation through their preferred surrogates. 
Accordingto Klinghoffer, the Soviet Union" began to supply 
the MPLA with arms "after Neto's visit to Moscow in lq.64 " 28 and 
used this supply leverage to lobby against factionalism in 
the MPLA leadership. The U.S. was in fact underwriting the 
27Ibid ., pp. 231-233. 
28Arthur Klinghoffer, The Angolan War: A Study in 
Soviet Pc;>licyin the Third World (Boulder: Westview, 1980), 
p. 17. 
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Portuguese colonial effort in Angola, as the Portuguese were 
~xperiencing severe economic dislocation as a result of the 
Tiiar effort. The Portuguese inflation rate of 23% was the-
highest in Europe and the country had a $400 million trade 
deficit. But while the Angolan situation was a low-key 
priority of the Johnson administration, th~ globalist pers-
pective of the succeeding Nixon administration fundamentally 
transformed the regional character of the Angolan struggle. 
containment, Correlation of Forces and 
Re'solution of the Colonial Phase of 
Intervention in Angola 
The symbolic support that the Kennedy administration 
had given to the Angola nationalists by voting against 
Portugal in the UN had been replaced by an essentially cold 
war perspective under Lyndon Johnson in 1965. The Nixon and 
Ford a:dministrations of 1969-1976 gave teeth to the cold war 
perspective. The Nixon National Security Assistant, Henry 
Alfred Kissinger, virtually~anslated into policy a thesis 
he had advanced in 1965, in which he equated African 
, l' 'th t' W t ' 29 nat10na 1sm W1 an 1- es ern1sm. According to this 
thesis, while a case might perhaps be made for change, i.e., 
from colonialism to independence, the validity is recognized 
only of that kind of change acceptable to the strategic 
interests of the West. Specifically, the genesis of the 
Nixon response to the Angolan situation lies in a policy 
29Henry Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership: A 




review30 prepared by the Interdepartmental Group for Africa 
of the u.s. National Security Council. After analysing the 
various options open to the administration, the reviewers 
opted for the 'tar baby' recommendation. This recommenda-
tion questioned the durability of the African resistance and 
advocated increased collaboration with its NATO ally--Portu-
gal. consequently, Portugal was granted $400 million in 
EximBank financing for industrial projects and up to $30 
million to purchase American products under the PL480 food 
program, a free loan of agricultural support technology, and 
$1 million for education reform. 3l The U.S. also granted 
authorization for sale of Boeing 707s to the Portuguese Air 
Force. Elite troops of Portuguese Armed Forces also 
received specialized training at NATO facilities and U.S. 
counterinsurgency programs. Then on April 25, 1974, elements 
of the Portuguese Armed Forces--Armed Forces Movement (AFM) 
overthrew the civil administration that was waging the colo-
nial war in Angola. The bottom had now fallen out of the 
'tar baby' option--rather than the durability of the justi-
fied African struggle against Portuguese colonialism, it was 
the Portuguese people having lost 11,000 dead, and 30,000 
30Mohammed A. El-Khawas and Barry Cohen (eds.), 
National S'ecurity Study Memorandum 39, The Kissinger Study 
of S'outhern Africa (Westport: Lawrence Hill and Company, 
1976) • 
3lDepartment of State Bulletin 66, No. 1697 
(January 3, 1972). 
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wounded or disabled,32 that could no longer countenance the 
continuation of the war. In January 1975, the new junta in 
Lisbon recognized the MPLA, FNLA and UNITA as representa-
tives of Angolan nationalist groups. Between January 3 and 
5, the three signed an accord under the aegis of the OAU to 
"end all types of hostilities and propaganda that could 
impede frank and sincere collaboration,1I 33 while also guaran-
teeing the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Angola, 
and agreed to begin the task of internal reconstruction. At 
the Alvor talks the three nationalists groups and the Portu-
guese government, on January 10, 1975 agreed to fix the 
date of the Angola independence at November 11, 1975 and a 
transitional government was set up comprising the three 
groups. But, the election that was agreed upon to determine 
the subsequent government of independent and sovereign Angola 
never took place. A month after the Portuguese coup of 
April 1974, "112 military advisors from the Peoples Republic 
of China led by a major-general of the Chinese army, 
arrived in Zaire to train the FNLA forces. 11 34 To the extent 
that one can determine the introduction of extra-African 
forces to this struggle (the Portuguese colonial forces 
belonged to the pre-coup Portugal) this Chinese action 
32Marcum, Angolan Revolution, Vol. II, p. 241. 
33Colin Legum, Africa Contemporary Record (New York: 
Africana Publishing Co., 1981), pp. 74-75. 
34John Stockwell, In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story 
(New York: Norton, 1978), p. 275. 
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effectively transformed an African nationalist struggle into 
a global power struggle, in that their presence in such a 
large number, albeit as instructors in a country that was 
aligned to a faction in the struggle, raised the strategic 
and military stakes. 
U.S.-Zaire-FNLA AXis 
The theoretical imprimatur of American response to the 
post-colonial phase of intervention in Angola is rooted in 
George Kennan's strategy of 'containment.,35 According to 
this American Kremlinologist, the Soviet foreign policy is 
conceived as a Afluid stream which moves constantly, 
wherever it is permitted to move, toward a given goal"--
which in his view is total world domination. The Western 
response, to contain this Soviet probing and pressure, is 
"by the adroit and vigilant application of counter-force at 
a series of constantly shifting geographical and political 
points, corresponding to the shifts and maneuvers of Soviet 
policy. ,,36 For the u.S. Angola represents the new shift to 
geographic~'l terrain where it is now to "contain" Soviet 
"adventurism." An interpretation of the Angola struggle, in 
terms of the cold war, informed by the correlation of forces 
view of the world system, lies at the basis of this policy. 
One may equate the term correlation of forces here to 
35George Kennan, American Diplomacy, 1900-1950 (New 
York: Mentor Books, 1952). 
36 Ibid ., pp. 89-106. 
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the term "balance of power" which could be "equal distribu-
tion of power among the states of the international system" 
or an "approximate equilibrium of power in the system as a 
whole. ,,37 Two problems innnediately arise from equating 
these two terms with special reference to the African sub-
unit of the world system. The term "balance" more often than 
not suggests a bipolar analysis of the world system, but in 
Africa to the extent that we accept that the bipolar analysis 
is reflective of the politics of Africa, the balance of power 
theory does not exist in the subregion. This is because the 
balance is tilted very heavily in favor of the capitalist 
camp for historical and contemporary reasons which we 
advanced in Chapter III. Secondly, the strategic parity 
which has characterized the bipolar system since 1970 did 
corne into play in Angola-~the fact that Soviet assistance 
delivery capability was a strategic fact that played a funda-
mental role in the outcome of the conflict. We shall pay 
more attention to this later in this chapter. It carne into 
play because the Soviets now could and did act boldly in 
defence of their own ideological ally in a way that was not 
only infeasible but impracticable in 1960-64 because of (I) 
Soviet strategic inferiority, i.e., capability, and (2) 
negative political conditions in the world at large, espe-
cially the colonized world. We define correlation of forces 
37R• J. Vicent, Non-Intervention and International 
Order (Princeton: university Press, 1974), p. 342. 
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as an aggregate of forces that inform and influence the 
strategic/ideological/nationalist formations in the world. 
The U.S. response in Angola was designed to keep both the 
balance of power--(state power) and the correlation of 
forces (influence) tilted towards the interest. of its ideolo-
gical camp-(NATO and its ruling allies in Africa) and speci-
fically to co-opt the incipient state of Angola. Consistent 
with this, the U.S. National Security Council 40 Committee 
authorized the CIA to make $300,000 available to the FNLA; 
the FNLA was characterized as the best equipped of the three 
Nationalist groupings and the one most committed to a mili-
38 tary solution to the struggle. Reinforced by supplids 
from the Zaire, FNLA forces attacked MPLA on March 23, 1975, 
and a week later, a motorized contingent of five hundred FNLA 
soldiers arrived in Luanda from Zaire. 
Through successive client governments in Zaire the 
united States had exploited the geographical proximity 
between Zaire and Angola to influence the nature of Angolan 
nationalist· response to Portuguese colonialism. The American-
sponsored Adoula government was the first to recognize the 
FNLA/GRAE government in exile in 1963. 39 Between 1972 and 
1974 the Zairois government of Mobutu began again to actively 
promote FNLA within the Pan-African caucus, after the 
38Marcum, Angolan Revolution, Vol. II, p. 257; 
Henderson, Angola, p. 249. 
39Marcum, Angolan Revolution, vol. II, p. 99. 
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withdrawal of OAU recognition to GRAE in 1971 and paved the 
f H ld b ' .. t t Ch . 40 way or 0 en Ro erto s V1S1 0 1na. While it is true 
Mobutu intervened in the Angolan war as an ally of the U.S., 
it is quite equally true that Zaire, also, had important 
economic and strategic interest in Angola, as well as a need 
to have to its Southern border a pliant, ideologically com-
patible neighbor. Besides, the port of Matadi and the 23-
mile strip of Zairois territory that separates Angola from 
Cabinda is Zaire's only direct access to a sea port. The 
Benguela railway which runs into the Southeastern border with 
Angola, transports zairois major foreign exchange earner--
copper. Zaire was to pay for its actions in Angola when the 
railway was closed due to hostilities during the Angolan 
Civil war. 4l Holden Roberto owed logistical, diplomatic and 
even personal security debts to Mobutu; he was once rescued 
from mutinous units of his FNLA by Mobutu's soldiers, after 
which the Zairois army took over the supervisory duties in 
the FNLA, and deprived of Zairois support in all its ramifi-
cations, FNLA could not exist as a credible faction in the 
alignment of forces in zaire. 42 
40. . 
Ib1d., pp. 227-228. 
4lNzongola Ntalaja, Class Struggles and National 
Liberation in Africa (Roxbury: Omenana, 1980), Chapter VII. 
42Basil Davidson, In the Eye of the Story (New York: 
Doubleday, 1972. 
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MPLA-USSR: The Strategic and Political 
Foundation of a Victorious Alliance 
The Soviet Union had enjoyed almost a virtual mono-
poly of influence with MPLA from its inception; however, 
intra-party conflicts within the MPLA led to a Soviet 
reassessment of continued MPLA support in 1972 and 1973, 
and support was actually terminated wholly by 1974. 43 In 
the heyday of Detente, MPLA leader Meto reportedly began 
pondering the possibility of the Soviet Union sacrificing 
the interest of the Angolan people in order to reach accom-
modations with the West on strategic negotiations. By 
October 1975, however, the Soviet Union began to send mili-
tary supplies to MPLA through Pointe Noire in Congo-
Brazzaville. What factors for example facilitated the 
process by which the Soviet Union intervened in Angola in 
such a magnitude, that, along with a set of other co-
variables, affected decisively the outcome of both the 
colonial struggle and the resultant civil war? 
The Soviet role in Angola must be recognized and 
analyzed in the context of certain objective strategic and 
political developments in Africa specifically and the world 
at large since 1960. It is in the context of these stra-
tegic and political conditions that the outcome of the 
Angolan struggle can be properly grasped. The Western 
43U•S • Senate, "Angola: Hearing Before the Subcom-
mittee on African Affairs of the Committee On Foreign 
Relations," 94th Congress, 1976, p. 185. 
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Collaborationist foreign policy agenda since 1945 has been 
premised on a need to contain what is seen as Soviet adven-
turism world wide and especially in the colonized areas, 
where centuries of Western hegemony had built up an organic 
base for neo-colonialism, disposed towards the West and 
manned by their ruling class allies in the Third World. For 
example in Zaire in 1964, Belgian paratroopers with u.s. 
Army logistical support were deployed to combat the Gbenye-
Soumialot forces that had set up a rival government to the 
American-backed Adoula government. Fourteen years later, 
i.e., 1978, with Mobutu facing another rebellion in Shaba, 
the NATO collaborationist agenda again became quite discern-
ible. French Legionnaires and Belgian paratroopers came to 
the fore, while the United States assisted in this collabora-
tionist effort by providing "eighteen C-14l starlifters and 
C-5 Galaxies and crews, plus a sophisticated telecommunica-
tion system.,,44 As the West understands it, all "disorders" 
crises and insurrections in the World are apt to be exploited 
by the Soviet Union or when this argument becomes quite 
exaggerated, the disorders and crises are actually due to 
Soviet "adventurism." Localized oppressive forces do not 
give rise to schisms and frictions, and hence counterforces 
to oppose them. If we believe this mechanist thesis though 
then five hundred years of brutal Portuguese colonial 
44Thomas Callaghy, The State, Society Struggle: Zaire 
in Comparative Struggle (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1984), p. 207. 
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hegemony in Angola was not a factor--the Angolan crisis 
began in October 1975, when the Soviets began massive air-
lift of sophisticated armaments to the MPLA in order to stem 
the rapid advance of South African forces. The Soviets of 
course did not start the Angolan Civil War between the con-
tending forces, neither did they invite Angolans to take up 
arms against Portuguese Colonialism. The Soviet airlift 
was a factor, true enough, but also among a set of co-
factors which brought a fundamental difference in the cor-
relation of forces in 1975, as opposed to those that faced 
Western coalition effort under the aegis of the UN in Zaire 
in 1960-64. We shall divide these conditions that facili-
tate a different outcome in Angola in two--(a) Generally--
to the world at large--in terms of the correlation of 
forces; (b) Specifica11y--to Africa--in terms of different 
political conditions that also then influenced the outcome. 
Generally, the first objective condition is the near 
strategic nuclear parity that exists today between the 
Soviet Union and its ideological adversary. This means 
that the Soviet Union cannot be blackmailed into a "reason-
able" behavior by its ideological adversary when it takes 
actions on the international scene. This near parity in 
strategic nuclear terms frees the Soviets from fear of 
unacceptable retaliation (in a nuclear sense) or the threat 
of use of nuclear weapons. Relative to the epoch of 1950 
to the early 1960s, the existence of this strategic parity 
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frees the Soviets from the anxieties of Western response. 
The acquisition of naval and air capability that could be 
used selectively, and with minimal risks to help Third World 
liberation movements or beleagured states becomes now a 
credible reality. In both Angola in 1975 and Ethiopia in 
1977, during the Somali invasion of Ogaden region, huge 
Soviet Antonov-22 planes, not as big as the u.S. Air Force 
C-130s used in the Shaba I and Shaba II, but with a flying 
range of 3,000 miles, were pivotal in the massive airlift 
of assistance. This situation did not exist in 1960-64 in 
Zaire when the Soviets attempted to aid Mulele-Gbenye-
Soumialot forces in Zaire in 1964. Concurrent with the 
strategic parity and the acquisition of naval capability 
that could project Soviet power in all the waters of the 
world, the airlift capability of the Soviet air force also 
increased by 130 percent between 1965 and 1978. This cap-
ability made the Soviet factor a crucial one in the series 
of factors that facilitated a different outcome in Angola 
from the consolidation of the pre-existing Western imperia-
list domination which was the outcome in Zaire. 
Secondly, the Soviet Union relative to the 1960-64 
period in Zaire, has narrowed the gap between itself and 
the u.S. in terms of Third World military assistance and 
political military capability to support Third World states 
and liberation movements under realistic conditions--the 
Soviets now have a fleet and air force capable of acting 
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throughout the oceans of the world. This is crucial to the 
extent that both the Soviet and its ideological adversary, 
NATO, view the Third World as areas of competition. It 
means that the Soviets are now a force to be reckoned 
with, and their influence, especially in an adversarial 
sense, must now be reckoned with in areas that have hitherto 
remained the exclusive preserve of the West. The bitter 
Western denunciation of Soviet "adventurism" in Southern 
Africa is essentially a forlorn reaction to and recognition 
of the fact that the Soviet factor, while peripheral in the 
past, is now a strategic realtiy. 
The combat assistance that the Republic of Cuba 
rendered to the MPLA must also be seen in the context of 
the general strategic environment referred to earlier. 
Without the massive increase in the Soviet assistance 
delivery capacity, the logic of proximity could have worked 
in favour of Savimbi and his South African allies. The posi-
tion of South Africa was unique in the interplay of align-
ment of forces in Angola because its support while crucial 
for its allies also carried the seed of their moral and 
political defeat. It is not the accident of geography alone 
that informs the South African intervention, the Settler 
regime also enjoys a convergence and confluence of interest 
with the Western alliance. For one, it stood for continued 
Western imperialist domination in Africa as part of Western 
civilization. Secondly, South Africa, like the European 
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powers is a colonial power in Africa. Indeed, South Africa 
is at once a colonial power, a settler power and also an 
imperialist power. It invades its neighbours at will to 
force and compel conformity with desired security objec-
tives. But, paradoxically, once the existence of the South 
Africa factor became known to the world as part of the 
alignment of forces in contention in Angola, South Africa 
and its allies in UNITA and FNLA, including the Western 
alliance began to fight a defensive war to remove the South 
African albatross. 
Thirdly, in our general conditions category here, is 
the recognition of the forces of nationalism as counterposed 
to the ideological in the world. This is particulary rele-
vant for the West, because Western social science, so con-
vinced by its modernization theory, views all Third World 
countries as "developing"--with no identity of their own, 
but in transition to a replica of Western society. Conse-
quently, perhaps merely out of force of habit, fostered by 
centuries of Western colonial hegemony, an attempt is then 
simply made to coopt these Third World nations into Western 
collaborationist agenda of anti-Sovietism. In Angola, the 
most eloquent testimony to this phenomenon is the bitter 
rebuttal and denunciation the U.S. received from Nigeria 
when it crudely and surreptitiously tried to pressure the 
OAU summit of 1976. Unwilling, for reasons of self interest, 
to perceive any phenomenon outside and beyond its crusading 
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ideology of anti-Sovietism, the Western alliance failed to 
see that the process unfolding in Angola was in response 
completely and wholly, and counterposed to the one it had 
initiated and sustained in the territory since colonialism. 
Indeed before the April 1974 coup in Portugal, Western 
strategy in Angola was: (a) to support the status quo of 
Portuguese colonialism by arming Portugal against the forces 
of African nationalism; (b) simultaneously ally itself to 
two of the nationalist factions (UNITA and FNLA) by spon-
soring them to assume state power and ultimately to coopt 
them in the anti-Soviet orbit after independence. While 
the Kennedy Administration had voted once at the United 
Nations in 1961 to pressure Portugal to grant independence 
to Angola, the strategic importance of the Portuguese-owned 
Azores facilities began to override the principle of self-
determination. NATO arms were now being given to Portugal 
45 to combat the forces of African nationalism in Angola. 
consistent with their long-range neo-colonial strategy, 
the leaders of both UNITA and FNLA had been recruited as 
paid operatives of two NATO members. The Porguguese Secret 
Police, i.e., Policia International de Defesa de Estado 
(PIDE) had recruited Jonas Savimbi of UNITA as an operative 
and had ceded a portion of Angolan territory as his base of 
45Arthur K1inghoffer, The Angolan War, p. 17. John 
Marcum, The Angolan Revolution: Exile,Politicc and Guerilla 
Warfare (Cambridge, M.I.T. Press, 1978), p. 23. 
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operation to boost his guerilla liberation 
u.s. the leader of the FNLA was a paid CIA 
image. 46 For the 
. 47 
operat~ve. 
Indeed, the rival government that Roberto and Savimbi set 
up in Huambo after the establishment of the MPLA government 
in Luanda was established with the assistance of "former 
members of the Portugese secret police ••• PIDE.,,48 
Specifically with reference to the objective political 
conditions in Africa during the final stages of the colonial 
phase to the beginning of the post-colonial phase of inter-
vention (roughly beginning from April 1974 to the consoli-
dation of state power by the MPLA in February 1976) the 
following considerations corne into play and can also be con-
trasted with the situation existing in Zaire at the onset of 
Western collaborative intervention in 1960. The year 1960 
had been called the year of Africa because many French 
colonies in Africa and the British colony of Nigeria became 
juridically independent and joined the United Nations that 
same year. However, this was a phenomenon that was parti-
cular especially to the West Coast of Africa; in Southern 
and East Africa the reality of Western colonialism remained. 
46west Africa, 20 August 1984. For excerpts on 
secret correspondence between Savimbi and Portuguese colo-
nial high command, see' We'st . Af'ri'ca , March 1 i, 1986. 
47Marcum, The Angolan Revolution: Exile Politics and 
Guerrilla Warfare, p. 17. 
48Klinghoffer, The Angolan War, p. 19. 
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The then Republic of Congo-Leopoldville was surrounded in 
the East by the British colony of Uganda, and Trust terri-
tory of Tanganyika, the Belgian Trust Territory of Ruanda-
urundi, the now defunct settler dominated colonial Federa-
tion of Rhodesia (Southern Rhodesia is now Zimbabwe and 
Northern Rhodesia is Zambia) and Nyasaland. Nyasaland is 
now Malawi. In the South, Congo-Leopoldville was bordered 
by the Portuguese colony of Angola, in the West by Congo-
Brazzaville and in the North by the now Central African 
Republic, then a French colony. To the extent that African 
countries were a force in the outcome of the intervention 
in Zaire, the aforementioned European colonies, for obvious 
reasons of colonial occupation, were not part of the equa-
tion. But certain African countries did try to exert some 
influence; if the outcome ran counter to the thrust of 
their efforts, it certainly was not for lack of trying. 
Ghana, Guinea and Morocco, for example, remained consistent 
supporters of Lumumbist forces in Zaire throughout the dura-
tion of the active interventionist period of 1960-1964. But 
they did not have the infrastructural capability to exercise 
decisive influence, so the moral, diplomatic, and even 
material support which they marshalled in favor of the 
Lumumbists were easily contained and neutralized by their 
Western adversaries. 
The objective juridical political situation in 
Africa during the Angolan civil war contrasts very sharply 
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and is in contradistinction to what obtained during the 
Zairois crisis. with the exception of the settler regime 
in Southern Rhodesia and the racist settler colony of 
Namibia, and of course South Africa, the reality of juri-
dical political independence was a factor in Africa. That 
is to say, the classic empires of direct colonial rule, 
even though now present in a new form, were over. It is a 
factor even though we recognize that this juridical sove-
reignty is no more than constitutional independence, and 
that without economic independence it will never be complete 
and always susceptible and subject to the danger of imper-
ialist domination and submission. The factor of this pheno-
menon--direct colonial rule being replaced by constitutional 
independence, can be grasped when it is realized that in 
spite of the severe limitations of this constitutional 
independence, the existence of certain states, which we 
characterize as "states of radical nationalist orientation" 
have been facilitated by the demise of direct colonial rule. 
We make no claims that these states have chosen a socialist 
path, or non-capitalist path, nor do we classify them into 
any neat ideological category. The ideological orientation 
spans a wide political spectrum, from state capitalism, to 
scientific socialism, to African Socialism. But we suggest 
that one common denominator unites them all--an abiding and 
enduring commitment towards aiding and sustaining the 
forces of nationalism in Africa in overcoming the forces 
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of racist r~action, imperial and settler colonialism. In 
Africa, these countries belong to this category--Algeria, 
Tanzania, Congo-Brazzaville, Guinea-Conakry, under Sekou 
Toure. (It is too early to determine the orientation of the 
Conteh regime.) 
For Angola, the existence of Congo-Brazzaville and 
Tanzania was especially crucial for many reasons. Firstly, 
the existence of contiguous land mass which during the 
period of insurgency can be used as a logistical base and 
terrain of operational manoeuvres was present. Tanzania 
and Zambia served this purpose for the MPLA and UNITA, 
respectively during the years of insurgency to overthrow 
Portuguese colonialism. In the years of Mozambique's 
struggle against Portuguese colonialism, Tanzania also 
played this role. For Congo-Brazzaville, its seaport of 
Pointe Noire served as delivery and relay station for 
onward transmission of sophisticated Soviet armament to 
the MPLA-Cuban forces during the civil war. From this, 
Algeria, Congo-Brazzaville, and Guinea-Conakry all encou-
raged Cuba to offer combat assistance to MPLA. The 
different outcome of the Angolan struggle must be under-
stood in the context of the dynamic interplay of the 
general strategic nuclear parity in the world, the net 
increase in the Soviet assistance delivery capability and 
the specific geopolitical condition in Africa. The upsurge 
of protracted African struggle against Portuguese 
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colonialism took place against this background and in the 
context of these general global objective realities and 
political situation in the African sUb-region.
49 
As the end of the colonial phase of intervention in 
Angola approached, and with MPLA-FNLA now locked in battle, 
UNITA looked like it could assume post-colonial state power 
by default. As noted, UNITA was the last of the three 
Angolan nationalist groups to be established. After fruit-
less attempts to effect a merger with both MPLA and FNLA, 
UNITA had hoped to eXPloit the advantage of its large Ovum-
bumdu·ethnic base as a propeller to an electoral victory. 
The outbreak of hostilities however, between the FNLA and 
MPLA completely thwarted the UNITA hope of electoral victory 
because the elections never took place. UNITA then turned 
ironically to both the Peoples Republic of China and South 
Africa hoping to exploit the anti-Soviet reflex of Chinese 
foreign policy, and South Africa's geo-political and ideolo-
gical concerns. The Peoples Republic of China, whose 
leaders Chou-En-Lai and Mao-Tse-Tung provided great inspira-
tion to peoples resisting colonial domination worldwide 
after the successful execution of their own revolution in 
49The analysis has been based on these works: Fred 
Holliday, "Moscow and the Third World: The Evolution of 
Soviet Policy·," Race and Class, Vol. XXIV (Autumn 1982); 
Hans Kohn, Nationalism: Its Meaning and History (New York: 
Van Nostrand Reinhold Co., 1965); Jack woddis, Introduction 
to Neo-Colonialism: The New Im erial ism in Asia, Africa 
an .Lat~n Amer~ca New·Yor: Internat~onal Publ~s ers, 
1967) • 
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1949, had, by 1975 radically modified its anti-imperialist 
image. For China, counteracting Soviet "social imperialism" 
now constitutes abiding state policy. The Chinese foreign 
policy of which its African policy is a subunit now centers 
around a veritable Russophobia--an unreasoning and vulgar 
equation of Soviet support of any issue in the international 
arena as an impetus for Chinese non-support of the same. 
Thus, contrary to the historical background of the Angolan 
struggle--and the fact that the Chinese by May 1974 were 
actually the first to introduce foreign advisors into the 
developing war, China continued to berate the Soviet Union 
f f ' h l' C' '1 W 50 or trans orm~ng t e strugg e ~nto ~v~ are However 
dissatisfied by the poor performance of its FNLA allies, 
even before independence was proclaimed in November, China 
ceased all assistance to both UNITA and FNLA. When China 
phased out its assistance, Savimbi threw in his lot with 
the South Africans. 
By June 1975, South African regular units began to 
take up positions inside Angola; apparently convinced now 
that it could not control the government that might emerge 
from FNLA-MPLA fighting. In August South Africa began 
training detachments of UNITA units and in conjunction with 
UNITA and Zairois regulars, South African troops began 
action against MPLA. The South African government insisted 
50washington Post, July 28, 1975. 
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that its intervention was with the explicit agreement of 
the u.s. government which has promised to replenish its 
armory. When the Portuguese withdrew from Angola on the 
independence day on November 11, 1975, the colonial phase 
ended on an inconclusive note of resolution due to this 
factionalism interlaced with ideological schisms among 
Angolan nationalists. 
The Post-Colonial Phase 
At midnight on November 10, 1975, the MPLA under 
Agostinho Neto, having consolidated in Luanda, proclaimed 
the Peoples Republic of Angola; while the UNITA/FNLA coali-
tion proclaimed the independence of the Democratic Peoples 
Republic of Angola (DPRA). Both the Unites States and the 
Soviet Union were now supporting opposite factions openly. 
One estimate of U.S. support for UNITA/FNLA was $14 million 
for weaponry specifically, the CIA admitted an expenditure 
to the tune of $32 million to which it suggested that the 
Soviets spend $80 million to promote MPLA armed effort 
through October 1975. 51 with South Africa-UNITA units dug 
in the South, Cuban troops were airlifted to supplement 
MPLA defence in August;S2 through "operation Carlota," the 
airlift of Cuban troops became a decisive factor in the 
MPLA effort. 
5lJohn A. Marcum, The Angolan Revolution, Vol. II 
(Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1978), p. 263. 
52Ibid ., p. 273. 
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But the addition of South African forces on the side 
of UNITA/FNLA coalition virtually guaranteed their loss of 
credibility53 both continentally in Africa and even among 
their Western sympathizers who might otherwise have wished 
to remain discrete supporters. On January 22, 1976, an OAU 
summit meeting which had been delayed to effect a recon-
ciliation between the Angolan nationalist groups convened 
in Kampala, Uganda~ by then the MPLA government was recog-
nized by more than thirty nations and none had recognized 
the FNLA/UNITA government which was located at Huambo in 
the South of Angola. Before then the MPLA had captured the 
FNLA capital in Uige, and the UNITA/FNLA-South African 
collusion had turned around many hitherto neutral African 
nations like Nigeria, Ghana, and Tanzania. Nigeria, for 
example, citing specifically the South African connection, 
recognized the Peoples Republic of Angola on November 27, 
1975. On the eve of the OAU summit, the U.S. President, 
Gerald Ford, dispatched an emissary to African countries, 
disavowing any collusion between it and South Africa in 
Angola. In a statement, the Nigerians rejected the 'fatuous 
attempt' by the U.S. government to insult the intelligence 
of African nations and totally "repudiates the false logic 
that equates the presence of the Cuban and Soviet advisers 
in Angola with that of the South African regular troops, 
53Lawrence W. Henderson, Angola: Five Centuries of 
Conflict (Ithaca: University Press, 1979), p. 256. 
-- - ----- --- ----------- --------------------------------
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their fellow soldiers of fortune and motley mercenaries." 
Since the Nigerian statement reflected much of nationalist 
radical thinking in Africa, while conceding the weakness of 
Africa in the world system, the rest of its arguement is 
quoted here: 
In case the Ford Administration chooses not 
to remember, the U.S.S.R. and Cuba have made the 
cause of the Angolan people their own since the 
earliest days of the liberation struggle. It is 
also worth noting that the war for Angolan libera-
tion had been the longest war of its type in Africa. 
Only the war in Vietnam which ended in victory for 
the nationalist and patriotic forces lasted longer. 
All through the heroic struggle of pur Angolan 
brothers, successive United State·s Administration 
unrelentingly supported, morally, materially and 
otherwise, the fascist, repressive and oppressive 
Portuguese Governments. All of a sudden one hears 
crocodile tears being shed for pe~ce in Angola! It 
is about time that friends of the benighted racist 
regimes and supporters of the degradation of Africans 
began to live with the realities of the present 
thinking in Africa. It should not be that difficult 
to draw a clear distinction between foreign countries 
invited by patriotic forces to assist in fighting 
for national independence and those racist adventurers 
who commit wanton aggression by invading African coun-
tries with the sole aim of undermining their indepen-
dence, and exporting their discredited and inhuman 
social system. The Federal Military Government recog-
nizes the MPLA-1ed government in Luanda as the legiti-
mate Government of Angola. It appreciates and respects 
the prerogative of that government to seek assistance 
from any source in the world in exercise of its sove-
reignty. Further, it draws attention to that basic 
tenet of international relations - that is non-
interference in the domestic affairs of sovereign 
nations. It is on account of the foregoing considera-
tions that the Federal Military Government reiterates 
its firm decision to completely reject the 'directive' 
from the United States' President. It also wishes to 
express the hope and expectation that all other sister 
African states which have been subjected to such 
untimely pressure will also reject it to enable us to 
build the Africa of our choice. Gone are the days 
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when Africa will ever bow to the threat of any so-
called super power. 54 
The particularly strong objection Nigeria took to the u.s. 
attempt to influence, through the OAU Summit, and the 
African reaction to the military situation in Angola marks 
a historic departure from the "moderate" non-activist stance 
that had characterized Nigerian African policy since 1960. 
There has always existed indeed in Nigeria a radical 
nationalist faction, operating on the fringe of the con-
servative bourgeois political leadership. The Nigerian 
civil. war of 1967-1970 produced a telling effect on the 
military-professional-bureaucratic bourgeoisie that prose-
cuted the war. This is because the hostile Western response 
to the federal attempt to contain the secession produced a 
healthy skepticism among many of the federal officers who 
led the war effort. From about 1972, certain top military 
officers, notably Colonels Murtala Mohammed, Olusegun 
Obasanjo and Sotomi began to attend seminars conducted by 
some scholars in Nigerian Universities and specifically 
the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs. The upshot 
of this encounter was a sensitization of these military 
officers to the imperatives of neo-colonial domination of 
Africa and particularly the protracted nature of the African 
struggle against settler colonialism in SOuthern Africa. 
These officers not only joined the Nigerian Society of 
54Late News Release No. 16, Federal Ministry of Infor-
mation (Lagos, 1975). 
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International Affairs, but became executive members, taking 
part in conferences and presenting papers. 55 On July 29, 
1975, General Yakubu Gowon was removed from power in a 
bloodless coup and a new government came in headed by 
Brigadier Murtala Mohammed with Obasanjo as the Chief of 
the General Staff and effective Prime Minister. Many of the 
scholars at the Inititute of International Affairs now 
became their advisors. It is against this background that 
an activist African policy came out of Nigerian foreign 
policy. For example, Nigeria not only lobbied hard for the 
MPLA, but gave the new nation a grant of twenty million 
dollars. 
Shortly after the recognition of Angola, the Obasanjo 
administration, which succeeded the Mohammed administration 
in 1976, nationalized the British owned British Petroleum 
(BP) in order to force the hands of the British government 
on Zimbabwe. The Nigerians lobbied to seat the Angolan 
government of MPLA while others like Zambia and Senegal 
began to talk of the "lion and its cubs." Kenneth Kaunda 
was sufficiently worried, about his security that he flew 
to Washington to plead the case for Western aid to UNITAl 
FNLA while Senegal sponsored56 the resolution for a 
55Alaba Ogunsanwo, "Nigeria's Foreign Policy Under 
~lohammed and Obasanjo: An Examination," in African Review, 
Vol. 9, No.1 (1982), pp. 1-15. 
56 Henderson, Angola: Five Centuries of Conflict, p. 
256. 
-210-
government that could include both UNITA and FLNA. In the 
end the OAU was deadlocked twenty-two votes for each reso-
. 57 58 lut1on. But by February 11, 1976, the UNITA/FNLA 
'capital' of Huambo fell to the MPLA forces, and the OAU 
recognized the MPLA government. In December, 1975, the U.S. 
Senate had also voted to terminate any more covert aid to 
the UNITA/FNLA group.59 With the capture - of Huambo, UNITA 
ceased to exist as a credible military force, its South 
African ally having withdrawn. The military situation also 
marked the consolidation of state power by the MPLA. 
Destablisation and Counterrevolution 
A constant and pernicious legacy of colonial hegemony 
in Africa which flows from conscious promotion of centri-
fugal tendencies by these colonial powers is mutual miscon-
ception and suspicion among ethnic groups. In Nigeria, for 
example, even though the British statutorily effected the 
amalgamation of Northern and Southern Nigeria in 1914, in 
reality Nigerians from the Northern and Southern parts of 
the country were almost virtually kept apart from 1900-1947, 
while British colonialism promoted differing social forma-
tions and institutions in the two regions. Efforts by 
Nigerians from different parts to cultivate/promote 
57Ibid • 
58Henderson, Angola: Five Centuries of Conflict, p. 257. 
59Marcum, The Angolan Revolution, Vol. II, p. 278. 
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transcultural affinity and the cross-fertilisation of ideas, 
met with brutal objection. Individuals who tried to espouse 
this national orientation were dubbed "rabble-rousers" and 
were forcibly removed and sent hack to their particular -
. f .. 60 reg10n 0 or1g1n. The MPLA faced this problem of ethnic 
cleavage fostered by the Portuguese and compounded by the 
contradiction of the leadership's social origin of mestico/ 
urban/intellectual, leading a largely rural populace. This 
situation was exacerbated by the privilege-chasing and com-
mandist tendencies of some of its leaders, who thought that 
••• they had the leadership of the country in their 
hands and that the unity of all classes was no 
longer possible. They thought they alone--and they 
personally above all--could lead the whole revolu-
tionary process in Angola. 6l 
Although the coup of August, 1977, led by Neto Alves, the 
MPLA government Interior Minister who challenged mesticos 62 
dominance and power in the state structure, may indeed be 
dismissed as coming from a 'disgruntled faction, ,63 the Neto 
government did learn a lesson64 from it, by broadening the 
base of its mass support and combating factionalism within 
600bafemi Awolowo, The Peoples Republic of Nigeria 
(Ibadan: Oxford University, 1968), Chapter 3. 
6lMichael Wolfers and James Bergerol, Angola in the 
Frontline (London: Zed Press, 1982), p. 163. 
62Marcum, The Angolan Revolution, Vol. II, p. 279. 
63Michael Wolfers and James Bergerol, Angola, pp. 
75-99. 
64 Ibid ., p. 162. 
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the MPLA. Immediately after the revolt was put down, the 
Neto government ceased its lethargy and complacency towards 
political and ideological work among the people, such that 
by 1983, there had been such a rapid incorporation of 
Angolans from different regions into the state structure so 
that there were only one white and six mesticos in the 65 
member central committee. 65 As Marcum onted, 
Any hope for building an integrated Angolan 
nation through consensual rather than coercive 
process must depend on conscious, sensitive and 
informed efforts to reduce communal tension by 
promoting interethnic and interracial understand-
ing and respect. To bind the wounds of war and 
reconstruct a unified social state, the MPLA will 
need more than the weapons "and men of the Soviet 
Union and Cuba. It will need to surmount the 
limits of its own social origin and reach out to 
those who continue to see it as an instrument of 
alien Portuguese/Cuban rule. 66 
Apart from the problems of building a new society from 
the legacies of five hundred years of Portuguese colonial 
hegemony, it is the continuing threat of destabilization and 
counterrevolution by the U.S.-South Africa-UNITA axis that 
has defined the nature of the securi"t:y of Angola. Mobutu 
used to be a member of this axis, both as an ally of the 
u.S. and in defense of his own class, in control of state 
power. The strategic geopoliticai importance of Zaire in 
Western attempt to contain the forces of radical nationaism 
was recognized quite early. According to Wallerstein: 
65Gerald Bender, "The Continuing Crisis in Angola," 
Current History (March 1983). 
66Marcum, Angolan Revolution, Vol. II, p. 279. 
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U.S. involvement in Zaire was the launching 
pad of a new U.S. attitude towards Southern Africa: 
Zaire was the first to flirt with the idea of 
drastic political realignments ••• it is rather 
clear that a Lumumba government securely in power 
would have given extensive support to an Angolan 
national liberation movement. The potential of 
such support to Angola is analogous to what Tanza-
nia later gave FRELIMO with two differences; it 
would have come much earlier on and from a country 
with far more resources to throw into the fray. 
It could have made a considerable difference to 
the whole history of liberation movements in 
Southern Africa •••• The U.S. wanted what it even-
tually got; a politically stable, economically, con-
servative regime in Zaire whose only true interest 
in Angola is to help establish there a regime of 
exactly the same variety. Translated into the terms 
of the Angola liberation movements, this has meant 
obstruction of the MPLA.67 
Mobutu's obscurantist policy towards Angola continued even 
after the defeat of the Zaire/FNLA forces by the MPLA in 
October, 1975. The victorious MPLA government was in-
terested in pursuing a policy of 'live and let live' with 
its northern neighbor and asked the government of Congo-
Brazzaville to mediate between it and the Mobutu government, 
a move which resulted in a summit meeting in Brazzaville, 
less than three weeks after the MPLA defeated UNITA forces 
in its capital of Huambo. The meeting did set an agenda 
for future talks and economic cooperation. Rather than 
neutralize the forces of his FNLA ally, Roberto, who had 
t k '1' K' h 68 b 'd f ' a en up ex~ e ~n ~ns asa, Mo utu cont~nue to unct~on 
67Immanuel Wallerstein, quoted in Wolfers et al., 
Angola in the Frontline, pp. 192-193. 
68Marcum, The Angolan Revolution, Vol. II, p. 277. 
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as a conduit for CIA payments69 to the FNLA leadership, 
give the FNLA logistical support in sporadic forays into 
Angola from the Angolan-Zairois border, and support separa-
tists (FLEC) from the Angola province of Cabinda. It 
took Mobutu a year after the summit meeting with the 
Angolan President Neto to recognize the new Angola govern-
70 ment - February, 1977. The tension and animosity between 
the two states continued until May, 1977, when former 
Kantangese gendameries operating from Angola invaded the 
Shaba region of Angola, routing Mobutu's troops, The inva-
sion was quashed by Morocco-Senegalese-Egyptian troops 
with the logistical assistance of France, Belgium and the 
United States. In September 1977, Neto charged that Zaire, 
along with South Africa, was planning a sabotage of its oil 
fields as well as a full scale military invasion, under an 
operation code named "Operation Cobra." The Zairois/FNLA 
forces had earlier invaded the Angolan town of pangala,7l 
the same month Mobutu recognized the Angolan government. 
But it was the second Shaba uprising of June 1978 that 
finally taught Mobutu the lesson of good neighbourliness; 
his precarious and unstable rule in Zaire was so seve~ly 
tested that, as noted in Chapter IV-it took a combined 
69John Stockwell, In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story 
(New York: Norton Co., 1978). 




force of French Legionnaires, Belgian paratroopers and 
regular forces from Gabon, Senegal, Egype and Sudan, with 
logistical support of the U.S., to put the insurrection 
down. After that a rapproachment was effected between 
Mobutu and Neto, through the offices of Donald McHenry of 
the U.S./UN Mission, in which both agreed to neutralize hos-
tile forces in their respective domains while Angola agreed 
to reo~en the Benguela railway line for Zaire's cooper 
72 export. Mobutu paid a State visit to Angola in October, 
1978. 73 
As for South Africa and the United States, both con-
tinued to provide logistical, material, diplomatic and moral 
support for UNITA to continue to operate and conduct a gue-
rill a war against the Angolan State under MPLA. The U.S. 
continues to see that the continued existence of an MPLA 
governnent is not compatible with longer systemic interest 
of "containing" what it sees as Soviet adventurism and expan-
sionism. America continues to take umbrage at the fact that 
20,000 Cuban soldiers, supplemented by 7,000 technicians, 
5,000 experts74 from the Eastern bloc of nations have helped 
the MPLA keep its South African nemisis at bay. From the 
Carter administration (1977-1980), and Reagan (1980--) "the 
72Henry Jackson, From Congo to Soweto (New York, 
1980), p. 84. 
73Wolfers and Bergerol, Angola in the Frontline, 
p. 221. 
74washington Post, June 5, 1980. 
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American policy to the Angolan State i. one of non-recogni-
tion, even though the .aligned CUbans guard the oil instal-
lations of the American oil company Gulf against acts of 
sabotage by tbe South Africans. Yet American economic in-
terest in Angola continues to grow; with Boeing Aircraft, 
Texaco, and Gulf Oil as tbe dominant ones, wbile French oil 
companies Total and Elf also maintain concessions for off-
sbore oil explorations. While American allies like West 
Germany, France,· Bri Ui n, Portugal, and Japan have all 
recognized the MPLA government and maintain diplomatic rela-
tions witb Luanda, the o.s. government of Ronald Reagan 
succeeded on July 10, 1985, in persuading tbe U.~. Congress 
to repeal the 1975 law - Clark Amendment, by which O.S. 
covert aid to UNITA was proscribed. As an MPLA government 
commentary on this development stated, 
Once free of the moral, legal or financial obstacles 
contained inthe Clark Amendment, the United States 
Government will surely want to give a new, more dan-
gerous dimension to its involvement in Southern 
Africa, and change from covert military aid to open 
support of armed subversion and state territorism.75 
!he Reagan administration has characterized its Angolan 
policy as the -linkage" of Cuban assistance to Angola to 
South Africa's continued occupation of Namibia. The Angolan 
government has countered that, apart from the fact that the 
issues are unrelated, 
75Ministry of External Relations, A Statement Regard-
ing the Repeal of the Clark Amendment (Luanda: July 12, 
1985). 
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The Peoples' Republic of Angola does not have 
the organized manpower resources with the 
required educational level or the available 
material and financial resources to wage a war 
against UNITA ••• and simultaneously to replace 
Cuban troops and armaments at strategic points 76 
in the South, Center, and North of the country. 
As a matter of survival, Angola spends over 50% of its 
national budget on security and defence. 77 
South Africa has been pivotal in efforts to destabi-
lize the Angolan State. Angola dates repeated South Africa 
military incursions into the country from April 3, 1976. 78 
The first South African-UNITA coordinated campaign started 
on July 29, 1977, and the invaders were able to occupy 
Cuangar, Derico, and Muscusso; the aim was to set up a 
"Black African and Socialist Republic of Angola" under 
S 'mh' 79 av~ ~. In August of 1981, South Africa launched one 
of its biggest military operations against Angola, the UN 
Security Council resolution on August 31 condemning the 
South African invasion was vetoed by the U.S. The then 
new Reagan administration, in the words of the President 
himself, regarded (and still does) South Africa as a 
friendly country--
76permanent Mission of the Peoples Republic of 
Angola, Message from the President of the People's Repub-
lic of An ola to the Secretary General of the united 
Nat~ons on Southern Afr~ca New York: Nov 9, 1984). 
77washington Notes on Africa, Washington Office on 
Africa (Washington, D.C.: Kinter, 1981). 
78wolfers and Bergerol, Angola in the Frontline, p. 224. 
79 Ibid., p. 22. 
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Can we abandon a country that has stood beside 
us in every war we ever fought? A country that 
strategically, is essential to the Free World 
in its production of minerals that we all must 
have. 80 
In March 1981, five South African military intelligence 
officers paid a visit to the U.S. government, a develop-
ment that contravened a 20-year policy that forbade such 
liaison. Between April 1976 and July 1985, South Africa 
conducted 17 raids inside Angola~ the Angolan government 
has estimated the total losses and damages resulting from 
South African aggression from April 1976 to July 1985 at 
$10 billion U.S. dollars. 8l It is just not that the South 
African government is acting at the behest of the U.S 
government, as a policeman for Western Interests or guar-
antor of the Western civilization. South Africa has its 
own strategic interest in Southern Africa, in which it 
wishes to coopt the countries of the sub-region into an 
economic community of "constellation of states" dominated 
by the advanced economy of South Africa, thereby hindering 
autonomous development as envisaged by countries of South 
Africa Development Coordinating Conference (SADCC). South 
African strategic objective is clear~ it is designed, when 
fully matured, to "tie the countries of the region into an 
80R Id R . t 1 ... . . h ona eagan, 1n a e eV1S1on 1nterv1ew W1t 
former CBS Television Anchor, Walter Chronkite, March 3, 1981. 
81permanent Mission of Angola, Statement Regarding 
the Repeal' of the Clark Amendment (New York, July 12, 1985), 
p. 3. 
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irreversible dependence on SOuth Africa; to turn the free 
States of Southern Africa into little more than Bantus- . 
tans.,,82 
Defeated in the struggle for power when its Huarnbo 
headquarters was taken by the MPLA forces on February 11, 
1976, UNITA, under Savimbi, had become a willing ally of 
the U.S.-South African axis to destabilize Angola. 
Savirnbi's UNITA has since 1976 on, with South African con-
nivance, maintained bases in Namibia from where its forces 
conduct sporadic incursions into Angola. The biggest 
South African invasions, "Operation Smoke-shell" of 1980; 
the "Operation Protea" of 1981, and 1983; repeated sabotage 
of Benguela's railway that impedes Zairois-Zambian import-
export traffic, were jointly coordinated with UNITA. 83 
Savirnbi himself visited the U.S. on November 30, 1981. 84 
These repeated acts of sabotage have cost Angola very 
dearly; its trade balance deteriorated from $471 million 
surplus in 1980 to a $5 million deficit in 1981, although 
oil production rose 30% in 1983. Also, by 1983, with 
mounting defence expenditure, Angola asked the Euro-
curreny market for trade credits for imports, and borrowed 
82Report of the Southern African Developing Coordi-
nating Conference, Maputo, November 1980, quoted in Wash-
ington Notes .(Washington, D. C .: 1981), p. 2. 
83Wolfers and Bergerol, Angola in the Frontline, pp. 
227-234. 
84washington Notes, vlinter 1981 (Washington, D.C.), 
p. 5. 
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$2.2 billion to meet its external commitments. It is in 
the light of these economic and security concerns of the 
Angolan government that one has to place the Lusaka 
Accord, reached between South African government and the 
government of Angola on February 16, 1984. The accord, 
mediated by the U.S. government, calls for a "phased South 
African withdrawal from Angolan territory in exchange for 
Angola's commitment to restrict SWAPQ's activities within 
85 Southern Angola. The Angolan government also hoped that 
by the agreement, "the Republic of SO·llth Africa would com-
mit itself, from the very start, to cease all support of 
UNITA bands, and the UN authorities would have to verify 
the dismantling of UNITA bases on the Namibian territory.,,86 
Like the Nkomati Accord that Mozambique signed, these two 
developments manifest a hard-headed recognition by Angola, 
that the campaign of harassment, intimidation and destabi-
lization waged by the U.S.-South African-UNITA axis, con-
stitutes a veritable drain on its resources and an unac-
ceptable deployment of these resources to meet contingen-
cies of war. 
Before the Lusaka Accord, South Africa had maintained 
a permanent military force in Southern Angola and there 
85Trans-Africa Forum, Issue Brief, "Angola Under 
Fire" (Washington, D.C., 1985). 
86permanent Mission of the People's Republic of 
Angola, Messaqe of the President of the People'·s Republic 
(New York, November 29, 1984), p. 6. 
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have been continuing post-agreement military raids into 
Angola. The first was only four months after South Africa 
pledged its commitment to a withdrawal of all its forces 
by initialing the Lusaka Agreement, i.e., June 1985. South 
Africa invaded Angola again on September 17, 1985. 87 
The question that can be raised is why, after ten 
years of statehood in which all the outward trappings of 
sovereign independence are manifest, there exists a stage 
of siege in Angola? The answer to this question lies in 
the geopolitical strategic and ideological position and 
importance of Angola in the whole Southern Africa configu-
ration. The ascendancy and consolidation of the Angolan 
revolution is a threat to the immediate interest of the 
racist enclave of South Africa and the long-term interest 
of the West. The same process of Western colonialism 
rationalized on race supremacy, that was ultimately success-
fully resisted with armed effort, radicalized the Angolan 
people to the point where the new Angolan society envi-
sioned is not the neo-colonial state the African political 
class has created in much of the rest of Africa. The pro-
cess of armed insurgency that brought about the Peoples 
Republic of Angola is in process in the racist colony of 
Namibia, whose Northern border is contiguous with Southern 
Angola. Angola is the base and sanctuary for Namibian 
freedom fighters and thus constitutes an immediate threat 
87New York Times, October 17, 1985. 
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to South Africa. In the long run, the force of the example 
of a new social system that offers the possibility of real 
freedom and justice from the tyranny of want and despair 
of capitalism, must worry the Western powers who support 
and arm South Africa against the just aspirations of its 
African majority. The fact is, from 1960, when the process 
of formal European decolonization began, to the present, a 
period which we have earlier characterized as the neo-
colonial epoch, the major preoccupation of the West in 
Africa, has been to design strategies and tactics to stem 
the tide of African revolutionary aspiration in a continent 
where Western hegemony has been pervasive and constant for 
400 years. The United States, as the principal hegemonic 
defender and regulator understands this very well. It has 
for example, since 1981, now tied the Namibian question to 
Cuban presence in Angola. 
In concrete terms, Angola represents a decisive 
attempt to rid an African nation of exploitative relations 
and domination of international capital. Consequently, 
United States policy of containment88 and South Africa's 
policy of total onslaught or "total national strategy,,,89 
in tandem, are premised on a need to demonstrate to the 
88Larry Bowman, "The Strategic Importance of South 
Africa to the United States," African Affairs, Vol. 82, 
No • 323 ( 1982) • 
89Republic of South Africa, Department of Defense, 
White Papers on Defense (Sirnonstown: South African Navy, 
1977), p. 5. 
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rest of Africa that, (1) Socialism or radical nationalism 
cannot work, i.e., will not be tolerated. Bence they arm 
UNITA to engage in a campaign of terror and int~idation 
to weaken the ability of the Angoaln government and dilute 
its resoluteness to lay the foundation of a new society; 
(2) only the acceptance and ascendancy of the capitalist 
order, operating under the hegemonic aegis of the West is 
the minimum condition for lifting their policy of sustained 
hostilitY1 (3) the possibility of realising a free indepen-
dent Africa lies only in the reconciliation of African 
interest with the security and economic interest of the West. 
The Angolan State, the Post-Oolonial 
Economy, pra~tism and Realism in 
an Insecure ~itical Environment 
The. constitution of the Peoples Republic of Angola 
talks of the establishment: of -just social relations in 
all sectors of production" and the government suggests that 
its economy is in transition from a colonial plantation 
economy to a resistance economy and ultimately to a planned 
one. What are the three fundamental pillars of the Angolan 
economy? They are (1) the state economic units--the state 
sector, (2) the cooperatives--joint ventures, (3) the 
private enterprise. The constitution guarantees private 
activities and property, even those of foreigners, so long 
as they are useful to the country's economy and "to the 
interests of Angolan people. n90 The decisive sector of the 
90The Constitution of the People's Republic of Ani01a, 
Mission uf the People's RepUbl~c of Angola,~ew York, 19 4. 
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Angolan economy is the extractive sector--oil production 
and diamond mining. The dependence of Angola on the tech-
nological infrastructure of the capitalist multinational 
companies has led to an economic policy of pragmatism by the 
MPLA government. Angola earns $1.5 million a day from oil 
alone and the U.S. Gulf Oil Company even though its 70% 
production has been reduced to 25% of the total is still 
the largest single producer of oil with "responsibility for 
about half the 500,000 barrel daily output planned for 
1985 •••• ,,91 The long gestation and maturation period of 
construction of mining and extractive infrastructure has 
meant an alliance of expedience between a government that 
claims to be laying the foundation of a socialist society 
and the western multinational companies. Angola needs 
immediate and continuing availability of funds to survive 
and thus it cannot fight an economic war of liberation with 
Western multinationals while fighting off invasion from 
South Africa and repeated sabotage92 by UNITA. Angola's oil 
company SONANGOL established in 1976 and governed by the Oil 
Law of 1978, has entered into new production agreements with 
the oil companies. But the oil and diamond industries on 
which Angola depends are still dominated by Western 
91Michael Wolfers and James Bergerol, Angola in the 
Frontline (London: Zed, 1983), p. 135; Michael Tanzer, The 
Race for Resouces (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1980r;-
pp. 179-181. 
92Gerald Bender, "The Continuing Crisis in Angola," 
Current History, March 1983. 
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multinational companies, namely Gulf, Texaco, Elf and Com-
pagnie Francaise des Petroles. Belgian Petrofina has 
majority control of the Angolan refinery--petrangol. 93 This 
refinery was once the object of South African Commando 
attack. 94 
The prospects of early termination of UNITA/South 
Africa security problem for Angola are not foreseeable in 
the immediate future. South Africa-UNITA forces continue 
their campaign of harassment and disruption of Angolan 
economy. Angola has listed 4,000 violations of its air 
space by South Africa between 1980-1985, including 168 bomb-
ing raids and 230 landing of airborne troops and four naval 
landings. 95 On January 6, 1986, a UNITA/South African force 
mb h d 1 '1' 96 a us e an Ango an m~ ~tary convoy. The Re"agan adminis-
tration and the U.S. conservative lobby have effectively 
corralled UNITA as one of its anti-communist national libera-
tion movements, with which it hopes to confront "Soviet 
adventurism" worldwide. Its defence department is to pro-
vide "nonlethal excess supplies and equipment for relief 
purposes around the world. ,,97 These non-communist 
93Bergerol and Wolfers, Angola, p. 136. 
94New York Times, January 12, 1986. 
95MPLA Second Congress Report, West Africa (Decem-
ber 23, 1985). 
96New York Times, January 13, 1986. 
97waShington Post, January 31, 1986. 
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l 'b t' 98 b' 1 ' 1 d f 1 era 10n movements 0 V10US Y 1nc u e apart rom UNITA, 
the contrarevolutionary forces fighting the Sandinista 
government of Nicaragua, the Cambodian refugees in Thailand, 
the Afghans in Pakistan. It is arguable to say the least 
that any of these newly discovered liberation movements can 
dislodge the government they are being armed to fight, but 
they can keep the Western anti-communist agenda alive in 
their particular locale. 
Jonas Savimbi of UNITA is a member of the elite leader-
ship of this anti-communist agenda for Angola. He visited 
the United States in January 1986, to seek "antitank and 
antiaircraft missiles,,99 for his forces and met with the 
u.s. President and Secretaries of State and Defence. The 
u.S. policy is clearly to use UNITA as a ploy to pres-
100 sure the Angola government and the high profile given to 
Savimbi is part of that pressure. Meanwhile the consolida-
tion of economic relations between the u.S. and Angola go 
on. The U.S. is Angola's largest trading partner, indeed 
Angola ranks only behind South Africa and Nigeria by the 
volume of U.S.-African trade. From $856 million in 1982, 
the Angola-U.S. trade increased to $1.1 billion in 1984. 
About 60% of Angolan oil production goes to the u.S. market. 
98"Jonas Savimbits Welcome," Editorial,Washington 
~, January 28, 1986. 
99washington Post, January 31, 1986. 
lOaThe CIA Contras in Nicaragua served the same pur-
pose, see, "Against Arms for the Contras," Washington 
Post, February 5, 1985. 
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American lending institutions like Chase Manhattan, Bankers 
Trust, CitiBank, Morgan Guaranty and Manufacturers Hanover 
including the U.S. official Export-Import bank have lent 
Angolan state oil corporation $450 million. Of this, Export-
Import Bank contributed $250 mi11ion. 10l 
U.S. oil company, Chevron, has a total asset of about 
$600 million in Angola and Western banks have put together a 
plan to invest $1 bi11ion102 in Angola in the next five years. 
Ultimately, because of sheer economic inefficiency of 
operating apartheid (elaborate surveillance, diversion of 
resources to security needs) the West will jettison a white-
controlled South Africa. This is because a chronically 
politically unstable South Africa cannot guarantee a favor-
able economic climate for Western investment. Apart from 
the access to South Africa's mineral deposits and the stra-
tegic geopolitical importance of the Cape Sea route as sea 
lane for transportation of petroleum from the Gulf region 
to the West1 the pivotal reason for the political and econo-
mic attachment of the West to South Africa is the enormous 
profits their transnational companies are reaping from the 
settler-ruled enclave. As the table below shows, when com-
pared to any other country in the world, the rate of return 
on u.S. investments in South Africa is better than six to 
one. Working under dehumanizing conditions and receiving 
10~ew York Times, January 12, 1986. 
102New York Times, January 31, 1986. 
penurious wage, the cheap African labor force enables the 
Western extractive conglomerates to return rates of profits 
unheard of since the epoch of primitive accumulation. 
(Comparative) Rate of Return on Total Book Value 























Source: Robert Pol1in, "The Multinational Mineral 
Industry in Crisis," Monthly Review 
April 1980, p. 28. 
False altruism or regard for African suffering or morality 
have no place in this equation: apartheid is based on profit-
able cheap labor of the African majority. Specifically to 
Angola, its immediate security problem can only be resolved 
when the South African question is resolved. It is possible 
but not probable that the outcome of the South African 
struggle could lead to a majority government that could still· 
be so ideologically hostile ~o Angola that it would continue 
to support armed effort to change it. In fact, inspite of 
the stalemate that bas attended the attempts to free Namibia 
from South Africa's stranglehold, the possibility also exists 
for Namibia to become an independent nation before the attain-
ment of majority rule in South Africa. If Namibia were to be 
free of South African control, i.e., controlled by its 
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African majority, led by South West African Peoples Organi-
zation (SWAPO), Angola's security problem could be mitigated, 
i.e., (UNITA could no longer use Namibia as sanctuary). Quite 
clearly, for Angola, its future in the long run, lies in the 
dawn of a new era--the resolution of conflict based on racial 
hegemony and an unjust and inhuman socioeconomic system. 
CHAPTER VI 
THE REALITY OF EXTERNAL PRESSURES ON AFRICAN POLITY 
AND THE LIMITATIONS OF AFRICAN RESPONSE 
In the preceding five chapters, much of our effort 
has been directed towards providng some elucidation to the 
interest-laden motivational factors for intervention in 
Africa generally, and in Angola and Zaire specifically. In 
this concluding chapter, our analysis will center on the 
internal dynamics in Africa that facilitate and perpetuate 
the phenomenon of external intervention as a recurring 
reality of African polity. 
We pose this cardinal question. Why is Africa so 
prone and susceptible to pressures and influences emanaging -
from countries removed thousands of miles from its shores? 
Our answer to this question will center on two main areas--
1. The profound structural weakness of the 
continent occasioned by the balkanized 
nature of its articulation with the 
world system makes the fragmented con-
tinent particularly vulnerable to external 
pressures. 
2. The records of bankrupt post-colonial 
African leadership in connivance and col-
lusion with the ruling class of African 
historical nemesis--the West--to perpetuate 
the sUbjugation of the resources of the con-
tinent to the needs of Euro-American stra-
tegic imperial domination. 
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The Nature of the African Political Class 
After more than two decades of the demise of classical 
colonial occupation and the advent of constitutional inde-
pendence in nearly all of Africa with the exception of the 
settler outpost of South Africa and its colony of Namibia, 
an objective assessment can be rendered of Africa's post-
colonial elites. One does not necessarily have to render 
a verdict of indictment by going the route of statistics of 
wretchedness and despair perennially adumbrated by many 
scholars to demonstrate a record of dismal stewardship and 
performance by the African political class. We believe a 
more revealing way to understand this phenomenon is to 
situate their role and place in a neo-colonial Africa. 
The evidence of two decades of African political inde-
pendence is that the African post-colonial political class 
regards itself as the independence "inheritance elite--who 
saw political independence as the fruit of a completed 
1 struggle. II As political managers of a neo-colonial state, 
but with a very weak economic base, the acquisition of state 
power becomes the most fruitful and lucrative method of 
material acquisition and accumulation given the fact that 
the acquisition of state power also means political manage-
ment of social wealth. The African political class led the 
movement for constitutional independence. The hated 
IR. W. Johnson, "Sekou Toure: The Man and His Ideas," 
in Peter Gutkind and Peter Waterman, African Social S·tudies: 
A Radical· Reader (New York: Monthly Review), pp. 329-333. 
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colonizer now pbysically gone, the political class steps 
into his sboes as his local representatives. Apart from 
facilitating -African economic retardation by draining 
African wealth and making it impossible to develop more 
rapidly the resources of the continent,_2 colonial impe-
rialism bequeaCba:1 to Africa an ·underdeveloped middle 
class· 3 that lacked critical material and intellectual 
resources to be the prototype of the bourgeoisie of the 
European industrial epoch of the 15th century. Their skills 
were mainly in commerce, and in the service professions such 
as law and administration. They therefore could not be a 
proper bourgeoisie that saved, invested and produced. They 
could not play the role of a ·social force capable of pro-
ducing a high level of development of a country's produc-
tive forces on the basis of its own choices. "4 Conditioned 
by colonial education to ideological and intellectual submis-
siveness and psychological dependency, they have accepted 
that the embourgeoisement of their country is the road to 
what they see as the need for "development." For them 
cd .. w .. 5 m ern1zat10n means estern1sat1on. 
2Walter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa (Dar-
es-Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, 1976), p. 37. 
3prantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (New York: 
Grove Press, 1968), p. 149. 
4Ronam~ Ledda, quoted by Jack Woddis, "Is there an -
African National Bourgeoisie?" in P. Gutkind and P. Water-
man (eds.), African Social Studies: A Radical Reader (New 
York: Monthly Review), p. 268. 
50. Onoge, in P. Gutkind and P. Waterman, African 
Social Studies, p. 37. 
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Bereft of any cultural resilience and psychological 
and intellectual autonomy, external support becomes the 
only yardstick of recognition. According to Nzongola this 
psychological dependence was so pervasive among the Zairos 
political class that "leaders began to depend so much on 
foreign advisors for their political ideas, programmes and 
strategies, that even after independence, this need for foreign_ 
technicians was elevated to the level of a cult • .,6 
The most potent medium which the colonialist had 
used to ensure the survival of the neo-colonial state is. 
through a process Galtung has characterized as "penetra-
tion,,,7 i.e., to condition the African political class 
ideologically and make them dependent by having a vested 
interest in the neo-colonial state. The African bourgeoisie 
thence is "tied body and soul to foreign capital and its 
interests cannot exist or be defended independently."S That 
is to say, the interest of foreign capital to maintain and 
retain the neo-colonial state and that of the African bour-
geoisie to perpetuate it for its class rule are complemen-
tary. The African bourgeoisie has now become the "junior 
6George Nzongola,"The Bourgeoisie and Revolution in 
the Congo," in Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 8, 
No. 4 (1970), p. 52S. 
7John Galtung, The European Community: 
in the Making {London: A en an Unw~n, 1 7 
8Ledda, quoted in Woddis, "Is There an African Bour-_. 
geoisie?" in p~ Gutkind and P. Waterman, African Social 
Studies: A Radical Reader (New York: Monthly Review), 
p. 268. 
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partners in governing the mass of unassimilated natives.,,9 
In order to conceal the use of State power to promote its 
class interest and the patron-client relationship between 
it and the now physically absent colonialist, the political 
class tries to cover up its betrayal of the just aspirations 
of its people by talking about "negritude," "authenticity," 
"African Socialism." 
When the forces opposed to neo-colonialism threaten 
the neo-colonial state, as in Zaire in 1964, 1977, and 1978 
the African bourgeois leadership now calls on its patrons, 
by appealing to the symbiotic interest that binds them. 
Umba Oi Lutete, Zairois ambassador to the United Nations 
during the Shaba I episode in 1977, put it so well, ..... 
we thought that those who shared our. ideas should come to our 
rescue and thus show (the people) that we were not isolated. 
We are very happy to see that they did come to help us ... 10 
Thus, the African neo-colonial political class reveals itself 
finally to its own people as part of the infrastructure of 
neo-colonial penetration and intervention. Without the 
active collusion of the Binza Group--military (Mobutu) 
security police (Nendaka), internal affairs (Kandolo), the 
11 National Bank (Ndele), Foreign Affairs (Bomboko),· the 
9George Padmore, Pan-Africanism or Communism (New 
York: Doubleday, 1962), p. 195. 
lOInterview, Umba oi Lutete, Zairois Ambassador to the 
UN, Africa Report (July/August 1977), p. 11. 
IlNzongola Ntalaja, Class Struggle and National 
Liberation in Africa (Roxbury: omenana, 1982), p. 67. 
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UN-Western collaborative intervention would perhaps have 
had to be effected by reverting to classical colonialism 
or declaring Zaire a "protectorate" of the UN. By mortgag-
ing their birthright as a front for UN-Western collabora-
tion in Zaire in 1960-64, they frustrated the possibility 
of exposing the neo-colonial designs of the intervenor. 
Nor is the situation different in Angola. 
In 1971, the FNLA/GRAE was acknowledged as the only 
nationalist movement by the OAU. The government of Angola 
in Exile (GRAE), was led by Holden Roberto. Roberto's 
nationalistic credibility had been boosted by the govern-
ment of Guinea-Conakry when Roberto was included in the 
Guinean diplomatic corp in order to better present the case 
for Angolan independence to the world community in early 
1960s. In reality, the head of the so-called Government 
of Revolutionary Angola in Exile with wide continental 
acceptability and revolutionary credentials, was an American 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operative on an annual 
12 salary. Consistent with its long-range neo-colonial 
strategic design, the U.S. was conducting a two-face 
policy. It was arming Portugal to contain Angolan nationa-
list independence aspiration and co-opting the leadership 
of the nationalist organisation in order to penetrate the 
neo-colonial state it expects its client to inherit. By 
12 John Marcum, The Angolan Revolution II (CaMbridge: 
M.T.T. Press, 1978), p.17 
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the same token, Jonas Savimbi, the leader of the "Black 
Socialist Republic of Angola" was FNLA secretary. Savimbi's 
true identity became known after the Portuguese coup of 
April 1974 and after the memoir' of Portuguese President 
Marcello Caetana was published. The Black President was 
then revealed asa long term Portuguese Security Police 
(PIDE) agent. UNITA's non-involvement in the armed phase 
of the struggle to liquidate Portuguese colonialsim now 
became quite understandable. Except that Savimbi claimed 
to be operating in a liberated area in the Luso region of 
Angola: Savimbi did have his liberated area--the one 
ceded to him by Portuguese colonialism to bolster his 
nationalist front asacredible anti-colonialist force in 
Angola. When this neo-colonial gambit failed, Savimbi 
turned to South Africa,13 while he continued to claim his 
"anti-colonialism" had been inspired by Kwame Nkruman and 
Abdel Nasser. 
Nor is the case of Roberto and Savimbi as a part of 
the infrastructure of neo-colonial intervention unique. 
As the political managers of the neo-colonial sta.te many 
French speaking African states have defence pacts with 
France which give France "over-flight rights and access 
14 to African airfields and ports for military purposes." 
l.3,qest Africa, August 20, 1984. 
l4Edward Corbett, The French Presence in Black 




cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Gabon, Ivory Coast, 
Madagascar, Niger, Senegal and Togo all have these treaties. 
The ideological and security affinity between the African 
political class and their Western patrons is often quite 
glaring; twice in 1983, the civil war in Chad where France 
continued to exert military economic and political influence 
after 1960, began to escalate with Libya and France now 
openly supporting the two contending factions. Western 
governments and media began to chorus about Libyan expan-
sionism. As a res~lt, the Organisation of African Unity 
(OAU) Summit of 1983 failed twice to achieve a quorum when 
it was obvious the chairmanship would pass to Muammar 
Gaddafi of Libya. Yet the Franco-African Summit was attended 
by all the French-speaking nations including the I non-
traditional friends' of France like Nigeria and Sierra-
Leone that same year. The same phenomenon of ideological 
affinity that underlies this patron-client and superordinate--
subordinate relationship was manifested during Shaba epi-
sodes in Zaire and the establishment of the so-called Pan 
African security force. 
It is the continuing assumption that Africa is, 
and must always remain part of the West European 
'sphere of influence.' This assumption is hardly 
being questioned. Even some African states take 
it for granted. 1S 
This clearly is what U.S. Vice President George Bush had in 
lSJulius Nyerere, "French Troops in Africa," Africa 
Report (July-August 1978), p. 11. 
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mind in addressing the Kenya political class when he spoke 
of "shared goals, common principles and mutual interests. ,,16 
The U.S. berthing facilities and communication infrastructure 
in the Kenyan port city of Mombassa represent part of these 
common principles and shared interest. The West does not 
hide its appreciation for the African political class as part 
of the infrastructure of intervention. The Central African 
Republic (CAR) where units of France's force de frappe are 
stationed and where France replaces political leaders with 
little fanfare is a case in point •. The CAR's first president, 
David Dacko was removed from office and lived in France; his 
replacement, the tragic comic Jean Bedel Bokassa was over-
thrown and replaced again by Dacko. Dacko was now replaced 
by Andre Kolingba. According to West Africa magazine of 
September 17, 1984, French Defence Minister Charles Hermi, 
presented this African President with the colours of the 
"Commandp.r of the Legion of Honour" for, as he put it, 
"exceptional service to France."li The French minister was 
visiting French troops and military installations in the 
CAR capital of Bangui and the City of Bouar. The two French 
military bases in a sovereign African country are used as 
rear bases to replenish French units in Chad. Caught 
between the justified aspirations of material betterment of 
l6George Bush, "A New Partnership with Africa, II in 
Africa Report (January-February 1983), p. 39. 
l7west Africa (September 17, 1984), p. 1920. 
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masses of their own people and the status-quo oriented 
imperatives of the imper1a.1 system, the African political 
class refuses to commit class suicide for to identify 
itself with the interest of the people is to pave the way 
for the revolutionary liquidation of its own class. 
Complementing this monopolization of state power and 
the use of the state machinery as part of the infrastructure 
of external intervention in Africa is the ba1kanized nature 
of African articulation with the world system. This collec-
tive fragmentation works to the African disadvantage in a 
system dominated by big and powerful actors. Africa's role 
is marginalized by this balkanization. This structural 
weakness had led to the half-hearted attempts at continental 
or quasi-continental integration as the East African Com-
munity (EAC), and the Southern African Development Confer-
ence (SADCC) have shown. But lacking any political commit-
ment, the basic planning problems of these attempts have 
often been advanced as reasons for their non-practicality. 
The fragmented nature of African articulation with the world 
system leaves the ba1kanized polities of the continent work-
ing at cross purposes and often mutually excluding and 
counteracting one another in the international fora. And, 
sometimes,havln~defined their intracontinental interaction 
solely within the parameters of their respective colonial 
experience, the political class, faithful to the imperatives 
of the neo-colonial, trade, monetary and even strategic 
---------------------------------- - -------------- ----
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infrastructure, comes down hard on putative African inte-
grative attempts. For example, prior to the establishment 
of ECOWAS, Senegal continually denounced ECOWAS as unwork-
able due to the size of Nigeria, "Senegal is not in favor 
of participating in the present project for a IS-member West 
African Community, in which a single state (Nigeria) would 
clearly dominate the other 14.,,18 Firmly ensconced within 
the neo-colonial orbit, the African political class feels 
its insecurity heightened by any attempt at continent-wide 
or even regional cooperation. Nor does the citation of this 
Senegalese position suggest that we subscribe to crude 
economist argument of economic community as precursor to 
political integration in Africa. An economic argument in 
Africa can only be valid, after the national economies of 
African states have been liberated from the domination of 
t " 119 t" Western transna 10na corpora 1ons. An attempt to pursue 
the integration of Africa economically will have to take 
" k" hI" 120 h f h f" 1nto rec on1ng t e neo-co on1a c aracter 0 teA r1can 
national economies. 
l8Elenga M'buyinga, "Africa's Economy in World Capi-
talism," in Pan Africanism or Neo-Colonialism: The Bank-
ruptcy of the O.A.U. (London: Zed Press, 1982), p. 109. 
19we use the word 'transnational' here because often 
times these companies have only one parent country or even 
two: but their true ownership and origin is concealed by 
using the word "multinational;" see Bala Usman, For the 
Liberation of Nigeria (London: Beacon Books, 1979), pp. 
52-58. 
20claude Ake, A Political Economy of Africa (Longmans, 
Essex, 1981), Chapters 4, 5, 6; Ake, Revolutionary Pressures 
in Africa (London: Zed Press, 1978), Chapter 2. 
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Indeed such a project could easily become a 
monster. We might end up with a vast institu-
tion which we could not master and which would 
thus become a powerful means whereby the old 
metropoles could perpetuate or even intensify 
their imperialist exploitation and recoloniza-
tion of the continent. 2l 
With specific reference to politico-military interven-
tion in Zaire and Angola, certain developments are discern-
ible in the international system. It is quite unlikely, 
for example, that the United Nations operations in any 
given country can now be partisanly manipulated with such 
unbridled audacity as happened in Zaire in the period 1960-
64. It is true that the ideological bi-polarity that 
characterized the international system in the era still 
exists. But, the united Nations General Assembly has since 
the 1960s lost its Western majority, it now consists of a 
majority that is "overwhelmingly non-white, non-western, 
underdeveloped and unschooled in the practice of national 
22 and international governance." Their being characterized 
'unschooled' in some spurious practice of governance is 
perhaps a forlorn recognition of the remarkable political 
sophistication the new majority has displayed. They recog-
nize that the United Nations system is more of a political 
institution than a diplomatic one. Their agenda is now 
21M'buyinga, "Pan Africanism or Neo-colonialism,"p. 13. 
22This is the characterization of Kurt Waldheim, the 
Austrian aristocrat who served as the Secretary-General of 
the UN Organisation from January 1972 to January 1982. See 
Kurt Waldheim, "The United Nations: the Tarnished Image," 
in Foreign Affairs (Fall 1984), p. 96. 
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pitted against the long-established practice of domination 
and manipulation of the erstwhile Western majority. 
Their collective interest is focused more on bargain-
ing for a restructuring of the international order than in 
stabilizing the imperial system. This is evident in the 
operational alliance they have organized within the United 
Nations system. The alliance--the Group of 77, represents 
over 100 third world nations. 23 To the West, the United 
Nations and indeed its specialized agencies have become 
dangerous fora; they are unresponsive to the furtherance of 
Western interest. The West recognized the enormous advan-
tage of being able to exert some degree of influence over 
supranational institutions. For example, the United States 
consistently vetoed the candidacy of Salim Ahmed Salim of 
Tanzania who emerged as the candidate most likely to win the 
ballot to determine the new United Nations Secretary-General 
in 1981. Salim was Tanzanian Foreign Minister and had been 
a principal spokesman for the African Liberation Committee 
of the Organisation of African Unity, (OAU). After the 
United States refused to end its veto or. Salim's condidacy, 
Javier Perez de Cuellar of Peru was nominated as a compromise 
candidate. 
It is highly unlikely in the contemporary era that the 
United Nations can be rendered an instrument to further the 
interest of any ideological bloc in a direct military 
23Ibid • 
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operation as in Zaire in the 1960s. As this study has 
shown, and as the experience of Zaire has demonstrated to 
date, politico-military intervention may now be a multi-
lateral affair between two entities, i.e., a target country 
and a constellation of states belonging to the same ideolo-
gicalorbit. A bilateral situation, i.e., involving one 
intervenor and a beleaguered local ally runs the risk of 
being labelled an aggression and thus possible condemnation 
in the international community. The more nations that share 
burden of intervention, the better for the intervenors, 
especially in the public perception and propaganda aspect. 
For. example, the Western effort to stabilize the minority 
Christian Phalangist government of Amin Gemayel in Lebanon, 
was termed a "Multinational Peace-Keeping Force." Its 
multinationality gives the impression of collective concern, 
but this solidarity is based on shared values and commit-
ment to install a Christian Maronite minority government in 
Lebanon allied to Israel. 
The same can be said for the so-called African peace-
keeping force in Zaire, acting as proxies for the NATO 
powers to defend the neo-colonial state in Zaire. The con-
trol of African states by a political class in ideological 
alliance with the West has constituted the bedrock of the 
resilience of the neo-colonial state in Africa. Multi-
lateralism is based on shared valuations, beliefs and com-
mitment to the defence of the preferred socio-economic order. 
-244-
It would appear that the idea of multilateralism will 
be the lynchpin of the politico-military rescue effort, 
mounted by the core and their proxies on behalf of Mobutu's 
Zaire in the future. Meanwhile, Mobutu appears to be firmly 
in control of the neo-colonial state. His rule has been an 
unmitigated disaster for the 18 million Zairens, most of 
whom who suffer from malnutrition as acknowledged even by 
his sponsors,24 while he devotes only 2% of Zairois national 
budget to health for the citizenty. At the inception of 
Mobutu's rule, health care constituted only 2.3% of the 
national budget of Zaire. After ten years of his rule, this 
miserly percentage had further dwindled to 1.5% of the total 
25 budget. But Mobutu is propped up by the unfailing support 
of Western nations in desperate need of a strategic ally in 
the heart of Africa and whose country also provides strategic 
me·tals for western military-industrial complex. Mobutu 
recently celebrated twenty years26 of his rule, his internal 
political opponents in disarray, contained or liquidated. 
His remaining vocal opposition, factionalized, fragmented and 
24Guy Grant quotes from an unpublished IBRD report, 
"Economy of Zaire," Report No. 82-ZR, 4 Volumes (July 23, 
1975), Vol. 2, p. 4 in Guy Grant, "Zaire 1978: The Ethical 
and Intellectual Bankruptcy of the World Systems," Africa 
T·oday (October-December 1978), p. 7. 
2.50pen Letter to Citizen Mobuto SeSe Seko, President-
Founder of the popular Movement of the Revolution, Presi-
dent of the Republic, by Thirteen National Assembly Repre-
sentatives of the Zairos Parliament (English Translation), 
(Washington, D.C. Center for Development Policy, 1982). 
26west Africa (December 2, 1985), p. 2523. 
-245-
marginalized as a credible force in the efforts to regain 
the control of their nation. Many are domiciled in exile, 
ironically in countries that constitute the most consistent 
supporters of Mobutu, notably France, Belgium and the United 
States. Mobutu's rule in Zaire highlights two essential 
realities of neo-colonial Africa. The bankruptcy of poli-
tical leadership and the antagonistic contradictions between 
the objective material interest of the people of Africa and 
the systemic interest of the West. Mobutu's Zaire, like 
many in Africa, is incapable of creating a viable state that 
can meet basic human needs of minimum comfort. Yet, efforts 
by Zairens to dislodge Mobutu and attempt to reconstruct 
their society must contend with two objective realities, 
i.e., the systemic interest of the Western world on one 
hand and the role and place of their nation in this system. 
The Angolan situation is different. Here is a country, 
attempting to redefine itself, regain its history and create 
a new society after 500 years of colonialism. It attained 
political independence with the aid of the ideological forma-
tion (revolutionary socialism) that the West had waged a 
consistent and violent struggle against since its v~ry first 
assumption of state power in 1917, i.e., the Russian revolu-
tion. But, for the strategic capability and the assistance 
delivery capacity of the Soviet Union and its allies, the 
assumption of state power by the MPLA on November 11, 1975 
would have been well-nigh impossible. But Angola exists 
today under siege, the forces of colonialism now existing 
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in a different form have mounted a counter-attack. Angola 
exists in a paradox. It is a sovereign Republic recognized 
by all African states (many, albeit, who do not wish it 
well) but most who would like to help it defend itself but 
cannot. They cannot because of the structural weakness 
occasioned by the balkanized nature of the continent's 
articulation with international system. The other paradox 
is that Angola exercises political power, which is guaran-
teed by the presence of internationalist fraternal commit-
ment of extra-African powers. The mainstay of the Angolan 
economy is petroleum, which is produced through the tech-
nological infrastructure of Western oil companies. This 
means that both the effective exercise of state power -
decisive power, and the effective production of its main 
economic wealth (two fundamentals of sovereignty integrity) 
are dependent on external pillars of support. 
In the short run, to do away wih Western technolo-
gical infrastructure will entail hardship and sacrifice 
which a nation under siege can ill afford. Oil technology, 
to be sure, is not a monopoly of any nation or group of 
nations, but Angola is hardly in a position to completely 
rebuild the infrastructural base of its petroleum industry 
while at the same time preoccupied with the security prob-
lems posed by South Africa/UNITA counter-revolutionary 
insurgency. Angola is being subjected to what has been 
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characterized as a "low key-low intensity warfare,,27 whose 
objective is to change the basic direction of the country. 
The Cuban internationalist troops in Angola are holding 
the line between the historical forces of reaction and 
enslavement of African people and a government that may 
be the first genuine systematic attempt to create a new 
nation out of the ruins of European colonialism in Africa. 
The West's best chance of co-option of the Angolan 
state into its orbit lies in the continued existence of a 
white minority-ruled South Africa. But South Africa 
itself is under assault and for the first time, it now 
faces a low-level armed insurgency whose escalation might 
shift its security concerns away from Angola to its real 
enemy--the oppressed African majority in South Africa. The 
assumption of state power by the MPLA in November 1975 and 
the movement's military consolidation of power by February 
1976 effectively prevented the likelihood of any Western 
political influence in post-colonial Angola. The only 
avenue, given the strategic and military configuration in 
Angola, open to the West now is military option. The low 
key-low intensity war of attrition against Angola is that 
military option in practice. Still for the West, the 
strategic and political factors we referred to in Chapter 
27This is the characterization of the Editor of the 
Washington Times in a public affairs program titled, 
r'Which Side Should We Support in Angola?" Firing Line 
February 2, 1986. 
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V appear to have doomed their counter-revolutionary effort 
in Angola. Savimbi seems to give credence to this position. 
According to the Washington Post, February 4, 1986, the UNITA 
leader concedes that he entertains no illusion that the MPLA 
government ean be dislodged militarily •.. Giving further evi-
dence of his widely-held image as a counterrevolutionary 
renegade and opportunist, he hopes the MPLA can be pressured 
into a coalition government that obviously will include him. 
South Africa may indeed conduct sporadic military forays 
into Angola; it may continue to save UNITA when its forces 
f " t 'h'l' 28 h d d b h 1 ace ~mm~nen ann1 1 at10n w en surroun e y t e Ango an 
army, but South Africa, acting as proxy for the West, cannot 
and will not invade Angola with such sufficient force as to 
dislodge the MPLA from :,ower. That is the militar? reality 
that ~as been facilitated by the aforementioned strategic 
and political conditions. 
In conclusion, this study has attempted to lay bare 
the political and coercive armed aspects of external assault 
on two African countries, a phenomenon that we have charac-
terized as being a polychromatic reality continentally. 
But ultimately the crisis of extra-African intervention is 
a political issue. It must be properly addressed at the 
political level. until that consciousness is grasped which 
accepts the need, as a matter of survival, for a democratic 
28washington Post, January 28, 1986. 
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continental politico-economic reality, Africa will in the 
foreseeable future continue to be a continent whose socio-
economic and political institutions rather than serve the 
interest of its people, serve the interest of the forces 
that occasioned its balkanization and powerlessness. Coer-
cive intervention then will continue to be the means of 
sustaining the status quo and keeping the continent and 
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TABLE IV 
AFRICA: ·PRINCTPAL· TRADING PARTNERS 
ANGOLA (US $MILLION) 
US: 
Netherlands: 





































* (CUSA = Botswana, Swaziland, S.A. and Lesotho) 
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EEC: 
USA: 
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Source: Africa South of the S'ahara ,19'8'4-85. 
Europa Publications Ltd. 
18 Bedford Square 













For some of these countries, the figures for the 
export-import trade are not up-to-date. All the 
same, our argument of the continent being a mar-
ket for Euro-American exports remains. Angola, 
for example, inspite of the hostility of the 
United States and South Africa, has moved up to 
be the U.S. third largest trading partner in 
Africa. The trade infrastructure from the colo-
nial era has not been dismantled. 
APPENDIX B 
TABLE V 
PERCENTAGE OF VULNERABILITY-CUM-DEPENDENCE 
OF EEC, JAPAN AND US ON SELECTED 
STRATEGIC METAL FROM AFRICA 
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TABLE V 
PERCENTAGE OF VULNERABILITY-CUM-DEPENDENCE OF EEC, 
JAPAN AND US ON SELECTED STRATEGIC METAL FROM AFRICA 
US··% OF EEC %··OF JAPAN % OF 
METAL IMPORT IMPORT IMPORT 
Chromium 46 100 100 
Cobalt 48 100 100 
Manganese 47 100 88 
Copper 98 90 
Phosphate 10 10 
Adopted from: 
Source: Olasupo Adedokum, "Franco-African Relations and the 
Use of Intervention As An Instrument of Foreign Policy 
Objectives: A Critical Study of the Victims of French 
Foreign Policy Objectives," (Ph.D. dissertation, 
Atlanta University, 1982), based on: 
Raw Materials and Foreign policy. International 
Economic Institute, Washington, D.C., 1976; 
Wolfgang Hanger, "Western Europe Economic Security," 
in Intereconomics, No.9, July/August 1980. 
u.S. President, International Econornic Report of the 
President (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1976), p. 184. 
u.S .. President, International Economic Report of the 
President (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1977), p. 187. 
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